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Abstract 
  
The  Namibian  transition  to  independence  and  the  South  African  transition  to  a  
majority  democracy have many similarities as well as differences. The key similarities are 
composed of  the  shared  history  and mutual  influences  on  society,  the  economy  and  
national  politics. Key differences constitute the manner in which the transitions were 
executed: internationally imposed in the Namibian case, and internally negotiated in the 
South African case.   Almost every  facet  of  Namibian  and  South  African  societies  have  
in  some  way  or  another  been imprinted  by  the  respective  transitions, which  also  
contributed  to  the  shape  of  the  national consciousness.  However, decades  of  state-
enforced  racial  discrimination  in  the  form  of Apartheid  legislation  left  its mark  on  both  
the Namibian  and  South African  society. As a result, public and private consciousness is 
marred with racial and ethnic identities created and legislated during Apartheid, which is 
hampering democratic consolidation.  
This  study  provides  a  comparison  between  the  South  African  and  Namibian  
transitions, within  the  broader  context  of  democratic  consolidation.  This  study  contends  
that reconciliation  is  a  necessary  condition  for  democratic  consolidation  in  South  
Africa  and Namibia, and aims to assess whether there is any significant difference between 
the impact of the  internationally  orchestrated Namibian  transition  as  opposed  to  the  
internally  negotiated South  African  transition  on  levels  of  reconciliation  in  the  two  
countries.  This  is  done  by applying Gibson’s  (2004)  four  criteria  of  reconciliation  
(interracial  reconciliation,  political tolerance, support for  the principles of democracy and  
legitimacy)  to  the South African and Namibian cases. The hypothesis  is  that  there should 
be  less support for democratic  ideals  in Namibia  than  in South Africa, on  the basis  that 
democracy was,  to a certain degree,  forced unto Namibian society, while it was freely 
chosen by South African society.   
 The main finding of this study, however, suggests that the differences in the transition style - 
the one being internationally orchestrated and the other being internally negotiated- seems not 
to  have  had  any  significant  affect  on  national  reconciliation.  It  seems  as  though  
hostility between  different  groups  based mainly  on  the  superficial  racial  and  ethnic  
differences  that were created during Apartheid has made way  for hostility centred more on  
socio-economic differences. While socio-economic issues have become the overriding 
concern for both South Africans and Namibians, socio-economic differences between 
individuals and groups are still largely tied to ethnicity and race.  
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Opsomming 
 
Die onafhanklikheidswording en die oorgang na ‘n meerderheidsdemokrasie van 
onderskeidelik Namibië en Suid-Afrika word gekenmerk deur ‘n aantal ooreenkomste asook 
verskille. Die sleutel ooreenkomste behels die gedeelde geskiedkundige agtergrond,  die 
invloede van die ekonomie en nasionalie politiek klimaat en die gevolglike uitwerking van 
hierdie faktore op die samelewing. In kontras behels die verskille die wyse waarop die 
oorgang uitgevoer is. In die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks is die proses deur interne 
onderhandelinge bewerkstellig terwyl die Namibiese oorgang sterk beinvloed is deur eksterne 
invloede.  
Ongeag hierdie verskille het die verwikkelinge ‘n hewige impak gehad op beide die Suid- 
Afrikaanse, asook die Namibiese publiek en hul kollektiewe bewussyn.  Die invloed van jare 
se rasdiskriminasie in die vorm van apartheidswetgewing het egter sy tol op die publiek 
geëis. Die gevolg is die merkbare invloed van ras en etniese identiteite op albei lande se 
bevolkings wat oor die langtermyn demokratiese konsolidasie kan teenwerk.  
Hierdie studie tref ‘n vergelyking tussen Suid-Afrika an Namibië binne die breër konteks van 
demokratiese konsolidasie. Die studie veronderstel dat versoening ‘n noodsaaklike vereiste is 
vir demokratiese konsolidasie in Suid-Afrika en Namibië, en poog ook om die invloed  van 
die intern-gedrewe Suid-Afrikaanse transisie teenoor die ekstern-georkestreerde Namibiese 
transisie te assesseer. Dit word gedoen deur die toepassing van Gibson (2004) se vier-voudige 
konsep van versoening (inter-ras versoening, politieke verdraagsaamheid, ondersteuning vir 
die beginsels van demokrasie en legitimiteit) op beide lande.  Die hipotese word as volg 
geformuleer: Die Namibiese bevolking toon ‘n negatiewe ingesteldheid teenoor demokratiese 
beginsels aangesien demokrasie as regeerstelsel op die bevolking  afgedwing is, in kontras 
met Suid-Afrika waar demokrasie as regeerstelsel deur ‘n meerderheidstemming verkies is. 
Die hoofbevinding van hierdie werkstuk is egter dat die verskille in die aard van die oorgang 
na demokrasie in beide lande nie ‘n noemenswardige invloed gehad het op nasionale 
versoening nie. Dit blyk egter dat konflik tussen sekere bevolkingsgroepe wat hoofsaaklik 
spruit uit die etniese en ras identiteite, soos geformuleer deur die apartheidswetgewing, 
huidiglik gesentreer is rondom sosio-ekonomiese verskille. Gevolglik word dit gemeld dat 
hierdie sosio-ekonomiese verskille direk verband hou met ras en etnisiteit. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and Framework: 
Prior to Namibia’s independence, and the end of Apartheid in South Africa, both countries 
were subjected to a system of white minority rule over the majority non-white population. 
Namibia had been under South African control for 73 years, which many times had been 
called illegal by various international social and political figures and organisations. The same 
could be said for the non-white South African population. With the start of the civil war in 
Angola, the then South African white minority government accepted that its long-standing 
objective of incorporating Namibia fully into the white Republic was no longer tenable. 
Instead it sought to create a client, conservative, multi-ethnic government under white 
tutelage in order to establish a buffer state to insulate South Africa from the `total onslaught 
of communism' supposedly threatening it from the north. This strategy represented a direct 
challenge to aspirations for independence of the radical nationalist liberation movement, the 
South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), and the international community 
(Sidaway & Simon, 1993:23). 
With the onset of the collapse of white Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique 
in 1975, the South African white minority government lost much of its legitimacy. The 
collapse was a crucial geopolitical change which eventually contributed to the Namibian and 
South African transitions to democracy.  South Africa’s military involvement in Angola and 
the issue of `linkage'1 between Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban forces 
from Angola eventually provided the pretext for a decades-long delay. Consequently, 
Namibia achieved internationally recognised statehood only on 21 March 1990. Of course, 
the world into which Namibia emerged in 1990 was vastly different from that facing newly-
independent Angola and Mozambique in 1975. The Cold War had somewhat come to an end 
and South Africa was the last African country under white minority rule. International 
political and social pressure, and economic sanctions eventually brought about change in 
South Africa as well; the transition to black majority rule (Sidaway & Simon, 1993:25-6). 
Often, the South African and Namibian transitions to democracy have been described as a 
culmination of a number of events and processes. Many South African historians and political 
scientists point to the Namibian transition to democracy; alongside the fall of Communism 
and the end of the Cold War; as being the most important event in bringing about the end of 
Apartheid.  It can be argued that the Namibian transition was the threshold in the process that 
forced the South African transition. Without the Namibian transition to democracy, the South 
African one would have been very different and might have taken place only at a later stage 
in time. The reasoning for this importance is that the Namibian transition created the hope for 
                                                 
1
 ‘Linkage’ here refers to fact that Cuban Troop removal was one of the stipulations the South African 
government requested for granting Namibia’s independence. 
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the majority of South Africa that the minority government had finally relinquished its illegal 
hold over Namibia and had allowed majority, free and fair elections in the neighbouring 
country. The manner and nature of the Namibian transition gave rise to possible directions 
the South African transition to democracy could take. The fact that the white minority 
government in Namibia had to relinquish control over the country and allow a majority 
government to be formed, stirred up great emotions and hopes in the people of South Africa. 
However, this reasoning should not be interpreted as to diminish the value and importance of 
other events that lead to and contributed to the fall of the authoritative minority government, 
such as the Soweto Uprising that sparked decades long township riots; economic, social and 
political sanctions; and an ever increasing insurgency by Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military 
wing of the African National Congress (ANC). However, the Namibian transition to 
democracy in 1989-90 set in motion the South African transition by creating possibilities for 
change; peaceful change from the old to the new. In essence, the Namibian transition was a 
“test run” for the people in moving from an oppressive white minority government towards a 
black (and mixed) majority government in the spirit of democracy and reconciliation. Results, 
successes and failures would serve as indication of possibilities and as guidelines for the 
South African transition to democracy. Often times, the South African transition has been 
hailed as the blueprint for democratic transitions and could be used as a model for other 
countries wishing to do the same. The South African transition was mostly successful and 
peaceful and deemed a great success by the international community. The Namibian 
transition was also mostly peaceful and created the opportunity for a peaceful South African 
transition. It showed that there was another way other than a violent overthrow of the then 
South African minority government through revolution and political violence. 
However, certain realities have to be taken into consideration. The South African transition 
has received far greater international academic and mass media attention than the Namibian 
one. The volume of academic and other texts on the South African transition is far greater 
than on the Namibian transition. One must ask him/herself as to why this is the case? One 
reason that quickly comes to mind is that South Africa has greater political and economic 
importance to the international community than Namibia. Another reason would be the 
significance attached to South Africa as a middle and regional power, being the economic 
and political powerhouse in Africa. It is often said that South Africa is to Africa what the 
United States (US) is to the world. 
Any person familiar with South African and Namibian history knows that the respective 
transitions form an integral part of the current political, social and economic state of affairs in 
either country. There is no doubt that the events that took place during 1989-90 and during 
1990-94, were integral in forming the Namibia and South Africa we know today, which is 
why it remains an important research topic. 
A direct comparison between the Namibian and the South African transitions is not generally 
possible since the histories of these two countries are far too entwined and interwoven. 
Furthermore, South Africa has always been the single greatest influence on Namibia as far as 
national sovereignty goes. However, two important distinctions can be made: the single 
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greatest difference between these two transitions is that the Namibian transition to democracy 
was from a colonial to a democratic, sovereign nation-state. The South African transition to 
democracy is different in that there was a change in the mode of governance and the 
recognition of universal human rights; which also played a more important overall role in the 
Namibian and South African state formation. Namibia freed itself from foreign rule while 
South Africa experienced social change resulting in political change. The second aspect is 
that the Namibian transition to democracy was largely internationally orchestrated, while the 
South Africa transition was largely internally negotiated.  
The objective here is not to determine which transition was the “better” one. Neither is it to 
come to a conclusion as to which was more successful. The issues alluded to above do not 
allow for such a comparison. However, enough similarities exist to warrant an informative 
comparison of the two transitions on the basis of shared history and other commonalities such 
as similar social and political circumstances, for example, the change from a white minority 
government to a black multi-party majority government. Historically, the similarities between 
South Africa and Namibia are relatively the same. Both countries have had one or two 
European colonial powers governing them and both have generally the same social, political 
and economic construct. The countries were governed very similarly with the South African 
government imposing its will on Namibia. The countries have roughly the same social make-
up of blacks, whites, Coloureds and Asians. They have the same executive, parliamentary, 
judicial and legislative systems. Civil society is strong in both societies; and unfortunately, 
the two countries also have the same inequality issues in common. Politics and civil society 
are characterised by race and ethnic conflict; and politics in both countries take on pluralistic 
aspects. Even the political economy of both does not differ widely from each other. Both 
countries follow economic restructuring and redistribution strategies in favour of the 
previously disadvantaged ethnic and social groups (Bauer & Taylor, 2005:205-75). An 
attempt will be made to discern between an internationally orchestrated transition (the 
Namibian) and an internally negotiated transition (the South African) and the impact this had 
on ethnic reconciliation.  
But what does the above mentioned distinction between an internationally and an internally 
organised transitions mean and entail? The internationally orchestrated Namibian transition to 
democracy was ultimately a transition from colonial rule to independence with the UN 
cooperating with the illegally occupying force – South Africa – in establishing an effective 
administration in Namibia to allow for the nation’s people their right to self-determination. 
Or as Dobell puts it (1998:22), “…when the transition has been designed by Western 
architects, implemented during the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and overseen 
by international donor organizations”.  
As for the South African transition to democracy, it differed in that there was no 
international, overarching organisation or institution to facilitate the transition. South African 
elites; ranging from academia, economic, political and social; from both sides – the one being 
the white minority ruling the other, black majority – meeting to discuss the end of Apartheid 
as South Africa had become ungovernable due to internal unrest and economic sanctions by 
the international community. The ruling elite had realised that the Apartheid system could 
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only further be maintained through intense suppression of the majority black population 
which would have resulted in enormous bloodshed and even possibly a civil war. To avoid 
this outcome then was to negotiate a transition to a democratic regime internally, meaning 
that South Africans themselves wanted to decide their fate.  
To clarify: the difference between ‘international’ and ‘internal’ is, in this sense, quite 
significant. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:8-9), in their research on political transitions, 
argue that few political institutions are strengthened by regime change. National judicial and 
legislative institutions remain weak. Moreover, past practices of clientalism, rentseeking and 
fraud remain deeply ingrained in certain administrations. The election of new leaders does 
not mean that they would cease to search for the spoils of political office, on the contrary, the 
advent of elections mark a scramble for political positions and an intensification of 
tendencies to quickly make the most of the benefits of office-holding. However, in the case of 
Namibia, the United Nations (UN) and its subsidiary United Nations Transition Assistance 
Group (UNTAG), facilitated and implemented the transition from South African colonial rule 
to democratic majority rule, thereby creating an entirely new government. Although it can be 
argued that the Namibian transition was mostly negotiated between the UNTAG Special 
Representative, Martti Ahtisaari and the South African Administrator-General, Louis Pienaar, 
the negotiations were not as extensive as the South African negotiations. In the South African 
case, the transition from white minority rule to black majority rule, the “negotiated nature” of 
the transition was the intentional striving towards a peaceful resolution to Apartheid. This 
meant that the majority South African population was to be incorporated into an existing 
government. In both cases, emphasis was placed on avoiding bloodshed and averting disaster. 
There was simply too much at stake.  
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:10-12) conceptualise regime transition as a shift from one 
set of political procedures to another, from an old pattern of rule to a new one. It is an interval 
of intense political uncertainty during which the shape of the new institutional dispensation is 
up for grabs by incumbent and opposition contenders. For this reason, a regime transition can 
be depicted as a struggle between competing political forces over the rules of the political 
game and for the resources with which the game is played. Regime changes can either be 
quick or can unfold incrementally. The reality of the Namibian and South African transitions 
is only slightly different from this definition. It was, from the onset of the Namibian 
transition process clear who the contenders where and from whom to whom political power 
would be transferred. There was no overall uncertainty as to what would happen, and who 
would gain the upper hand; there was however uncertainty of what the new government 
would or would not do after gaining political power. For South Africa, the transition was an 
attempt by the National Party for ‘power-sharing’. It was accepted that the ANC would be in 
government, but it was not known to what extent. Hence, the negotiated nature of both 
transitions. It was clear from the beginning that political power would change from white 
minority rule to black majority rule in both countries. The essence to be explored on this 
aspect in this thesis then is: to what extent was the transition in either country negotiated and 
how did the one differ from the other?  
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1.2 Problem Statement and Research Aim: 
The comparison between the South African and Namibian transitions will be undertaken 
within the broader context of democratic consolidation, which will be outlined further in the 
section titled “conceptualisation”. Democratic consolidation takes on numerous aspects and 
considerable time and effort has been invested by academic scholars and organisations into 
determining what exactly democratic consolidation entails or should, at least. However, the 
focus in this thesis is on one aspect of democratic consolidation, this being reconciliation 
between the former antagonists. Following Gibson (2004:7) the contention is that 
reconciliation is a necessary condition for democratic consolidation in South Africa and 
Namibia.  
This study aims to assess whether there is any significant difference between the impact of 
the  internationally orchestrated Namibian transition as opposed to the internally negotiated 
South African transition on levels of reconciliation in the two countries. This is done by 
applying Gibson’s (2004) four criteria of reconciliation (interracial reconciliation, political 
tolerance, support for the principles of democracy and legitimacy) to the South African and 
Namibian cases. The hypothesis is that there should be less support for democratic ideals in 
Namibia than in South Africa, on the basis that democracy was, to a certain degree, forced 
unto Namibian society, while it was freely chosen by South African society.  
 
1.3 Methodology and Analytical Framework 
The research that will be done for this thesis will largely be of a descriptive and explanatory 
nature. Most information/sources used will be secondary sources, on the basis that there is 
enough academic literature present on both transitions to warrant such an approach. 
Secondary survey data is used to establishing the levels of reconciliation with the thesis 
authors’ own interpretation of the findings of the data. 
The aim is not to reinterpret the transitions anew, but to rather to approach them from the 
constructs of race and ethnicity and assess the differences and similarities of results with 
regard to ethnic reconciliation. The study is therefore comparative and qualitative in nature to 
best allow for such an assessment.  
In comparing the South African and Namibian transitions a politico-institutional approach as 
laid out by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) will be followed. Their argument is that 
domestic politics take on greater importance in the establishment of state and government in 
transitions than macroeconomic and international factors. Domestic politics instead constitute 
the context in which political structures and processes are shaped and precipitated. Economic 
and international factors take on secondary characteristics and roles, i.e. their importance is 
not diminished and still have some influence to a significant degree; especially in the case of 
the Namibian transition. As Bratton & Van de Walle (1997:41) express it, “A country’s 
political prospects derive directly from its own inherited practices.” However, it has to be 
emphasized here, that the politico-institutional approach serves to illustrate the South African 
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transition. As will be illustrated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the Namibian transition was 
influenced more by international intervention than domestic politics. The framework is still 
useful for an interpretation of the Namibian transition, however, in that Namibian politicians 
did have a certain amount of influence on the shaping of new political institutions. As 
Friedman (1998) pointed out, the way in which transitions to democracy are achieved is often 
believed to shape the polity which they produce. 
An institutional approach to the two transitions best serves to analyse the outcome of both. 
Institutions (political, civil and economic)  structure political battles and their outcomes. For 
both countries, it is evident that a set of political, social and economic institutions was agreed 
upon and maintained.  As Fukuyama (2004:17) argues, “…well-functioning public 
institutions require certain habits of mind, and operate in complex ways…” He argues that he 
dominant trend in world politics for the past generation has been the critique of “big 
government” and the attempt to move activities from the state sector to private markets or to 
civil society. However, in the case of South Africa and Namibia, big government was the 
only viable actor in correcting racial and ethnic imbalances in socio-economic development 
created through a century long Apartheid legislature. 
As stated, however, the core aim is to determine the effects of such state building on 
democratic consolidation, in particular on reconciliation as an essential component of 
democratic consolidation.  Democratic consolidation, according to Leftwich (2000:135), 
“…is where all major political actors take for granted the fact that democratic process dictates 
government renewal.” He elaborates by stating that a democracy is consolidated where the 
people, political parties and groups pursue their interests according to peaceful, rule-based 
competition, negotiation and cooperation, and where there is agreement that the succession of 
one government by another is decided by these means. He identifies five conditions for 
democratic survival and consolidation. These are legitimacy of the political system; 
adherence to the rules of the game; policy restraint by the winning parties; poverty as an 
obstacle to democratic consolidation; and ethnic, cultural or religious cleavages as constraints 
on democracy (Leftwich, 2000:136-145). 
According to Schedler (1998:91-2) democratic consolidation is in its very nature a murky 
concept to define. To classify a democratic regime actually depends on the viewpoint from 
which one approaches the concept and where one would like to end; to come to a conclusion. 
He therefore defines democratic consolidation into four categories. These range from 
authoritarian regimes, to electoral democracies, to liberal democracies, to advanced 
democracies. To assess the democratic consolidation of Namibia and South Africa with 
regard to reconciliation is necessary in that, as said previously, reconciliation is paramount in 
making democracy work in either country. However, it has to be made clear that although 
these definitions are in general sufficient they cannot be applied fully to either country since 
no country in the world fits any definition of democratic consolidation fully. The question is 
to what degree are both countries consolidating their democracies? The question is not 
whether either country is democratic or not, but rather how either country is striving to 
achieve some form of reconciliation to make their respective democracies work. Two aspects 
take on significant importance: the first is avoiding democratic breakdown and erosion; while 
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the second is completing and deepening democracy (Schedler, 1998:94-9). What are the 
governments of Namibia and South Africa doing to meet these two aspects of democratic 
consolidation within the context of reconciliation?  
So why is this aspect to be analysed and not others? The historical context of both Namibia 
and South Africa determine the context of the current political manifestation. As pointed out 
by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:44), political regimes are aggregates clusters of 
interlocking institutions. New political leaders oftentimes try to apply a consistent set of 
political rules across institutional arenas; regimes tend to cohere into mutually reinforcing 
syndromes of governance. They argue that state elites in Africa have sought political power 
primarily to obtain and defend economic benefits. Apartheid legislation was first and 
foremost an attempt at separate socio-economic ‘development’. Access to economic 
resources was one central aspect in the struggle against the Apartheid and colonial regimes in 
South Africa and Namibia respectively. The same situation abounds in Namibia and South 
Africa, historically and currently. Although both liberation movements, the SWAPO and 
ANC, claim to have fought the suppressive regime for democracy and equal human rights for 
all, there is undoubtedly an economic aspect to the transitions. To assess democratic 
consolidation is to state that for the Namibian and South African transitions to democracy, to 
be regarded as real successes, is to determine whether or not there has been ethnic 
reconciliation; whether or not a politics built on ethnic identity has resulted in negative or 
positive aspects for democratic consolidation.  
The framework to be used for assessing reconciliation will be taken from Gibson (2004). He 
defines reconciliation as a summary of four parts, which he contends can even be 
independent sub-concepts. Firstly, there has to be interracial reconciliation in which racial 
stereotypes are reduced to a minimum by building trust between people from different racial 
and ethnic groups. Secondly, political tolerance includes the commitment by people to 
tolerate political views and opinions other to their own. Thirdly, support for the principles of 
democracy, both abstract and applied, has to be present; meaning the upholding of the rule of 
law and a commitment towards universalistic rights. Fourthly, legitimacy is important in that 
it denotes the willingness by the public to accept the authority of the state and its institutions.  
For both South Africa and Namibia, ethnic identity in politics was a central aspect in the 
transitions due to the fears the non-black minority had that the black majority would use state 
and government power to reverse historical repression. Much of the negotiations that took 
place, for either transition, were the attempt by the outgoing white minority government to 
limit the power and influence of the incoming black majority government so as to guarantee 
them that there would be no wide-spread repression and reprisal by the new government 
against the old (Slabbert, 2006:41-2). Both countries also share a common characteristic: both 
countries had principles of pluralism already built into the system. These existing 
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes allowed for an easier transition to democratic political 
competition (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:179). The findings of Bratton and Van de 
Walle’s (1997:225) study on transitions do indicate that precedents of political participation 
have a positive impact on the level of democracy. Regimes that had featured regular elections 
in the past were likely to extend the availability of political rights during the period of 
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transition. Electoral precedents that were formative in getting to democracy are also likely to 
be helpful in consolidating participatory regimes into the future.  
Evidently, the logical assumption is that both transitions strove for the negotiation of 
political, social and economic institutions; to make these participatory and accessible for the 
entire populace of either country and to bring about the end of discrimination of one group by 
another based on politically and ideologically constructed racial and ethnic identities. The 
contemporary reality however does indicate that although there has been political and social 
emancipation of the previously disadvantaged groups in Namibia and South Africa, there still 
exists pervasive economic separation based on race and ethnicity. Although the black 
majority holds political power, the white minority holds economic power, in both countries. 
With SWAPO being forced by the international community to accept liberal market practices 
and democratic ideals during the Namibian transition; has this then impaired ethnic 
reconciliation comparative to the South African transition where the ANC rescinded, in the 
negotiations, of bringing about a revolution in the economic sphere as well? Following this 
logic, ethnic reconciliation should be greater in South Africa since the protagonist; mostly the 
ANC elites decided that national unity could only be achieved by distancing themselves from 
radical ideology, such a socialist market structure. As will be shown later, it matters to the 
ordinary people how democracy brings about equality and rectifies historically created socio-
economic differences.  
 
1.4 Limitations: 
As mentioned above, the aim of the thesis is to establish whether or not there have been 
significant differences in reconciliation due to the varying nature of either transition in the 
framework of democratic consolidation. (Ethnic) reconciliation is the central aspect for the 
new Namibia and new South Africa on their path to consolidate their democracies. However, 
the scope of the thesis limits the analytical timeframe to the transitions themselves which will 
be covered in Chapters Two and Three respectively. No great focus will be placed on events 
preceding the actual transition phase. References will be made to events and issues that 
occurred pre-transition only to highlight the effects on the formation of the context that either 
transition took place in. There are a number of issues and variables, such as leadership, that 
can possibly have an influence on the nature of both transitions. These will be investigated 
further in subsequent chapters. 
Therefore, the timeframe for the Namibian transition is from 1988 to 1990, from the point 
where the South African Apartheid regime truly committed itself to bringing about 
independence for Namibia, culminating in the creation of the Namibian state on 21 March 
1990. Events prior to this timeframe are not necessarily ignored however, the scope is to 
assess the form the transition took and how this eventually affected the outcome of the 
transition. The emphasis here lies with outcome. The timeframe for the South African 
transition is from 1989 to 1994, from the point when F.W. de Klerk’s took control of the NP 
party, to the culmination of all-inclusive elections on the 27 April 1994. Importance will be 
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placed on the nature of the transition, the negotiated aspects and how the various actors in the 
transition eventually influenced the outcome of the transition, focusing on the negotiated 
nature of the transition. The timeframe for the assessment of reconciliation in both countries 
will encompass the period after the completion of the transition to the present day.  
Although the focus here is on the link between the nature of the transition and subsequent 
reconciliation, it is important to be aware of the fact that the transitions cannot be held solely 
accountable for the outcomes of reconciliation. There are a great number of intervening 
variables that will be considered within the context of reconciliation. Where other variables 
appear to have an influence on the degree of reconciliation besides that resulting from the 
nature of the transition, these will be accounted for and incorporated into the analysis, where 
possible. However, in-depth analyses of these additional variables falls outside the scope of 
this study. 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure:  
Chapters Two and Three of this thesis will cover the Namibian and South African transitions 
respectively, starting with a short overview of either country and then, following a themed 
approach, an overview of both transitions to democracy to establish the similarities and more 
importantly the differences. The analysis of the transition will be approached from a political-
institutional point (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:41), so as to ascertain an overall picture of 
the construction and negotiation of political, social and economic institutions. 
Chapters Two and Three will also include a short overview of the social, political and 
economic history of both Namibia and South Africa, pointing out the differences and 
similarities of both countries preceding the transition of either nation. The aim here is to 
establish whether or not both nations faced similar problems and challenges in the social, 
political and economic spheres.  In essence these two chapters will cover in detail the most 
significant events preceding and during the transitions of both nations. The aim is to analyze 
the importance and impact such events had on the transition processes and to determine if the 
similarities and differences.  
Chapter Four will deal with the essence of the thesis. Further conceptualization of 
reconciliation will take place in the beginning of the chapter to point out the complexity of 
the issue. The approach pertaining to this chapter will be to assess the differences and 
similarities in ethnic reconciliation between Namibia and South Africa with a time frame of 
10 to 15 years subsequent of the transition to democracy. The goal is to assess if there has 
been reconciliation in Namibia and South Africa and to what degree? It has to be 
acknowledged that this will be done in accordance with the interpretations of the Namibian 
and South African transitions respectively. The issue of internationally orchestrated versus 
internally negotiated will be expounded further in this chapter as well.  
Chapter Five will form the conclusion to the thesis. An assessment will be made, drawing 
from chapters two and three in the context of the analysis of ethnic reconciliation of chapter 
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four. Eventually, a verdict will be reached whether or not there is significant difference in 
ethnic reconciliation in both countries and whether this might be due to the difference in 
transition style.  
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Chapter Two 
The Namibian Transition 1989-1990 
2.1 Introduction: 
During the 1980s the African continent was viewed by the world as wracked by ethnic 
conflict, economic failure, political decay and social malaise. The insurgency war waged by 
SWAPO in Namibia (then called South West Africa – SWA)2 had been going on for 25 years 
and South Africa had stalled Resolution 435 of the United Nations numerous times. Due to 
decades of South African imposed Apartheid rule, Namibia’s society was split in two: the one 
side well educated, skilled, politically and socially influential and prosperous: the other side 
mostly destitute, having no access to the levels of social and economic prosperity as the other 
side. As in South Africa, these sides were racially and ethnically separated along white and 
black skin colour respectively. Namibia’s struggle for democracy was in fact a struggle for 
independence since Namibia was Africa’s last colony, administered since 1915 by South 
Africa. The struggle was waged mainly by the South West African People’s Organisation 
(SWAPO), but included many groups and individuals from both sides of the superficial racial 
divide. Namibia’s independence seemed to many to be a hope for change at the end of the 
Cold War for a more Africa-friendly world order (Bauer & Taylor, 2005:205).  
The Namibian transition to democracy is a very unique one in that the UN and other 
international organisations negotiated mainly with the South African administration, with 
Namibian actors’ influence limited to petitions, commentary, demonstrations, strike actions, 
military and civil actions against the oppressive South African regime. In presenting an 
overall picture of the transition, the timeframe to be used will be from 1988 to 1991. This 
allows for representation of the major events shortly before and during the transition that 
eventually gave rise to the structures and institutions that characterized Namibia and still do 
today. However, to show how the situation in 1988 came to be, a short historical overview is 
necessary. 
 
2.2 Historical Overview: 
Namibia had been a German colony from 1884 to 1915 and was administered as a settler 
colony which eventually led to tensions between the German settlers and the indigenous 
people, mainly the Herero, and Nama-Damara. A number of wars erupted from 1904 to 1907 
that were conducted with brutal efficiency and malice. About 80% of the Herero, 50% of the 
Nama and 30% of the Damaras were killed. At the end of these wars, land and livestock of 
the defeated people was redistributed to the German and new Boer Settlers. After World War 
I, having defeated the German colonial troops, South Africa took control of the German 
colony after being handed the mandate to administrate the colony by the League of Nations 
with the goal of eventually leading the territory to independence. The South African 
                                                 
2
 Namibia’s previous designations were ‘German South West Africa’ during the colonial period (1884-1915) 
and ‘South West Africa’ during the South African occupation (1915-1989). 
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administration, however, continued with the practices used by the German colonial 
administration of native reserves and native commissioners to administer the indigenous 
people. Legislation was introduced that facilitated a migrant labour system from the north of 
the country to the emerging towns and commercial farms (Bauer & Taylor, 2005:209-10). 
In 1946, Namibia became a trust territory under the United Nations after the dissolution of 
the League of Nations. South Africa, however, tried to incorporate Namibia into the South 
African Union as a de facto fifth province, which was rejected by the UN General Assembly. 
A few years later, with the rise of the National Party (NP) government and its Apartheid 
policies, South Africa extended Apartheid legislature to its now de jure fifth province during 
the 1950s and 1960s. A policy of separate development was put in place and the native 
reserves were changed into ethnic homelands, although none of these homelands was ever 
granted nominal independence as had occurred with the homelands in South Africa. South 
Africa’s de facto incorporation of Namibia into its territory was never accepted by the 
Namibian population and neither by the international community. By the 1940s and 50s, 
Namibian leaders began petitioning the United Nations for an end of South African rule. By 
the end of the 1950s, the first Namibian nationalist movement had emerged, the Ovamboland 
People’s Organisation (OPO) in 1959. This organization eventually became SWAPO in 1960 
(Bauer & Taylor, 2005:211). 
The forced removal of residents from the Namibian Old Location township in 1959, which 
resulted in shooting and deaths, gave the South African administration a reason to imprison 
and ban nationalist leaders. In 1962, SWAPO decided to take up an armed struggle against 
the South African administration of Namibia and started an insurgency war into Namibia 
from bases inside and outside of Namibia; the organisation having been inspired by the 
ANC’s endeavour to fight the Apartheid regime with military means. During the 1970s three 
events changed Namibia’s future. A general strike of migrant labourers in 1971-72 caused an 
imposition of emergency regulations in the north of Namibia, Owamboland in particular 
which gave considerable power and leeway to the security forces and establishment. The 
exodus of thousands of young Namibians in 1974 was caused by school boycotts, brutal 
punishment by tribal courts and the new proximity of SWAPO camps in Angola and 
Zamibia. The third important event was the collapse of the Portuguese colonial 
administration in 1975, which opened up Angola to SWAPO. This gave the movement 
considerable advantage in waging their liberation struggle by being allowed to erect bases for 
Namibians in exile and military bases for training insurgents just north of Namibia’s borders 
(Bauer & Taylor, 2005:211). It also has to be noted that many of the Apartheid laws were 
abolished in 1978 due to pressure on the South African administration from mainly the white 
community in Namibia. Their argument was that these laws were a hindrance for economic 
growth (Lush, 1993:4-5). 
The South African administration reacted by declaring martial law and withdrawing civilians 
from the northern border in Owamboland, Caprivi and Kavango. South African Defence 
Force troops were stationed in the north and Namibian volunteers were drafted for the 
creation of ethnic military units to fight the externally nationalist movement to restore order 
in the north of the country. Against this backdrop, South Africa twice attempted an internal 
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settlement of the Namibian situation by creating an interim government in 1980 and a 
government of national unity in 1985. The government of national unity lasted until 1989 
when an internationally sanctioned and monitored transition began. National diplomatic 
efforts were directed at ending South Africa’s colonial rule of Namibia and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union greatly increased international commitment to bring about peace in Angola 
and Namibian independence. It is against this historical background of legislated ethnic 
separation and war between ethnic and racial groups that the transition was to take place 
(Bauer & Taylor, 2005:212-3). 
 
2.3 The Transition: an Overview 
In 1988, the situation was comprised of a historical separation of whites from black in that 
this separation was legislated to such an extent that white Namibians enjoyed social and 
economic prosperity and a functioning democracy, from which the majority black Namibians 
were excluded. However, even the white enclave did not have the democratic option of 
electing the executive as this was done by the South African government by appointing an 
Administrator-General. By 1988, strike actions taken by industrial and migrant labourers 
were becoming increasingly violent and often clashed with security forces all over the 
country. The number of ‘successful’ terrorist acts by the SWAPO had been increasing since 
the beginning of the 1980’s. A number of civil groups had been established along racial lines 
such as the Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging and a number of political parties were founded 
based on race and language due to the civilian population feeling that change was coming 
soon. For the South African administration the main problem lay in the security of the 
Namibian northern border and the large number of Cuban troops in Angola (Dierks, 2002). 
The first draft of a constitution by the transitional government of unity was rejected by South 
Africa in 1987 and it seemed as though political negotiations for Namibia’s independence 
had come to a halt. Negotiations between Angola and the USA regarding the withdrawal of 
Cuban troops had not resulted in significant change. In January 1988, a series of military 
battles took place in the south-eastern corner of Angola. They were caused by a MPLA-
Soviet-Cuban assault on UNITA-held territory and bases, UNITA being given substantial 
support by South Africa3. The MPLA troops failed in their assault on Mavinga and then lost 
the battle at the Lomba River. About 6,000 SA troops together with UNITA forces 
commenced counter-operations to conquer Cuito Cuanavale, but they found strong resistance. 
In January and February as well, SWAPO successfully carried out terrorist attacks against 
military and civilian targets in Windhoek, Oshakati and Owamboland (Dierks, 2002). On the 
4 May 1988, about 50,000 Cuban, Angolan and PLAN4 troops succeeded in pushing the 
South African Defence Force (SADF) back at Cuito Cuanavale. Estimates placed the cost of 
the war for South Africa at not less than US$ 2 billion a year, and it was becoming 
                                                 
3
 UNITA and MPLA were the main contenders in the Angolan civil war. UNITA were supported by South 
Africa and the USA, while MPLA and FAPLA were supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union. 
4
 PLAN – People’s Liberation Army of Namibia. SWAPO’s military wing. 
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increasingly unpopular among South African conscripts and their families. The impact of 
sanctions and huge disinvestment that had taken place in the 1980s had finally taken a major 
toll on the South African economy. Chester Crocker of the USA quoted an estimated 17% 
decline in the South African Gross National Product (GNP) from 1987 to 1991 (Dierks, 2002; 
Leys & Saul, 1995:36-37). South Africa’s will to defend Apartheid was weakening, as was its 
control over Namibia. All these events forced South Africa to begin serious negotiations on 
the implementation of Security Council (SC) Resolution 435, despite the fact that South 
Africa and UNITA still both claimed victory at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale. 
Although the transition process had been forcibly moved along; by the beginning of June 
1988, 75,000 school students boycotted schools throughout the country in protest of the 
South African army and police repressions. By the end of June the National Union of 
Namibian Workers (NUNW) organised a general strike in support of the students. More than 
60,000 workers supported the strike (Lush, 1993:152-154).  
The most important event that jeopardised the transition was the outbreak of hostilities during 
April 1989. A ceasefire had entered into effect and SWAPO combatants were supposed to 
gather at UNTAG points in northern Namibia for repatriation, as was stipulated by 
Resolution 435. However, the SADF and South African administration manipulated the 
situation to make it seem as though SWAPO was executing plans for a large-scale invasion of 
northern Namibia. The intensity of the fighting increased considerably during the first days of 
April when it became clear that there was no ceasefire. In the following days and weeks of 
April 1989 the South African counter-insurgency forces could not be restrained. In 1998 the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission referred to the suspicion that grave 
crimes were committed by those forces at that time. It was alluding to reports of the summary 
execution of many SWAPO prisoners (Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
1998, Vol. 2). The April 1989 disaster was made worse when South African troops which, 
according to Resolution 435 were to be restricted to base at Oshivelo and Grootfontein, left 
their bases with the approval of UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari, to stop the 
SWAPO troops. Heavy fighting ensued, with 300 SWAPO, both soldiers and known local 
SWAPO supporters, and 27 South African soldiers killed. SWAPO’s representative at the 
United Nations, Theo-Ben Gurirab, was outraged, speaking to Martti Ahtisaari of the UN 
hands covered in Namibian blood (Lush, 1993:89-92). 
Shortly afterwards, SWAPO stated they were ready to accept a new ceasefire and await the 
UN’s response. The burden lay with Ahtisaari (who had requested the use of the South 
African troops) to get the South African military to adhere to the ceasefire conditions. The 
Namibian Human Rights Centre informed UNTAG about events in the north of Namibia 
during the first four days of April 1989. It was a chilling account, suggesting the arrival and 
congregation of PLAN forces in a peaceful manner and their being set upon by the South 
African security forces. Bodies were then piled together in heaps and left to decompose. 
SWAPO felt betrayed by UNTAG and ordered its troops to go into hiding, thereby stopping 
the demilitarisation process. On the 7 April, the Administrator-General Pienaar unilaterally 
suspends the independence process. However, the UN Secretary-General ordered the early 
mobilisation of three UNTAG-battalions from Finland, Kenya and Malaysia. SWAPO 
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President Sam Nujoma recalled all troops to return to Angola, however, fighting continued 
until the end of April (Dierks, 2002). 
From the outset, pro-SWAPO demonstrations staged in Windhoek to welcome UNTAG were 
crushed by the South West African Police. The demonstrations continued, however, in 
Katutura5. With between 10,000 and 15,000 participants, these were the largest 
demonstrations ever held in the history of Namibia. On the 17 May 1989, the Administrator-
General appointed the Judicial Commission for the Prevention of Intimidation and Election 
Malpractices with Bryan O’Linn as its chairman. On the 22 May, the Administrator-General 
passed the necessary legislation and took the appropriate administrative measures to ensure 
the envisaged free and fair process leading to Namibian independence. The first one was 
Proclamation AG 11 which provided for the "Establishment and Powers of the Commission 
for the Prevention and Combating of Intimidation and Election Malpractices". The Namibian 
transition to independence had started off with considerable political setbacks, with the 
uncertain military situation and political leaders unwilling to cooperate. 
 
2.3.1 International Manipulation of the Transition: 
To better illustrate the internationally orchestrated nature of the Namibian transition, events 
preceding the transition and during the transition will be illustrated below to show how 
Namibian actors, such as political parties and civil society groups, were left out of decisive 
negotiations that significantly altered the course of Namibia’s transition. 
The striving for the creation of a sovereign nation of Namibia was borne out of the League of 
Nations’ goal of ridding the world of colonies and the suppression of one people by another. 
The UN assisted and maintained control in every aspect of the Namibian transition and at its 
height had up to 8,000 personnel from 120 countries stationed in Namibia to effectively build 
up a democratic society and government in co-ordinance with international expectations. A 
UN task force was established, the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) 
to take charge of and implement the transition process. Though it had elements reminiscent of 
other UN field operations, which have monitored elections and law and order and patrolled 
borders with peacekeeping forces, it also had numerous novel aspects. It did not fit into the 
traditional mould of peacekeeping operations nor did it follow the pattern of the United 
Nations previous endeavours in the decolonisation process.  
As Dobell (1998:81) argues, the transition process in Namibia was an uneven one in that the 
previous incumbents (the South African appointed Administrator-General6) still held 
considerable control over the formation of the new state and significant discretionary power 
over the rules of the game. SWAPO did not play a significant role in the shaping of the 
                                                 
5
 Katatura is the biggest township in Windhoek. Black Namibians had been forcibly resettled there after the SA 
Administration destroyed the ‘Old Location Township’ in 1959. 
6
 At the time of the Transition the AG was Louis Pienaar. Laws were passed by the Administrator-General. 
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transition rules and it would, on coming to power, inherit pre-existing institutions originally 
devised to serve different purposes. Included in those were a predominantly white civil 
service and a political opposition groomed for decades by the South African administration. 
SWAPO’s ability to implement reforms after the transition was severely limited. Prior to 
independence, society in Namibia was characterised by inequality and fragmentation. 
Apartheid in education, training and culture led to differentiated access to employment and 
hence to wages. (Bauer & Taylor, 2005:213). 
Prior to the April 1989 ceasefire failure and the commencement of the transition, the first 
draft of a constitution by the transitional government of unity had been rejected by South 
Africa in 1987 and it seemed as though political negotiations for independence had come to a 
halt. Negotiations between Angola and the USA regarding the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
had not resulted in significant change, however, a number of SWAPO activists had been 
released who had been detained on charges of terrorism (Dobell, 1998:73). The UN had 
affirmed that all outstanding issues relevant to the implementation of Security Council (SC) 
Resolution 435 had been resolved on their side and the Security Council authorised the 
Secretary-General to proceed with arrangements for a ceasefire between South Africa and 
SWAPO, following which administrative and practical steps were to be taken for UNTAG’s 
deployment. SWAPO had created the Namibian Press Agency to cover the liberation struggle 
and the transition from outside Namibia (Dierks, 2002). However, the potential for escalating 
conflict in southern Angola between South Africa /UNITA and Cuba/MPLA halted internal 
constitutional developments in Namibia as negotiations around UN Resolution 435 and 
related matters began between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, with US mediation and with 
support from the Soviet Union (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:144). 
The outcome of the Battle at Cuito Cuanavale forced the South African administration to 
meet with Angola and Cuba for a number of negotiation rounds in London, later Cairo, then 
in New York; where the agreement on "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South West 
Africa, Angola, Cuba and South Africa" were established; and finally in Geneva which lead 
to the ‘Geneva Protocol’ which stipulated that SC Resolution 435 would be implemented on 
1st September 1988. Angola and Cuba signed a bilateral accord to govern the Cuban 
withdrawal from Angola. However, the South Africans again delayed the negotiations with a 
new demand that Angola ceases assisting the South African ANC (Dierks, 2002; Dobell, 
1998:74). 
By August of 1988, South Africa had voluntarily committed itself to a de facto cessation of 
hostilities, and the ceasefire was observed by SWAPO while South Africa completed the 
withdrawal of its troops from Angola. From August to December 1988 the Brazzaville 
meetings took place between Angola, Cuba and South Africa under the chairmanship of the 
US and with Soviet observation. Again the South Africans tried to delay the peace process by 
demanding an all-party conference in Namibia before Resolution 435 came into force. In 
view of the fact that SWAPO was not a party to the Geneva Protocol, it was provided that, 
"Angola and Cuba shall use their good offices so that, once a total withdrawal of South 
African troops from Angola is completed and within the context also of the cessation of 
hostilities in Namibia, SWAPO’s forces will be deployed to the north of the 16th parallel." 
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This indicates, as pointed out by Dobell (1998:72) that for one, Namibia did not rank highly 
on the Reagan administration’s foreign policy hierarchy and two, the South African 
administration’s attempt at minimising SWAPO’s role in the transition. Dobell (1998:72-3) 
argues then that the Namibian settlement was a result of a combination of dramatic changes 
in the international environment and a shift in South African policy towards the country, 
rather than being directly bound to SWAPO’s struggle7.  
By the end of 1988, on the 13 December, South Africa, Angola and Cuba signed the 
Brazzaville Protocol, which recommended that the UN Secretary-General set 1 April 1989 as 
the deadline for the implementation of Resolution 435. The protocol also established a Joint 
Monitoring Commission. On the 22 December, South Africa, Angola and Cuba signed the 
New York Treaty8 at the UN Headquarters, which finalised the agreements reached earlier in 
Geneva. Angola and Cuba also signed a bilateral agreement on the Cuban troop withdrawal 
from Angola, which paved the way for Resolution 435 to be implemented. The parties also 
confirmed that the Joint Monitoring Commission would monitor the implementation of the 
agreements. The US and Soviet Union both participated as observers and facilitators (Dobell, 
1998:72; Leys & Saul, 1995:36). 
By January of 1989 after many previous attempts the UN Security Council managed to agree 
that implementation of Resolution 435 would begin on 1 April 1989. However, UNTAG’s 
military component was substantially cut from 7,500 to 4,500 troops. Fortunately, the UN 
Secretary-General’s military adviser, proposed that UNTAG keep the original ceiling of 
7,500 troops, but in the first instance only 4,650 would be deployed. By the 18 January, the 
civilian component of UNTAG had been established with 300 professional personnel for the 
political, electoral and administrative offices at headquarters in Windhoek and the 42 regional 
and district political field offices. A second group of about 180 came for the registration 
process (Dierks, 2002). 
In February of 1989, Resolution 632 of the UN Security Council was passed to enforce the 
implementation of Resolution 435. By the date of 1 April 1989, UNTAG forces were to be in 
place, including those to man the reception points at which PLAN soldiers were to be 
confined to base. South African troops were to be restricted to bases.  In particular, the 
Council was at last freed from constraints preventing UNTAG from sending preparatory staff 
into the country. However, by the end of February, new problems in the implementation of 
Resolution 435 came to the forefront. The Non-Aligned Movement questioned whether 
UNTAG was permitted to purchase in South Africa despite the existence of sanctions, in 
spite of the fact that UNTAG could not have survived in Namibia without purchasing from 
South Africa. Only the hint that independent countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe were 
massively dependent upon South Africa, despite the sanctions, resolved the situation (Leys & 
Saul, 1995:172-173). 
                                                 
7
 As pointed out in the reference to Bratton & Van de Walle’s transition framework on p. 6 of this thesis. 
8
 Also known as the Tripartite Agreement 
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By the end of February, the first key-personnel of UNTAG arrived in Namibia’s capital, 
Windhoek. The transitional government of unity was dissolved by itself and the 
Administrator-General Louis Pienaar assumed control over all governmental affairs in 
Namibia. By 14 March 1989, the UN Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, proceeded the 
arrangement for the formal agreement on a ceasefire between SWAPO and South Africa as 
had been envisaged in Resolution 435. However, the UN had to make a major concession to 
the South Africans during the final stages of negotiation of the UNTAG Status of Forces 
Agreement. They agreed with South Africa that it could refuse visas to UNTAG staff if and 
when they felt like it. Consequently the South Africans denied visas to many UNTAG staff, 
especially press people. Martti Ahtisaari exercised strong pressure on the South African 
representative in Windhoek, Jeremy Shearar, to get this ban lifted (Dierks, 2002). On the 31 
March, the Special Representative for UNTAG, Martti Ahtisaari, arrived in Windhoek to take 
over the functions of the interim government together with the Administrator-General. He 
was received at the Windhoek International Airport by pro-South African forces. SWAPO 
gave an order to stay away from the event. SWAPO supporters would rather delay their 
demonstrations until the real implementation of Resolution 435 commenced on 1 April 1989. 
On the 1 April 1989, the implementation of Resolution 435 commenced, initiating the 
holding of UN-supervised free and fair elections for a Constituent Assembly. The ceasefire 
between SWAPO and SA came into effect. UNTAG was not yet fully deployed with fewer 
than one quarter of the envisaged  - already reduced – 4,650 UNTAG troops present in 
Namibia and not strategically deployed as yet, especially not in the north. As mentioned 
already, on that day, the independence process faltered, as an estimated 600 PLAN soldiers 
entered Namibia from Angola and clashed with SA-led security forces in northern Namibia. 
The incident was used by the South Africans to motivate the Special Representative for 
UNTAG, Martti Ahtisaari (after receiving an ultimatum from the South Africans of only half-
an-hour to think it over), to release South African troops out of their restricted bases (Leys & 
Saul, 1995:106-111). On the other hand many Namibian sources showed that PLAN soldiers 
had always been in northern Namibia. One witness, Johannes Kutumba, was the only 
survivor of 28 PLAN soldiers who were killed during April 1989. Kutumba reported that his 
unit has been in hiding in northern Namibia since December 1988. Klaus Dierks (2002) 
reported later that he personally had been inside PLAN camps within Namibia before the 1 
April. 
The decisive clause in SC Resolution 435 stated that, "Provision for SWAPO forces inside 
Namibia at the time of ceasefire to be restricted to base at designated locations inside 
Namibia to be specified by Special Representative after necessary consultation". With 
regards to SWAPO bases in Namibia, all available evidence pointed to the reality that 
although PLAN soldiers frequently crossed from Angola into Namibia, and stayed for longer 
periods in the bush and among the people, they returned to Angola once their tasks had been 
carried out. They did not have "bases" in Namibia, in the sense of permanent installations 
containing personnel and technical infrastructure. The South Africans maintained that PLAN 
had come to carry out offensive actions against South African security installations. There 
were supposed plans for large-scale mine-laying, the cutting of water pipelines and the 
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infiltration of the white-owned commercial farming areas around Tsumeb (Leys & Saul, 
1995:134). The chief of the South West African Police (SWAPOL), maintained that the 
PLAN forces did not care about the proposed ceasefire. These South African accusations 
were never found to be substantiated. Two taken PLAN prisoners-of-war - who had seriously 
been assaulted by the South Africans - were interrogated by Daniel Opande and Ed Omotoso 
from UNTAG. The answers the two prisoners had given were consistent and held up under 
detailed questioning. Each said that "they have been ordered by his commander to enter 
Namibia peacefully and not to engage the South African security forces, because a ceasefire 
came into effect on 1 April 1989 and that there was to be no more fighting” (Dierks, 2002).  
An attempt to resolve the breaking of the April 1989 ceasefire was made when 
representatives of South Africa, Angola and Cuba in the Joint Monitoring Commission, with 
US, Soviet, and UNTAG observation, met at Mount Etjo to salvage the independence plan. 
The parties agreed that SWAPO troops should be assembled at 16 assembly points and 
withdraw from Namibia to the 16th latitude in Angola, under guarantee of safe passage. All 
assembly points would be under UNTAG supervision and be operational by noon on 11 April 
1989. However, the Mount Etjo Agreement was in jeopardy because South African troops 
continued to fight and block the PLAN combatant’s withdrawal to Angola. Very few PLAN 
fighters showed up at the official assembly points due to the highly visible South African 
army mechanised infantry units camping alongside the unarmed UN peacekeepers which 
arrived in the country during the weeks of 17 April to 1 May 1989 (Leys & Saul, 1995:33-
35). 
On the 26 June 1989, after complex negotiations, UNTAG and the Administrator-General 
finally reached an agreement concerning the qualifications for voter registration. On the 30 
June, The Administrator-General passed Proclamation AG 19 for the Registration of voters 
(Constituent Assembly Proclamation); and official election campaigning started on the 1 July 
(Lush, 1993:182-183). There were however, major differences in expectations of election 
procedures between UNTAG and the Administrator-General. Reactions throughout Namibia 
were hostile to a draft proclamation made by the Administrator-General which indicated that 
South Africa wanted to heavily influence the first elections. UNTAG even seriously 
considered to postpone the elections in October 1989. One key difference between the two 
parties was that UNTAG wanted political party agents to be allowed at polling stations and at 
the count, and to be allowed to be present at all stages of the polling.  This was to help ensure 
not only that the voting would be free and fair, but also that it would be seen to be so by the 
Namibian people. This was opposed by the South Africans, who even tried to influence the 
establishment of the Constituent Assembly. The attempt of the draft proclamation had shown 
renewed proof of South Africa’s embittered determination to dominate the constitution-
making process in Namibia and to retain control up to the last moment, and possibly beyond 
(Lush, 1993:183-186). 
On the 21 July 1989, UN Secretary-General Péres de Cuéllar visited Namibia. He was 
disturbed about the continued violence, especially in the northern regions. One of the UN 
Secretary-General’s main priorities was to meet with all the parties and meet with them all 
together. Everybody came; the representatives of ten political parties, large and small, and all 
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the Namibian press to record the unprecedented meeting. Péres de Cuéllar declared inter alia 
to the political parties, "Sooner or later, UNTAG and the South Africans will depart. You, as 
the representatives of the Namibian people, will achieve your long-delayed inheritance of 
independence. You will also shoulder the full responsibilities of independence and of nation-
building ...." Péres de Cuéllar’s suggestions were adopted by all parties. One outcome of the 
meeting was the "Code of Electoral Conduct" of 12 September 1989 (Dierks, 2002; Lush, 
1993:207). 
On the 10 October 1989, Martti Ahtisaari declared the creation of a Constituent Assembly 
tasked with the creation of the constitution for an independent Namibia and to establish initial 
government structures for the new country. Subsequently, the Administrator-General passed 
Proclamation AG 49 for the Holding of an Election for a Constituent Assembly. However, on 
the 20 October, a young South African civil servant, reported a big, heavily funded 
disinformation campaign against UNTAG and the Security Council Resolution 435 by the 
South Africans. On the 1 November 1989, South Africa made a final attempt at disrupting the 
Namibian independence process. South African troops were placed on alert after reports of a 
SWAPO troop presence on the Angola-Namibia border. South African Foreign Minister Pik 
Botha alleged that South Africa had been monitoring UNTAG’s communications for several 
days and had clear and unambiguous proof that UNTAG had been aware of SWAPO plans 
for a mass invasion from Angola into Namibia more or less on the eve of the elections. Very 
quickly and after experts had checked the "evidence", the threat turned out to be a hoax and 
crude forgery; a case of deliberate misinformation by "anti-independence" forces (Lush, 
1993: 238-239). 
 
2.3.2 Limited Internal Negotiations: 
Although the process was mainly externally driven, there was also an internal aspect to the 
Namibian transition. A number of events regarding Namibian security forces; the 
Administrator-General; the formation of the new Namibian government; and the creation of a 
number of state institutions will be explored to illustrate the ‘internally negotiated’ part of 
Namibia’s transition. 
A major breakthrough came in the beginning of October 1988 when a "Consultative 
Conference" was held between SWAPO and progressive Namibians in Kabwe, Zambia. 
Prominent exiled SWAPO leaders were present as well. However, Bryan O’Linn, Chairman 
of the Namibia Peace Plan 435 (NPP-435), did not take part because the CDA (Christian 
Democratic Action for Social Justice) leader had not been invited by SWAPO. The 
conference had an over proportionate representation of white Namibians. This event took on 
a quite important significance in that the South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, and the 
head of the South African National Intelligence Service, Neil Barnard, argued the need for 
the earliest action to resolve the Namibian question, which was destabilising the region and 
seriously complicating the major issue which South Africa itself would have to face. Ten 
years later Botha spoke of the "decisive effect" which the Namibian Peace Process and 
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Namibia’s independence had had on the abolishing of Apartheid in South Africa (Dobell, 
1998:74-76). 
On the 1 June 1989, the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) fully stood down after 
having been remobilised after the events of 1 April. Resolution 435 had required the 
demobilisation of the SWATF and of what was called "citizen forces" and "commandos" 
which should have had been completed by 1 April 1989. These forces numbered 11,158 and 
their arms and equipment were deposited in drill halls and were guarded by UNTAG infantry. 
The SWATF consisted of 21,661 personnel of all ranks. Its members, however, believed 
themselves to be on indefinite leave, rather than demobilised. They kept their uniforms, 
reported twice a month and received their salary from South African senior officers, all in 
civilian clothes. UNTAG believed this as a breach of the Settlement Plan, dismissing South 
African arguments based on the danger of future SWAPO incursions. The issue was not 
resolved until the November 1989 elections, when the possibility of creating a national army 
for Namibia began to be examined (Leys & Saul, 1995:199). The eventual demobilisation 
was an internal negotiation between UNTAG and the Administrator-General as shows of 
good faith by the South African government towards the peaceful progress of the transition. 
On the 8 May 1989, the Administrator-General passed Proclamation AG 14 for the "First 
Law amendment (Abolition of Discriminatory of Restrictive Laws for purposes of Free and 
Fair Elections)". By the 12th, the Administrator-General declared a general amnesty for all 
Namibians living abroad, lifted prohibitions on political activities and repealed or amended 
46 discriminatory laws (AG 16 of 1989). This enabled the return of Namibian exiles. 
UNTAG only had its official networks in place by mid-June. These networks consisted of 
five such, which were the military; the UN’s civilian police; the UNTAG administration; the 
electoral division; and finally the regional and district coordination network. Other 
organisations were monitored closely by UNTAG, such as the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the RRR (Repatriation, Resettlement, 
Reconstruction) Committee of the CCN (Council of Churches of Namibia), which did 
nevertheless operated autonomously. UNTAG kept links to events in Namibia through its 
network of primary and secondary reception centres throughout the country. During 
UNTAG’s peak they had more than 8,000 personnel from 21 countries (military), 25 
countries (police) and 80 countries (civil) in Namibia (Leys & Saul, 1995:171-173). 
In the second week of June 1989, the repatriation of Namibian exiles had begun. The first 
group of senior SWAPO leaders returned from exile and SWAPO’s first appeal for national 
reconciliation followed their return. Altogether 42,736 Namibians eventually returned from 
exile from 42 countries, including about 7,000 PLAN soldiers in civilian clothes with their 
commanders, far more than the 30,000 Namibians who fought against SWAPO in the South 
West Africa Territory Force and around 6,000 others who belonged to the South West 
African Police or para-military units such as Koevoet9. Most of the exiles returned from the 
                                                 
9
 Koevoet was the para-military force created by the SADF during the beginning of the 1980’s for combating 
SWAPO insurgents with guerilla warfare and tactics. Koevoet consisted mostly out of voluntary Namibians. 
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SWAPO Camp Kwanza Sul in Angola (Lush, 1993: 180-181). However, this event had 
remained un-covered by the local broadcaster; the South African controlled South West 
African Broadcasting Corporation. The broadcasters’ partiality in favour of the South African 
colonial authority continued until well after the November elections. However, by the 18 
June 1989, the South African Government withdrew their annual budget subsidy to the 
Namibian treasury. The outcome of South Africa’s decision caused a serious deterioration in 
the country’s infrastructure and the cause of the abolishment of many essential services. It 
was not possible to meet civil services salaries throughout the financial year ending on 31 
March 1990. UNTAG warned South Africa that Namibia is its responsibility until 
independence (Lush, 1993: 182). These factors all contributed to the internal aspect of the 
transition as they mainly included SWAPO and SWATF forces being reintegrated into the 
civilian population. The Administrator-General feared a loss of control over law and order 
prior to the elections, with SWAPO attempting a last attempt at revolutionary takeover of the 
country. However, he did not consider the possibility of SWATF and Koevoet members 
disturbing the transition process. 
Violence occurred on 23 August 1989, when some South West Africa police officers, 
including Koevoet soldiers, shot at SWAPO members during election meetings. To halt 
political intimidation in Namibia, the UN Security Council unanimously passed UN 
Resolution 640 calling for the demobilisation of all paramilitary groups and local units 
(SWATF, Koevoet). After much debate and negotiation between UNTAG and the 
Administrator-General, Koevoet is disbanded. They hand in their uniforms and weapons and 
returned to civilian life. On the 12 September Advocate Anton Lubowski, one of SWAPO’s 
few white members and Acting Director of Finance and Administration in the SWAPO 
Election Directorate, was assassinated outside his home in Windhoek. Reportedly the South 
African Civil Co-operation Bureau; which has previously been accused of human rights 
abuses in Namibia; was assumed to be responsible for this murder (Lush, 1993: 215-217). 
On the 14 September 1989, SWAPO President, Sam Nujoma, accompanied by others, 
returned to Namibia after 30 years of exile. He was greeted by thousands of SWAPO 
supporters at the Windhoek International Airport. However, UNCIVPOL (United Nations 
Civilian Police); the UN police force, only reached its final strength of 1,500 policemen from 
25 countries on the 15 September 1989. Its special task was to control South Africa’s "special 
operations" unit, Koevoet which still intimidated the local population in the north. Many 
Koevoet and SWAPOL (South West Africa Police) members were essentially there to 
enforce a colonial-Apartheid system, rather than to be upholders of a neutral system of law 
and order and to protect the people. Conversely, the strength of SWAPOL began to diminish 
after UNCIVPOL reached its full strength. By the time of the November 1989 elections, 
UNCIVPOL was effectively the only organised law-enforcing body in the north of Namibia. 
UNCIVPOL also provided first-line policing for the UNHCR’s programme of returnee-
return, being present at the critical points of entry, and at the primary and secondary reception 
centres. UNCIVPOL was especially active in monitoring SWAPOL as the election campaign 
and programme of rallies became more intense. By the time of the elections UNCIVPOL 
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attended about 100 rallies a week, with SWAPOL having appeared only sporadically (Leys & 
Saul, 1995:133-135). 
On the eve of the elections, 6 November 1989, for the Constituent Assembly, UNTAG’s 
spokesperson declared that UNTAG monitors, "...from Oshakati to Keetmanshoop, from 
Swakopmund to Gobabis, report that the country is exceptionally calm". On the 7 November 
1989, elections for the Constituent Assembly took place. UN Special Representative Martti 
Ahtisaari declared that there was overwhelming voter turnout and that all regions reported a 
situation of overall calm. On the 11 November, Martti Ahtisaari declared the elections free 
and fair, commending Namibians for having demonstrated vast resources of calm, self-
discipline and determination. (Dierks, 2002; Lush, 1993: 245-250). 
However, there was a general break-down of law and order in the north with SWAPOL 
having been virtually passive. Many members packed their belongings and return to South 
Africa. The vacuum that developed in the north was troublesome. The Administrator-
General’s office was reminded by UNTAG that until independence South Africa has the 
responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. Various SWAPO members and the Joint 
Monitoring Commission mett to discuss international support up until independence; the 
status of South African troops stationed in Walvis Bay (which still was under South African 
administration); and South African supported military units such as Koevoet. SWAPO also 
approach Commonwealth countries for support and assistance in the creation of a Namibian 
military and police force. Just before Christmas two committees were established to look at 
the creation of the nucleus of a national army, and at the integration and training of a new 
Namibian police force. On 12 December 1989 the Home Affairs Minister-Designate, 
Hifikepunye Pohamba, approved a training course for the future NAMPOL (Namibian 
Police). By the 28 December, the first group of UNTAG soldiers left Namibia. However, 
Sam Nujoma asked one Kenyan battalion to stay behind and assist in the establishment of the 
future Namibian Defence Force. Likewise, the British Government had pledged its support in 
the task (Leys & Saul, 1995:137-139). 
On New Year’s Eve the Constituent Assembly voted unanimously for Namibia to become 
independent on 21 March 1990 (officially announced on 29 January 1990). This symbolic 
date must be seen as a remembrance of the occurrences in Sharpeville, South Africa, in 
March 1960. On the 9 January, the Constituent Assembly unanimously adopted a new 
Constitution. This symbolically and materially ended an era of colonial oppression and 
resistance against foreign rule. It was adopted at an outdoor ceremony before the facade of 
the Tintenpalast (previous residence of the German colonial administrations). Article 133 of 
the new Constitution provides that the Constituent Assembly would become the first National 
Assembly of Namibia, the first President being the person elected to that office in the 
Constituent Assembly. On 16 January, the Constituent Assembly unanimously elected Sam 
Nujoma President of the future independent state. 
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2.3.3 Ethnic and Racial Tensions during the Transition: 
During the transition, inter-ethnic and racial divides became apparent and threatened to 
destabilise the transition process. Radical and extremist groups began forming to either 
counter the transition or bring about more radical aspects of the formation of a new 
government and state institutions. A number of racially characterised political parties, civil 
society groups emerged during this period. The following part illustrates the effects of a 
number of issues and actions that were racially and ethnically motivated.   
During January 1988, the Supreme Court gave an advisory opinion that AG8 contradicted the 
Bill of Fundamental Human Rights as contained in Proclamation R101, however the SA 
Court of Appeal rejected the opinion. In March, another application was brought before the 
SWA Division of the Supreme Court whether the Proclamation on Representative Authorities 
according to the AG 8 Act of 1980 were not in contradiction to the "Bill of Fundamental 
Rights and Objectives" in the annex to Proclamation R101 of 1985. The court ruled in favour 
of abolishing of the AG 8 Act. However, the Action Front for the Retention of Turnhalle 
Principles (ACTUR) remained opposed to the abolition. The dispute in the transitional 
government of national unity was still not resolved by the 1 April 1989, when the 
implementation of Resolution 435 commenced (Dobell, 1998:70). 
On the 8 May 1989, UNTAG demanded the suspension of a senior policeman as a result of a 
South African police raid by the Koevoet on a church hospital in the north where Koevoet 
broke into the place in search of SWAPO soldiers whom they thought had sought sanctuary 
there. The suspension was granted and a joint committee was proposed to which all problems 
about bias and intimidation could be sent, with the authority to call on the Attorney-General 
to initiate prosecutions. 
Political violence increased at the end of September 1989 as voter registration ended on the 
22nd. On the 28th, at Windhoek-Katutura there was a scuffle between SWAPO and DTA 
(Democratic Turnhalle Alliance; the major opposition party to SWAPO) supporters, the worst 
such incident since the beginning of that year. About 500 DTA people marched into the 
middle of the SWAPO area of the township, with clubs and sticks. Fighting broke out almost 
immediately with in the end assault weapons being used. Several people were injured, 
fortunately nobody was killed. The South West African Police (SWAPOL) was suspiciously 
absent. Violence continued well into October 1989, often between SWAPO and DTA 
supporters, particularly in the north. UNTAG managed to contain the violence by persuading 
all parties to sign a "Code of Electoral Conduct".  
By the 24 October 1989, UNTAG had received reports from various sources about 
unexplained destabilising activities in the north. One example showed activities by the 
Ombili Foundation. This foundation supported Bushmen (San or Khoisan) activities in the 
north and had two objectives. One was to try to create and support a DTA presence in what 
was otherwise a SWAPO stronghold area through enticement and a show of force. The other 
was to conduct liaison with a large UNITA camp just across the Angolan border. The 
foundation was providing transit camps and general security for the supply route to this 
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UNITA formation from the Tsumeb-Grootfontein area. They also supported the readiness of 
South Africa supported Bushman contingents as a potential guerilla-type defensive entity 
(Dobell, 1998:90-92). 
On the 9January 1990, the Windhoek Municipality planed to celebrate Windhoek’s centenary 
but angered those people who believed the festivities would be honouring colonialism, as 
Windhoek was much older than a hundred years in 1990. SWAPO declared that the liberation 
movement would have nothing to do with the centenary celebrations. This development later 
led to the cancellation of the planned centenary celebrations. 
On the 14 January 1990, the South African Defence Force (SADF) asked the ex-soldiers of 
the Bushmen (San or Khoisan) military units under Koevoet, whether or not they want to 
move to South Africa. After a vote was taken, over half wanted to go to South Africa. Sam 
Nujoma strongly rejected the idea of relocating Bushmen of Namibian origin, but the first 
group was relocated to South Africa on 20 February 1990. On the 7 March 1990, at Omega 
(West Caprivi), members from the Tripartite Working Group on the Bushmen Issue met with 
Bushmen (San or Khoisan) elders, then with about 150 ex-soldiers of the Bushmen. The 
SWAPO delegation leader, brought a message from President Nujoma, personally, of 
reconciliation, protection and opportunities for all, without discrimination. The Bushmen 
were told that South Africa had its own problems, which were going to deepen. The Bushmen 
were advised to stay in Namibia in which they are genuinely welcome, rather than depart for 
some foreign country. However, Bushmen leaders pointed out that they had already taken 
their decision. They felt they were being pressured. They had chosen their future a year ago, 
and would not change their minds each time somebody from the new government visited 
them. At the Bushmen village of Mangetti Dune the same routine and much of the same 
discussion took place. The leaders, when asked why the Bushmen want to leave their native 
country, refer to incidents of discrimination and hostility towards Bushmen in Namibia. 
Because they had decided to leave, they had sold their houses and cattle, and there was now 
only option left to them; to leave Namibia for South Africa. By the 13 March, 1,340 
Bushmen and their dependants; and one day later, 585 left for Smithsdrift in South Africa. 
The move was completed on 16 March 1990, five days before Namibia’s independence 
(Dierks, 2002). 
A number of incidents had taken place during the transition which were racially motivated. 
As mentioned earlier, the notorious South African Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) which in 
the past had been responsible for numerous human right abuses in Namibia such as the killing 
of PLAN prisoners of war, tried to disturb the peace process. Wouter Basson allegedly tried 
to poison the water supply system at the Döbra reception centre for returning Namibian exiles 
with cholera bacterium. Later (2000) it was established that he allegedly ordered the 
"poisoning" of more than 200 SWAPO soldiers. Another incident of such nature was an 
attack of the regional offices of UNTAG in Outjo. The attack was perpetrated by three South 
African right-wingers, who would later be called the "Outjo firebomb attackers". Two 
Namibians were killed in the attack. After initial arrest, the three South Africans managed to 
flee and escape to South Africa (Dierks, 2002). 
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Another such incident occurred when the newspaper ‘The Namibian’ reported that 500 white 
extremists of the former colonial dispensation planned to overthrow the new Namibian 
government. On the 5 August 1989, a bomb was thrown into ‘The Namibian’ newspapers 
headquarters. Later, at the end of August, beginning of September and on 12 October, ten 
white men are arrested in conjunction with the supposed coup. Before the court case for high 
treason could be opened on 8 October, most of them managed to flee to South Africa (Lush, 
1993:174). Another ethnic incidence was the crisis that loomed in the Rehoboth area. The 
former South African policy of Apartheid had manifested in a demand by the political 
leadership of the Baster, under the Baster Captain Diergaardt, for autonomy for the Rehoboth 
area. During an unofficial Referendum, 84,1% of 9,289 Baster voters called for far reaching 
autonomy and special rights for the Baster group. The conflict escalated and, eventually, a 
visit of President Nujoma himself, on 3 November and a High Court decision influenced the 
Baster to recind their claims for secession (Dobell, 1998:114). 
To illustrate the racial divide in socio-economic development; the first census after 
independence resulted in a Namibian population of 1,4 million. Further statistics showed that 
annual per capita income was R3,000 (1988), whereby whites had an annual per capita 
income of R41,250 while 55% of the mainly black population had to live with an annual per 
capital income of only R212. During the International Donor Conference for Namibia that 
took place in New York, President Nujoma appealed to the conference to grade Namibia as a 
"Least Developed Country", in spite of the relatively high average per-capita income, but 
rather in the light of the extreme skewed income relations between the rich, mainly white and 
the poor, mainly black income groups (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:237-239). 
 
2.4 Outcomes: 
On the 14 November 1989, election results were announced with SWAPO taking 57,3%, 
DTA 28,6%, UDF 5,6%, ACN 3,5%, and other parties taking 1% and less of the casted votes. 
Over 97% of registered voters of 701,483 went to the polls. SWAPO won 41 of the 72 seats 
in the Assembly (Dierks, 2002). The DTA managed to block a two-thirds SWAPO majority 
by winning 21 seats. Of the 23 electoral districts, the DTA won 14, SWAPO 8 (including the 
three largest - Ovamboland, the Kavango and Windhoek) and the UDF one. The high DTA 
poll was achieved by a concerted South African effort to transport thousands of white South 
Africans and Angolan UNITA supporters to Namibia in order to vote against SWAPO. The 
two party leaders, Sam Nujoma and Mishake Muyongo, accepted the voting results as free 
and fair. On the 15 November 1989, SWAPO President Sam Nujoma announced that 
SWAPO did not want to create a one-party state, but would rather work together with its 
political opponents to build the new state (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:207, 253). 
On 21 March 1990, the Republic of Namibia was born, with Sam Nujoma as its first 
President. Nujoma was sworn in by UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. 30,000 
spectators in the Windhoek Sport Stadium viewed the great event. The independence 
celebrations were witnessed by representatives of 147 countries including 20 heads of state. 
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Leaders, whom international politics had previously precluded from official meetings finally 
met – F.W. De Klerk met with Yasser Arafat, Kenneth Kaunda and, Nelson Mandela who, 
just released from prison, made a precisely timed arrival, immediately before proceedings 
began. However, at the beginning of the proceedings turmoil erupted due to an incoming 
thunderstorm. Security people pushed some Prime Ministers into their seats. The turbulence 
resulted in some delays with independence being delayed by 15 minutes. The new proud flag 
of independent Namibia did not fly because there was no breeze; it drooped limply just as did 
the South African flag. The 78 members (including six appointed members by the President) 
of the National Assembly of the Republic of Namibia were sworn in (Dierks, 2002; Dobell, 
1998:107). On the 22 March, the last South African Administrator-General, Louis Pienaar, 
was given an official farewell by President Sam Nujoma; and on the 28 March UNTAG’s 
mandate came to an end. When it pulled back from its 236 premises, it did so with 
remarkable speed. 
 
2.5 Attempts at Reconciliation: 
On the 4 May 1988, Sam Nujoma (President of SWAPO) announced in Washington D.C. a 
policy of national reconciliation, neutrality and non-alignment by a future SWAPO 
government in Namibia. In June of 1988, the SWAPO leadership (Sam Nujoma, Hage 
Geingob and Hidipo Hamutenya and others) and a delegation of whites from Namibia met in 
Stockholm to negotiate. Present was also the newly appointed UN Commissioner for 
Namibia. Shortly afterwards a conference was held in Bremen, West Germany, on 
"Education for Liberation", attended by SWAPO members to facilitate the process of turning 
the SWAPO liberation movement into a political party capable of governing the country after 
the completion of the transition (Lush, 1993:80-85). 
By the end of March 1989, SWAPO, and especially its President, Sam Nujoma, proceeded to 
inform the PLAN soldiers stationed in SWAPO military bases of the ceasefire agreement 
which was to come into full effect by the 1 April 1989. He told them that from that day most 
of them would become civilians again and would return to Namibia to take part in the 
"political mobilisation of the masses and to vote for SWAPO". On the 2 July 1989, 
SWAPO’s vision of Independent Namibia was published in its Election Manifesto which was 
based on the drafted Constitution of 1975. It made provision for a bill of fundamental rights, 
the structure of state organs, citizenship requirements and the fundamental characteristics of 
the future Namibian state under the principle of "justice and equality for all" (Lush, 
1993:182-183). 
On the 8 January 1990, the designated Minister for Finance, Otto Herrigel, announced, in his 
first official speech, that independent Namibia would follow a pragmatic economic course. 
Namibia intended to stay for at least three years in the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU). Furthermore he proposed the establishment of an independent Central Bank (later 
Bank of Namibia). This showed SWAPO’s commitment to abstain from radical economic 
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reform, thereby soothing fears of the white business community who controlled to a large 
extent the Namibian economy. 
During the first session of the Constituent Assembly exactly one week after the elections, it 
was agreed that Namibia would be a multi-party democracy with an independent judiciary 
and a strong Bill of Rights which would protect civil liberties and oppose arbitrary 
expropriation of private property without justification. The first Speaker of the assembly 
chaired a Standing Committee which consisted of twelve SWAPO members and nine from 
other parties to draft the rules of procedure of the assembly which were adopted by the end of 
November 1989. The DTA proposed the acceptance of the SWAPO draft as the basis for 
drafting the Constitution. The constitutional draft was decisively designed by Hartmut Ruppel 
and the President of the NNF (Namibia National Front), Vekuui Rukoro. Namibia was the 
second country in Africa (after Cape Verde) to abolish the death penalty. The Bill of Rights 
was designed in such a way that the basic human rights clause cannot be changed, not even 
with a two-third majority in Parliament (Dobell, 1998:110-111). 
A cornerstone of the national policy of the new independent Namibia was the policy of 
national reconciliation. The policy seeks to address the consequences of the legacy of 
Namibia’s violent past, dating back to German colonial times, specifically the German 
Colonial genocide of the Herero people during the uprising of 1904-1907, the South African 
oppression and effects of the Apartheid system together with human rights violations 
committed during the liberation struggle. This policy of national reconciliation would also 
redress economic disparities in a peaceful fashion in order to achieve the fruits of the 
Namibian independence for all Namibians (Dobell, 1998:86-89). 
The SWAPO Congress that took place in Windhoek, in the beginning of December 1991, saw 
a new Party Constitution and a new political programme being adopted. This programme 
paved the way for the change from a liberation movement to a political party. A new Central 
Committee was elected and, surprisingly, two white members managed their way into the 
highest party body for the first time. While approximately 50% of the government positions 
had been allocated to the Oshivambo speaking community (the largest ethnic group in 
Namibia), other Namibian communities were also represented. The key positions were filled 
by formerly exiled SWAPO members of the SWAPO Central Committee. The white and 
especially the German speaking community were noticeably over-represented. Two deputy 
ministers belonged to opposition parties (NNF and UDF). This setup of government indicated 
SWAPO’s somewhat vague willingness to follow its own policy of "National Reconciliation" 
(Dobell, 1998:111-112). 
To allow for a degree of power sharing with the opposition, the Cabinet approved newly 
consolidated political and administrative regional structures for the country. According to the 
recommendations of the Delimitation Commission, Namibia would be subdivided into 13 
regions. These regions form the base from which to select the second chamber of Parliament, 
the National Council. In subsequence of the Cabinet Decision dated 17 August, the 
Government appointed Regional Commissioners for the 13 regions. In the spirit of the policy 
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of national reconciliation members of other political parties and former SWAPO detainees 
were also appointed (Dobell, 1998:129-130). 
At the end of August 1992, the Regional Councils Act, the Regional Authorities Act and the 
Electoral Act were promulgated by the National Assembly, creating the basis for the 
establishment for the second house of Parliament, the National Council. The National 
Council consisted of two Regional Councillors for each of the 13 regions which were 
established by the Delimitation Commission in 1990. All voters in the local authorities had to 
elect their representatives, with the result that for the first time cities and towns like 
Windhoek got a majority black City Council and black majors. 
In order to balance "the two Namibias", SWAPO made known a major infrastructure 
upgrading programme for the formerly neglected Ovamboland in northern Namibia. Special 
emphasis was laid on the cost-optimised and economically and financially feasibility of the 
programme, taking into account social problems like unemployment, gender balance and 
environmental arguments. To this effect labour-based construction methods were used to 
provide employment to many of the returning Namibian exiles and former PLAN members. 
The financing of these ambitious projects had to be realised from Namibian budget 
allocations and donor assistance from various countries. The realisation of the ambitious 
project in the subsequent ten years comprised one of the greatest successes of the SWAPO 
government (Dobell, 1998:86-89). 
The Foreign Investment Bill created the foundation for a free market economy. Approved 
foreign investments were guaranteed and would be granted free access to foreign currencies. 
Foreign investments were protected and conflict resolutions follow international practices. 
However, in 1991, 1992 and 1993, the new government made no serious attempt at 
alleviating the inherited social imbalance between black and white communities (Dobell, 
1998: 118-119).  
The drought catastrophe of 1991 resulted in some hundred Damara who were resettled 
against their will in Otjohorongo in 1956 returning and camping next to the main road from 
Windhoek to the Daan Viljoen game park. They demanded the return of their ancestral land. 
Another such issue re-emerged when the Popular Movement 1904 (PM 1904) was founded in 
July 1988 as a political pressure group with the aim of repatriating all refugees who settled in 
Botswana in the aftermath of the Ovaherero-German War of 1904/06. Another aim was to 
bring about government dedication to the cause of returning confiscated land. In June 1991, 
the governments of Botswana and Namibia reached an agreement regarding the establishment 
of a Joint Commission to Repatriate Persons of Namibian Origin from Botswana. The target 
group to be repatriated were the descendants of Herero who fled during the Ovaherero-
German War. Consequently the land issue became a hotly debated topic in the new National 
Assembly (Dierks, 2002). 
Eventually, the long awaited Land Conference took place with 500 delegates in Windhoek 
during the last week of June 1991. The conference ended with 23 resolutions which had only 
recommending and not binding effect. The existing status quo in the sensitive land issue was 
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maintained. The existing imbalance in the land distribution was also kept. Demands for the 
return of land on ground of historical claims were excluded. Transfer of land was only 
possible for just compensation in accordance with the Namibian Constitution. The Cabinet 
appointed a Technical Committee on Commercial Farmland (TCCF) under the auspices of 
the Office of the Prime Minister. It had to investigate the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Land Conference of 1991. It was tasked to create a comprehensive, 
fair and transparent tax on commercial farm land (Dobell, 1998:122-125). 
However, SWAPO sought to broker a new deal regarding the land issue by declaring that 
there would not be any large-scale nationalisation of the land. It was envisaged that a 
combination of state farms, cooperatives, peasant communities and commercial farming was 
to be established to broaden participation and increase agricultural production. White 
commercial farmers were urged to remain in Namibia and assured that in an independent 
Namibia under a SWAPO government, “... for them there would be better opportunities for 
comfortable and secure undertakings than a foreign country...” (Dobell, 1998:88). Rural 
economic development would be encouraged and employment opportunities created through 
the promotion of agro-industries and processing plants. 
 
2.6 Assessment: 
The Namibian transition was turbulent at best and often time close of being scrapped entirely 
by either party involved. Due to malignant efforts of the South African administration, using 
shadow tactics and covert operations, the transition to independence was fraught with trail-
and-error scenarios. A number of mistakes could have been avoided had the negotiating 
parties agreed on rules of the transition beforehand. As pointed out, SWAPO did ultimately 
not have significant influence in shaping the transition process, with the main negotiations 
and deliberations taking place between the South African Administrator-General and the UN 
envoy, Martti Ahtisaari. The SWAPO leadership eventually realised that a radical revolution 
before, during or after the transition was not a viable option. They also realised that, since the 
economy was controlled by the white community, any radical wholesale changes would most 
probably cause nationwide disaster and economic meltdown. The new majority SWAPO 
government awaited a grand task in correcting more than 100 years of colonial rule based on 
racial and ethnic segregation. 
Although the SWAPO leadership committed itself to reconciliation and keeping to the rules 
of democracy as outlined in the Bill of Rights, there were virtually no bottom-up attempts at 
national reconciliation. Racial and ethnic tension was common before and during the 
transition and did not abate afterwards. Many Namibians from the white community feared 
for their socio-economic status and believed that SWAPO would instigate a Soviet-style 
socialist revolution. Other non-white communities saw the formation of the Namibian state as 
an opportunity for either demanding secession, such as the Baster in the Rehoboth area and 
the Caprivi communities, or by immigrating such as the Bushmen community. Instead, ethnic 
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reconciliation would have to be top-down, formulated and executed by the SWAPO 
government. The effects of this on reconciliation will be explored in Chapter Four.  
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Chapter Three 
The South African Transition 1990-1994 
3.1 Introduction: 
South Africa held its first ever fully inclusive democratic elections on the 27 April 1994. A 
short time before, such an event was thought to be unachievable; the peaceful manner of the 
transition from an authoritarian state ruled by the white minority to a democratic black 
majority state unthinkable. The first ever fully inclusive government brought together 
antagonists and protagonists in sharing power and control of the country. The ANC (African 
National Congress), the NP (National Party) and the IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party) joined 
together in a Government of National Unity (GNU) to dismantle the Apartheid state and 
bring about equality for all South Africans. The 1994 election was hailed as a miracle and in 
contrast to South Africa’s very recent past, a great achievement that instilled a sense of 
optimistic enthusiasm about the future of South Africa (Mattes, 2002:22).3 
As pointed out by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:178), the collapse of military support for 
the ANC by the Communist East Bloc in the late 1980s, the increasingly ungovernable 
situation of the nation by the government to control political violence and mass insurrection, 
and international sanctions against South Africa, and its then government, created an impasse 
in which neither the NP government and the ANC could achieve its preferred political goals. 
The situation of the time forced both parties to negotiate a solution to the countries problems. 
After much negotiation and political manoeuvring, eventually the white minority accepted 
black majority rule under free elections and universal franchise and rights; and the black 
majority conceded proportional representation in government, job security for white civil 
servants and an amnesty for security forces that committed crimes against humanity under the 
old regime. To quote Omer-Cooper (1995:849), “Thus the new South Africa was born in far 
more joyous atmosphere then even the most optimistic had dared.” 
The 1994 election, the creation of GNU and the dismantling of Apartheid allowed South 
Africa to re-enter the international community after having suffered severe sanctions on the 
economic, sport, scientific and social levels. Sanctions had badly damaged the economy and 
had made the country ungovernable. Linked with internal resistance by the populace who had 
banded together in a number of anti-Apartheid movements and an armed struggle waged by 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the military wing of the ANC, and the Azanian 
People’s Liberation Army (APLA), the military wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). 
The combination of regional instability, global sanctions, labour shortages and declining 
resources and a weakening resolve of the Apartheid administration caused increases in the 
human and material cost of state repression; all contributing to the eventual negotiated nature 
of the transition (du Toit, 1995:194). For the South African Apartheid state, having been 
substantially weakened by both domestic and international pressure by the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, a negotiated settlement was the best opportunity for the authoritarian regime to 
end the stalemate and return the country to normal and peaceful conditions.  
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3.2 Historical Overview: 
From 1910 to 1948, political power was dominated by pro-British, English-speaking interests 
until the Afrikaner dominated National Party gained control over the state in 1948. The party 
had campaigned on a racial platform of separate development – Apartheid – and began 
implementing the policy directly after assuming government power. Apartheid was brutally 
oppressive and entailed economic, social and political programmes to advance the interests of 
Afrikaners and the white community in general. This system was rationalised by 
hypernationalism, a system of repression; and strict Calvinist religious convictions of the 
Afrikaner people (Deegan, 2001: 13-14). However, racial segregation policies had been in 
effect prior to 1948, some as early as 1894. The key pieces of pre-Apartheid and early 
Apartheid legislation are drawn together in table 3.1 The essential pillar of Apartheid was the 
notion of racial purity and separate economic and social development for the different racial 
groups in South Africa. 
Non-white groups began to resist this form of institutionalised oppression early on with the 
founding of the ANC in 1912. The ANC at that time sought inclusion into the existing 
political system and eventually attracted a mass following. When it became clear that 
methods of peaceful resistance were being met with aggressive and brutal repression, the 
ANC decided to formally adopt a policy of armed struggle in 1961. Many of its leaders were 
caught and, charged with treason, imprisoned for life at the Rivonia Trail in 1964.  
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Table 3.2.1 Key Pieces of Pre-Apartheid and Early Apartheid Era Legislation 
Pre-Apartheid 
Legislation 
Year enacted Function 
Glen Gray Act 1894 Restrict black landholdings (principally 
the Cape) 
Mines and Works Act 1911 Barred Africans from skilled positions 
Native Lands Act 1913 Limited African landownership to 7% of 
land (all in “native” reserves) 
Native Trust and Land 
Act 
1936 Limited African landownership to 13% of 
land 
Natives (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act 
1945 Mandated carrying of passes in Urban 
areas for Africans 
Early Apartheid 
Legislation 
  
Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriage Act 
1949 Outlawed interracial marriages 
Population Registration 
Act 
1950 Classified South African by “race” 
Group Areas Act 1950 Outlawed interracial communities and 
created racially defined residential areas 
Suppression of 
Communism Act 
1950 Granted State broad police powers to 
prevent “communistic” activity 
Bantu Education Act 1953 Consigned African to menial education 
Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act 
1953 Outlawed integration of public facilities 
Native Labour 
(Settlement and 
Disputes) Act 
1953 Made African Strikes illegal 
(Adapted from Table 9.1 by Bauer & Taylor, 2005:243). 
 
During the 1970s and by the 1980s, the resistance struggle had become more serious an issue 
for  the NP government. Domestic mass action against Apartheid was met by state violence 
and the imposition of states of emergency even further curtailing the rights of blacks and 
other non-white communities. The Apartheid state developed a massive security apparatus 
designed to defeat dissent from black communities. This was met with mass mobilisation 
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throughout the country. Over time, the black urban townships became ungovernable. Also, a 
number of civil-society organisation emerged, for example the United Democratic Front 
(UDF), mobilising its members in boycott activities. Trade unions also contributed to the 
anti-Apartheid struggle by instigating campaigns of civil disobedience and strikes. The 
setting up of a Tricameral Parliament by the NP was an attempt at rearranging Apartheid in 
1983. This Tricameral Parliament was however also boycotted by the UDF. Pragmatic 
reforms in the economy were introduced at the behest of the business community while the 
government tried to court the Coloured and Indian communities by offering the political 
concessions and bringing them into central government, excluding however, the majority 
black population. In the Tricameral Parliament each assembly had control over its own 
concerns. The NP envisaged a bloc of non-blacks to prevent the ‘black-power onslaught’ 
(Deegan, 2001: 44-60).  
The end of Apartheid was manifest in its own design. An oppression of any people will 
eventually lead to resistance. The creation of the State Security Council (SSC) in 1972 and 
the implementation of the ‘total strategy’ aimed at restoring total state control were a result of 
the way in which the NP government perceived its position in South African society. 
Everything was viewed through a prism of security which meant that any anti-state action by 
the populace was a threat to its security. During the Botha administration, the SSC was 
upgraded and the South African Police (SAP) and South African Defence Force (SADF) 
were integrated and given wide-ranging powers; from riot control to the infiltration and 
prosecution of anti-Apartheid organisations. After the Soweto riots in 1976, the expenditure 
of the Department of Law and Order increased by 800% between 1975 and 1986. This use of 
indiscriminate force to subdue the ANC and other outlawed organisations caused an 
environment of violence and lawlessness. In February 1989 F.W. de Klerk was thrust into the 
limelight as the new NP party leader. He believed that the NP had to make fundamental 
changes as the mounting crisis was engulfing the nation (Deegan, 2001:61-68). 
De Klerk eventually played an instrumental part in facilitating the transition to majority rule. 
In his now famous 2 February 1990 Speech, he promulgated the removal of a 30 year old ban 
of the ANC, PAC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) and ordered the release of 
Mandela and most of his compatriots by 11 February 1990. This marked the beginning of the 
end for Apartheid as a state system (du Toit, 2001:58). As Fredericks Van Zyl Slabbert 
(2006:16) points out, the intensity of the decision by De Klerk to unravel the Apartheid 
system came as surprise to most in the security establishment but most had seen that there 
was no military solution to South Africa’s problem. There were concerns about internal revolt 
at the time and the solution to these concerns lay in political negotiations for a fully-inclusive 
democracy. However, many of the minority-white government and populace felt betrayed 
and their interests marginalised through De Klerk’s actions (Slabbert, 2006:17). 
By the beginning of 1989, South Africa's economy had been feeling the impact of economic 
sanctions and other anti-Apartheid measures by many of the country's major trading partners 
and their business entities. While such sanctions had not yet resulted in a deep recession, they 
had forced the regime to pay a high price for Apartheid, and over the next few years the 
country’s economic survival came at the cost of reduced growth, rising inflation, high 
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unemployment and subsequently more social unrest. Economic sanctions by most of South 
Africa’s industrialised trading partners had resulted in a loss of export income. The price of 
gold had dropped and the balance-of-payments had worsened considerably. Economic growth 
was only an estimated 2,7% in 1988. Apartheid had started to severely affect South African 
businesses negatively. The prospect of ‘separate development’ for the different racial groups 
had become an unattainable prospect by 1989 due to regional developments such as the 
advent of the Namibian transition; the outcome of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale which 
placed the South African military operations in Angola at a disadvantage; as well as the end 
of the Cold War which ultimately meant the end of Soviet and Cuban support for the ANC – 
a crucial factor in the NP’s decision to start negotiations with the ANC (Ottaway, 1993:134-
135).  
 
3.3 The Transition: an Overview 
The parties that formed the major contenders for power during the negotiations were the 
National Party (NP) government and the Africa National Congress (ANC). By the beginning 
of the transition, both parties, saw themselves to be at an advantage and perceived themselves 
as being able to win; the ANC due to its numerical superiority and the NP due to its control 
of the state apparatus. The balance of power eventually shifted to the ANC with many of the 
NP’s demands being rescinded by having failed to gain concessions from the ANC. 
Negotiations had begun as early as 1985 when secret meetings were held between the 
imprisoned Nelson Mandela and NP justice minister Kobie Coetsee at the behest of then-
President P.W. Botha. These talks were aimed at discovering each other’s positions and 
beliefs.  
The following three years of negotiations between mainly the ANC and the NP, with other 
parties joining in occasionally, were marked by repeated violent and politically motivated 
clashes, suspensions and occasional public accusations of other parties acting in bad faith of 
the transition. This period was overshadowed by a worsening security environment, growing 
community violence and accusations of the state instigating violence in the black community, 
specifically between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC (Bauer & Taylor, 
2005:246). As the Apartheid state began to unravel in the early 1990s due to reverse 
demographics for the white population of South Africa, economic stagnation and increased 
black resistance; the NP elite became less interested in ethnic separate development and more 
interested in negotiating a position for themselves and the white community in South Africa 
(Giliomee, 1997:126-130).  
By the end of November and beginning of December 1990, de Klerk issueed a statement that 
the National Security Management System (NSMS) was to be disbanded and met with 
Nelson Mandela to discuss the country’s political future. After de Klerk’s, speech at the 
opening of Parliament, he announced among other measures, the suspension of the death 
sentence, the release of some political prisoners and the partial lifting of restrictions on the 
media and on some detainees. Consequently, Nelson Mandela was released from prison on 
the 11 February 1990 after 27 years (Sparks, 1995:107-8 & 120-123). 
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On the 16 December 1990, the ANC held its first national consultative conference inside 
South Africa in 31 years. The Conference, which lasted three days and was attended by 1,600 
delegates, mandated the National Executive Committee to “serve notice on the regime that 
unless all the obstacles are removed on or before 30 April 1991, the ANC shall consider the 
suspension of the whole negotiation process" and announced that 1991 would be a "year of 
mass action". It rejected a call to relax international sanctions against South Africa and 
approved the creation of "defence units" to protect townships residents. At the conference, 
Nelson Mandela was elected President of the ANC, replacing Oliver Tambo (Marais, 
2001:86-87). 
Exactly one year after the speech by de Klerk that ushered in the end of Apartheid, de Klerk 
made a speech at the opening of Parliament that legislation would be tabled for the repeal of 
the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the Group Areas Act of 1966 and the Development of Black 
Communities Act of 1984, as well as the Population Registration Act of 1950. The repeal of 
the latter would be accompanied by the adoption of temporary transitional measures. 
President de Klerk also declared his opposition to the idea of a Constituent Assembly and to 
that of an interim government (similar to Namibia’s transition). On the 16 June 1991, the 
ANC began an open-ended campaign of public protest with a day of rallies, work stoppages 
and threats of a crippling general strike until the government agreed to terms for the creation 
of an interim government and an elected assembly to write a new constitution. On the 17th the 
Boipatong township massacre took place. Armed attackers shot and hacked their way through 
the black township leaving more than 40 people dead and many injured, including women 
and children. Witnesses said that the violence was perpetrated by residents of a nearby hostel. 
Following the Boipatong massacre, the ANC suspended bilateral talks with the government 
and participation in CODESA negotiations, accusing security forces of collusion with the 
attackers (which was later found to be untrue) (Sparks, 1995:142-143). 
By November 1992, de Klerk announced a proposed government timetable on a transitional 
process in South Africa which envisaged that a fully representative government of national 
unity would be in place no later than the first half of 1994. In January 1993, bilateral 
meetings were held between the government and both the IFP and the ANC. These meetings 
aimed to lay a foundation for negotiation between various interested parties by the end of 
1993 and how power was to be shared between black and white. At the opening of 
Parliament, President F.W. de Klerk warned that South Africa would be plunged into a 
Yugoslav style civil war if democratic negotiations failed. Multi-party constitutional talks 
would be resumed in March. The ANC expressed deep concerns at the sincerity of the South 
African’s government’s commitment to peaceful negotiations when it was revealed that 
SADF had a budget of R4,38 million for its secret Defence Special Account sub-section the 
CCB during the previous financial year (Marais, 2001: 89-90). 
On the 16 January 1994, the PAC suspended its armed struggle and its guerrillas disarmed. 
On the 2 February, President de Klerk announced that South Africa's first non-racial 
democratic elections would be held from 26-28 April 1994. However, on the 14 February, at 
a meeting in Durban City hall, Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini told President de Klerk that he 
was prepared to set up a Zulu Kingdom. In a memorandum he presented to President de 
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Klerk, the Zulu King rejected South Africa's interim constitution. To defuse black and white 
threats of conflict, Nelson Mandela announced six constitutional concessions. Amongst them 
were a change from a single to a double-ballot system and provision for each province to 
determine its form of government. The ANC and the South African government made further 
concessions in an attempt to draw other parties into an inclusive constitutional settlement 
(Robertson, 1994:60-62). 
 
3.3.1 Attempts at Influence by the International Community: 
In contrast with the Namibian transition, the international community’s involvement in the 
South African transition was substantial but not significant. Most of the action taken by either 
the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, the Non-Alignment Movement and 
other actors, was limited to an advisory capacity. The reasoning by the NP and ANC was that 
they would have to negotiate the transition and resolve their differences themselves due to the 
severity of the situation. In addition, there was distrust of the international community from 
both sides (from the NP, of the UN which had for decades criticised the Apartheid state; and 
from the ANC of states like the USA and the UK, which until the mid-1980s had continued to 
support the NP government). For South Africa to make a peaceful transition, South Africans 
themselves would have to commit to peaceful negotiations and not rely on foreign influence 
that could possibly have negative effects on the transition process. Therefore, the South 
African transition was by and large internally negotiated and organised.  
There are a few known events where the international community was involved in the South 
African transition. On the 22 March 1990, after meeting with F.W. de Klerk, the US 
Secretary of State, James Baker, reported that the South African President had assured him 
that the government had started an irreversible process and that it was going to follow it to its 
logical conclusion. The Reagan Administration pledged its support and guaranteed the 
abolishment of sanctions as soon as possible. The first inclusion of foreign elements in the 
transition process took place in December 1991 as the United Nations Secretary-General 
announced that Mrs. Sadako Ogata, High Commissioner for Refugees, and Professor Ibrahim 
Gambari, Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, would lead the United 
Nations observer delegation to CODESA. In addition to the United Nations, the Organisation 
of African Unity, the Movement of Non-Aligned countries, the Commonwealth and the 
European Community were also observers at CODESA. In January 1993, The 
Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa (COMSA), a 15-member team, which 
consisted of police, military, legal and political experts further, advised the negotiating 
parties of the transition that South Africa's best hope of containing the political violence that 
had engulfed the country by then, was to move speedily toward democratic elections and a 
durable resolution of the country's political crisis.  
 
International mediators Henry Kissinger and Lord Carrington, who had played a major role in 
the Zimbabwean independence talks, arrived in South Africa, but left within twenty-four 
hours because the parties were unable to agree on the terms of reference for the mediators. 
They left behind a little-known Kenyan negotiator, Washington Okumu, a friend of IFP 
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leader Buthelezi for over twenty years. Speculation remains over the role that Okumu played 
in convincing Buthelezi to participate in the elections after all, less than a week before the 
elections were scheduled to take place (Bouckaert, 2009 :250). 
 
3.3.2 South Africans Negotiating their Future: 
As mentioned above, the South African transition was by and large organised and executed 
by the South African NP government and the major contenders for power, the ANC and to a 
lesser extent the IFP. South Africans wanted to demonstrate to the international community 
that they were capable of negotiating a peaceful transition to an inclusive democracy where 
universal human rights and a government of national unity had replaced Apartheid and the 
oppression of one people by another had ceased. The following is an account of the major 
turning points and the internally-driven nature of the process. 
On the 2 February 1989, F.W. de Klerk took over the post of party leader from P.W. Botha, 
who still remained President of South Africa. The first serious attempts of reform were 
undertaken with the establishment of the Free Settlement Board to legalise multi-racial free 
settlement areas in carefully chosen zones in main cities and towns. On the 29 June 1989, 
F.W. de Klerk explained to the NP Federal Congress in Pretoria the Party’s next five-year 
plan, outlining the aspect of giving black South Africans a say in running the country and at 
the same time maintaining white superiority. The NP adopted this five-year programme, 
which included a "reform" plan to give South Africa's black majority a role in national as 
well as local government. However, the government was not able to persuade any prominent 
black leaders to negotiate on the "reform" initiative, with the ANC claiming that it would 
consider nothing less than a one-man, one-vote system.  
From the 2 to 4 May the ANC and the government held the Groote Schuur talks in which 
both parties reached an agreement on conditions for full-scale negotiations on ending political 
conflict in South Africa. At the end of the talks, the South African government and the ANC 
issued a joint statement entitled “the Groote Schuur Minute”. The statement addressed the 
issue of the release of political prisoners; included temporary immunity from prosecution for 
selected ANC members; and that the government would seek to end the state of emergency. 
Both parties pledged themselves to end the climate of violence and intimidation and 
committed themselves to a peaceful process of negotiations and to establish effective lines of 
communications (Ottaway, 1993:173-75). 
On 7 August 1990, the ANC and the South African Government issued a joint declaration 
(the “Pretoria Minute”) in which the ANC announced that it would immediately suspend all 
armed actions, while the Government undertook to consider lifting the state of emergency in 
Natal as early as possible and to continue reviewing the security legislation and its 
application in order to ensure free political activity. The final report of the Joint Working 
Group (established at the Groote Schuur talks) on political offences was accepted by both 
parties. Both sides pledged to redouble efforts to reduce the level of violence in the country 
(Saul, 1993:102-105). Compared to Namibia, political violence between members of 
SWAPO and opposition parties was mainly caused by instigation of the South African 
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regime. As had been pointed out, South Africa covertly financed political opposition parties 
to create a climate of uncertainty and fear during the period 1989-90 in Namibia’s rural and 
township areas. 
Meanwhile, the security situation further deteriorated to the point where, on the 6 September 
1990, two gunmen opened fire on a crowd of commuters in Johannesburg railway station 
killing 26 people. It was later alleged that South African Special Forces were responsible. On 
the 11th, a delegation of officials of the ANC, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) met with President de Klerk and 
discussed the issue of violence. After the meeting, ANC Deputy-President Nelson Mandela, 
who led the delegation, warned that "the failure of action on the part of the Government 
threatened the peace process". As a measure to curb politically motivated violence during the 
negotiations and to resolve the factional fighting between the IFP and ANC, both parties met 
during the middle of September in Durban to discuss ways of ending the violence in Natal 
and the townships. By the 8 October, after a meeting between Mandela and de Klerk, a joint 
statement is issued that outlined the acknowledgement that different perceptions of the 
violence of the two parties concerning the causes existed (Saul, 1993:106). As one can see, 
the parties involved in the negotiations tried to contain and curb the political violence by 
calling on their members and supporters to cease hostilities. During the Namibian transition, 
the military wing of UNTAG took over a similar responsibility, by providing security and 
police work. 
On the 29 January 1991, a summit meeting was held in Durban between the ANC and the 
Inkatha Freedom Party. The meeting was addressed by Zulu Chief Buthelezi and ANC then-
Deputy President Nelson Mandela. In a joint statement, both parties expressed their 
commitment to political tolerance and called on the security forces to play an effective peace-
keeping role. On the 12 February 1991, following a 12-hour meeting in Cape Town between 
President de Klerk and ANC Deputy-President Nelson Mandela, they announced that they 
had resolved differences on the interpretation of the Pretoria Minute. Under the new 
agreement, the authorities undertook to expedite the return of exiles and the release of 
political prisoners while the ANC conceded to end the recruitment and training of cadres for 
its military branch Umkhonto we Sizwe. On the 22 June 1991, a church-sponsored peace 
conference for the first time included the government, ANC, IFP, PAC the Azanian People's 
Organisation (AZAPO) and representatives of the South African Communist Party, as well as 
other parliamentary parties and trade unions. A preparatory committee was formed which 
included working groups that would study the possibility of adopting codes of conduct for 
political organisations and the security forces as well as mechanisms for enforcing a peace 
agreement, and the reconstruction of areas affected by violence (Sparks, 1995:153-154). 
On the 22 July 1991, following an emergency meeting of its National Working Committee, 
the ANC called, among other things, for the dismissal of Law and Order Minister Adriaan 
Vlok and Defence Minister Magnus Malan; the establishment of a multi-party commission of 
inquiry into the authorities' involvement in the violence and the secret funding of political 
activity, as well as the public dismantling of all special counter-insurgency forces. On the 
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23rd, The Inkatha Gate10 scandal claimed its first victim, when the personal assistant to Chief 
Buthelezi (President of the Inkatha Freedom Party and Chief Minister of Kwa-Zulu), resigned 
after admitting that he acted as a middle man who organised covert funds paid by the Security 
Police for two Inkatha rallies. De Klerk announced on the 29th that Vlok and Malan would be 
replaced by Hernus Kriel and Roelf Meyer (who later became one of the key figures in the 
negotiations) respectively. The former two would occupy other ministerial positions. On the 
30th, de Klerk announced that all special projects and secret funds designated for political 
purposes are to be ceased and investigated. 
On the 15 August, the South African government, and the ANC and IFP agreed on a draft 
National Peace Accord which they described as a firm foundation on which peace in South 
Africa could be achieved. The accord included a Code of Conduct for political parties, a 
Code of Conduct for the police and the security forces, provisions for socio-economic 
development, and a complex set of enforcement mechanisms. This National Peace Accord 
was signed in Johannesburg by 23 political parties and organisations including the ANC, the 
IFP and a number of political parties, trade unions, religious and civic organisations, as well 
as the government on the 14 September. Many others endorsed it, including the Pan-
Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC). It included a Code of Conduct for security forces and 
political parties; and established a National Peace Committee and a Commission of Inquiry 
Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation to monitor implementation of 
the Accord. 
On the 27 October 1991, at the end of a Patriotic United Front Conference held in Durban 
and attended by some 90 organisations, participants adopted a Declaration in which they 
called for a Constituent Assembly to draft and adopt a democratic constitution; a sovereign 
Interim Government/Transitional Authority; and an All Party Congress/Pre-Constituent 
Assembly Meeting, brought together by independent and neutral conveners, to be held as 
soon as possible. On the 30 November, at the end of a two-day preparatory meeting chaired 
by two judges, 19 political and other organisations decided unanimously that the first meeting 
of a Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) would be held near Johannesburg 
on 20 and 21 December 1991, to discuss constitutional principles; constitution-making body 
or process; and transitional arrangements. Participating delegations also agreed on a nine-
point agenda for the Convention, the establishment of a steering committee to facilitate its 
convening; and on invitations to various international organisations to observe its 
proceedings. The PAC, however, disassociated itself from the final statement. Several PAC 
proposals, such as neutral international conveners, the holding of CODESA outside of South 
Africa and the opening of CODESA's sessions to the media, were rejected by the other 
parties (Sparks, 1995:133-136). 
On the 20 and 21 December 1991 CODESA held its first meeting. Seventeen of the nineteen 
parties attending the Convention signed a Declaration of Intent, whereby they committed 
themselves to multiparty politics. Tension arose out of ethnic differences when Chief 
                                                 
10
 A scandal where it had become known that the NP government had been covertly funding the IFP to 
perpetrate political violence against its rival the ANC. The IFP leadership denied these allegations. 
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Buthelezi of the IFP did not attend the first session of CODESA, as the decision taken by its 
Steering Committee not to invite Zulu King Goodwill Zelethini amounted to an insult. The 
PAC also did not attend (Ottaway, 1993:157-59).  
In February 1992, the ANC had submitted its constitutional blue-print to CODESA. It 
suggested a two phase transitional period of multiparty rule for fifteen months, to be followed 
by a coalition government for up to five years. However, Defence Minister Roelf Meyer said 
that the ANC's proposals on joint control of security forces and on a role for the international 
community in the supervision of the transition were not acceptable to the NP government. 
The ANC President, however, called for an independent international monitoring force 
consisting of the UN, US and Soviet delegates to help curb violence in South Africa, saying 
that the government had abdicated itself from its duties. The South African government 
submitted its proposal for an interim constitution for South Africa to CODESA on the 23 
April (Ottaway, 1993:168-69). 
By the 12 May 1992, an agreement was reached in Working Group III of CODESA on the 
establishment of a multiparty Transitional Executive Council (TEC), which could make 
decisions by an 80% majority. Participants in Working Group I agreed that all security forces 
were to be placed under the control of the transitional governmental structures. However, 
CODESA talks ended in deadlock on the 16 May 1992 due to the ANC threatening mass 
action if the government did not compromise on constitutional issues. The second round of 
CODESA (II) talks ended without any significant progress being achieved. Failure to resolve 
the deadlock on issues related to the constitution-making process prevented the consideration 
of other issues. The ANC decided on mass action to press for the establishment of an interim 
government and elections for a Constituent Assembly (Marais, 2001:91-92). 
To break the stalemate that had engulfed CODESA II, President de Klerk offered to lower the 
margin of approval needed for changes in South Africa's constitution from 75 per cent to 70 
per cent. This issue, among others, had brought the talks to an impasse.  Agreement was 
reached between the South African Police, ANC, SACP and COSATU on the principles 
outlined by a panel of experts on how mass demonstrations should be handled. The IFP 
declared it was unable to agree to terms restricting the carrying of cultural weapons. On the 
27 July 1992, church leaders launched a major initiative among business, labour, government 
and political groups to restart negotiations and help create a more favourable political 
climate. The ANC organised a general strike on the 3 August aimed not as an insurrection but 
the peaceful removal of de Klerk from power; the immediate transfer of political power to the 
people; installation of an interim government; and free and fair elections to a Constituent 
Assembly. The ANC requested the United Nations to send observers, with which the UN 
complied. From the 3 to 5 August 1992, millions of workers joined the ANC in a nation-wide 
general strike (Sparks, 1995:135-136). 
On the 21 August 1992, ANC Secretary-General Cyril Ramaphosa met with Constitutional 
Affairs Minister Roelf Meyer to discuss possible compromises on ANC pre-conditions to the 
resumption of negotiations and the revamping of the National Peace Accord (Sparks, 
1995:137-138). On the 26 September, a bilateral summit between delegations of the ANC 
and the South African government, led respectively by Nelson Mandela and President de 
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Klerk, were held in Johannesburg. A joint Record of Understanding was published, which 
laid the basis for the resumption of negotiations. Agreement was reached, in particular, on the 
banning of dangerous weapons throughout the country; the fencing of a number of hostels; 
the release of all remaining political prisoners before 15 November 1992; and the need for an 
elected Constituent Assembly with a fixed time frame and adequate deadlock-breaking 
mechanisms. However, the IFP rejected the deal brokered between the government and the 
ANC as illegitimate; the concept of a Constituent Assembly was rejected as a decision was 
taken to brake off talks with the government.  
On the 5 March 1993, delegations from 26 parties and organisations held a two-day 
multiparty planning conference ending a 10-month negotiation deadlock. In a resolution 
adopted by all the parties, except the Conservative Party which abstained, they agreed to start 
new multiparty negotiations not later than 5 April 1993. The only major political parties not 
present were the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) and the Afrikaner-
Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), who had refused to participate in multi-party talks. On the 1 
April, representatives from 26 South African political parties and organisations resumed 
multiparty negotiations marking the start of serious deliberations on the transition since the 
collapse of CODESA I and II. These multi-party negotiations had a broader representation 
than CODESA. The negotiations result in 23 of the 26 parties involved in the talks at the 
World Trade Centre to adopt a Declaration of Intent on the setting of an election date for a 
transitional government. On the 13 May, the South African government granted diplomatic 
immunity and privileges to about 100 UN, Commonwealth, European Community and OAU 
observers. 
In June 1993, the election date for South Africa’s first democratic election was set for 27 
April 1994, at the multi-party talks held in Kempton Park. Nelson Mandela and IFP leader 
Buthelezi met and pledged to work together. They intended holding joint rallies in war torn 
areas of conflict. The PAC agreed in principle to halt hostilities. However, the Concerned 
South African Group (COSAG) stormed out of the Multi-Party Talks. Following the incident 
the government and the ANC made concessions, allowing COSAG to return to the talks. The 
President’s Council closed after an existence of just over twelve years (Sparks, 1995:225). By 
July, the key points of the interim constitution had been outlined. 
A constitutional compromise was agreed on at the Multi-Party Talks. The negotiators decided 
on regional administrative structures for the country and on binding constitutional principles; 
the constitution itself to be drawn up by an elected constitution-making body. The Plenary of 
the Multi-party Negotiating Process adopted by consensus, 27 constitutional principles 
which, along with a Bill of Rights, were to be included in both the interim constitution and 
the final constitution to be adopted by an elected Constituent Assembly. On the 3 September, 
an outline of the purpose and function of the TEC was announced and Parliament met to 
approve four new laws. Parliament voted 211-36 in favour of the Transitional Executive 
Council Bill which oversaw the transition to democracy. Independent electoral and media 
commission bills are also passed. Parliament met again in November to approve a new 
constitution. The interim constitution was eventually approved by nineteen of the twenty-one 
parties participating in the Multi-Party Talks (Robertson, 1994:48-51). In the case of 
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Namibia, only after the November 1989 elections and the formation of the Constituent 
Assembly a week later, were negotiations held regarding the format and content of the 
Namibian constitution. 
On the 18 November 1993, leaders of 20 political parties at the Multi-party Negotiating 
Process endorsed an interim constitution and an electoral bill. They also reached a package of 
agreements for the transition. On the 2 December, Multi-Party negotiators agreed to the 
reincorporation of the TBVC states (Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda). On the 6 
December, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) began its work. At its first session, the 
TEC adopted a resolution of the Multi-party Negotiating Council requesting that the United 
Nations, the Commonwealth, the European Community, the Organisation of African Unity 
and individual governments provide a sufficient number of international observers to monitor 
the electoral process. The TEC also appealed to the United Nations to coordinate all 
international observers and to ensure that their deployment was effectively coordinated 
through close cooperation with the Independent Electoral Commission (Robertson, 1994:52-
55). 
 
3.3.3 Ethnic and Racial Tension during the Transition: 
As illustrated in the previous section, the South African transition process was marred with 
ever-increasing ethnic and racial tensions that often escalated into clashes between ANC and 
IFP supporters and between the police and security forces and township rioters. In addition, a 
number of extremist groups and organisations tried to promote minority interests at the 
expense of other groups. These groups were exclusively race based. Existing groups, such as 
the Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) had intensified their resistance to the negotiation 
process and had increased terrorist activities. Some of the extreme-right groups, mostly white 
Afrikaner organizations, reacted with anger to the reforms by F.W. de Klerk and attacked the 
United Kingdom Embassy in Pretoria. On the 21 February 1990, The Star newspaper 
reported that Defence Minister, Magnus A. Malan, knew as early as 1987 of a secret "hit 
squad" made up of police officers which was used to kill opponents of Apartheid. The 
allegations posed a growing embarrassment to de Klerk, who faced demands for the dismissal 
of the Defence Minister (Sparks, 1995:161). In a related development, the activities of the 
Civil Cooperation Bureau, the military unit involved in the assassinations, were suspended 
pending the outcome of a judicial inquiry. The Minister also claimed that Anton Lubowski, 
the SWAPO white official killed by assassins in Windhoek in September 1988, was an agent 
of the South African Defence Force.  
On the 24 February 1990, more than 100,000 people attended a rally in Durban addressed by 
Nelson Mandela, who urged his followers to end the factional warfare that had taken more 
than 2,500 lives in the last five years in the Natal region. However, by March, violence 
erupted in South African ‘homelands’ and Ciskei fell in a military coup. The ANC military 
commander Joe Modise, stated that the organisation could consider the suspension of the 
armed struggle but not the laying down of arms, to facilitate negotiations (Deegan, 2001:76-
78). On the 26 March, 17 people are killed and 380 wounded after police opened fire on anti-
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Apartheid protestors in the township of Sebokeng who were protesting high rent rates and for 
the ending of racially segregated local facilities.  
In the beginning of June 1990, President F.W. de Klerk announced that the four-year old 
state-of-emergency was to be lifted in three of South Africa’s four provinces, with the 
exception of Natal and the homeland of KwaZulu where security forces were to be increased 
to maintain order and stability. However, the far-right carried out further fire-bombings of the 
offices of the Minister of National Black Education and the offices of Deputy Constitutional 
Development Minister, Roelf Meyer. The ANC condemned the tolerant attitude of the South 
African Security forces regarding the violent activities of far-right and extremist groups after 
a bomb exploded in a Johannesburg bus and taxi terminal wounding more than 25 persons. 
An extreme-right group, who called themselves “the White Wolves” claimed responsibility 
for five other bombings carried out during the first days of June, including one against a 
liberal politician and another one against a synagogue (Alexander, 2002:50-52).  
On the 15 August 1990, after three days of intense fighting between supporters of the IFP and 
ANC, SADF troops were deployed to prevent further deaths after an already estimated 150. 
On the 16 August, Mandela and de Klerk hold emergency talks in Pretoria regarding the 
violence in the townships. However, on the 17th, The ANC as well as COSATU issued 
statements accusing elements of the South African security forces of orchestrating the 
conflict in the townships. By the 24th, more than 500 people had died in eleven days of 
fighting. Mandela accused the South African Police of encouraging factional fighting (Saul, 
1993:102-105). 
By March 1991 the first group of political exiles returned to South Africa and the government 
released forty (mainly ANC) political prisoners. Amongst these, is Piet ‘Skiet’ Rudolph, a 
prominent right-winger facing charges of planting bombs and theft of arms and ammunition. 
Authorities granted indemnity from prosecution to 2,605 anti-Apartheid activists and 
members of far right groups. The indemnity included 1,819 members of Umkhonto we 
Sizwe. Throughout April and May 1991, de Klerk made numerous attempts at appeasing the 
ANC by offering them positions in cabinet. A broad consensus was reached between the 
government and the ANC to stop violence in the Townships. However, on the 12 May, IFP 
supporters rampage through Kagiso township killing at least 22 people.  
On the 10 June 1991, speaking before journalists, a retired army major, Nico Basson, said 
that the South African military had supplied weapons (such as AK 47 assault rifles) and 
covert assistance to IFP in order to weaken the ANC. He also disclosed that the South 
African military had previously carried out similar activities in Namibia to discredit the South 
West Africa People's Organisation. IFP leader Chief Buthelezi denied these allegations. The 
government later admits to having funded the IFP and its associated trade unions11 (Sparks, 
1995:153-154). 
On the 9th August, a bloody confrontation took place between members of the right wing 
AWB and government security forces in Ventersdorp. Around the same time, Umkhonto we 
                                                 
11
 The Inkatha Gate Scandal. 
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Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC, held its first conference in South Africa after thirty 
years and called for a formal ceasefire in the country (Ottaway, 1993:181-82). However, on 
the 28 January 1992, the leader of the AWB, Eugene Terre’Blanche, and nine other members 
were arrested for staging a riot on 9 August 1991 when President F.W. de Klerk was 
addressing a meeting in Ventersdorp. A study by the Human Sciences Research Council 
shows that violent attacks by whites against blacks had increased sharply in the two years 
since President de Klerk announced the first measures towards the end of Apartheid. 
In April 1992, the Human Rights Commission (HCR) of South Africa stated that the level of 
violence in the country had reached unprecedented levels during March 1992, with 437 
persons killed and 898 injured, and that "the extreme level of violence was undoubtedly the 
result of forces working to destabilise the referendum and the peace process". In April as 
well, the Conservative Party (CP) caucus agreed to hold talks with the National Party on 
setting up a white state (Volkstaat), but expelled one of its Members of Parliament, who had 
advocated immediate participation in CODESA (Marais, 2001:91-92). 
The issue of violence in the townships and South Africa in general had also not been resolved 
up to that point in time. The second report of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, had been released. It indicated that the 
Commission had received no evidence yet of a third force implicated in the violence, but 
denounced the government's failure to take sufficiently steps to prevent criminal conduct by 
members of the security forces and the police. It also accused the ANC and the IFP of 
resorting to violence and intimidation in their attempts to gain control over geographic areas. 
On the 7 September 1992, the ANC led a march against the Ciskei government and Ciskei 
security forces fired on ANC demonstrators marching towards the capital of the homeland, 
killing 29 of them and wounding more than 200. On the 9 September, President de Klerk 
stated that it was not possible to negotiate constitutional issues before the question of 
violence had been dealt with satisfactorily. He called for a meeting at leadership level to be 
convened urgently with the ANC to discuss the violence and other obstacles to the 
resumption of negotiations. By the 21 September, President de Klerk and Mandela agreed, at 
a peace summit, to resume constitutional negotiations that were suspended in June 1992 
(Sparks, 1995:137-138). Unfortunately, political violence did not subside when, on the 28 
September, four white South Africans were killed and seventeen injured when armed persons 
stormed into a golf club in King Williams's Town. 
However, political violence did not decline in 1993. South African Communist Party General 
Secretary and member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, Chris Hani was 
shot dead outside his home on the 10 April. In May, the Afrikaner Volksfront was officially 
founded in Pretoria. It was to articulate the interest of right-wing groups and had the support 
of twenty-one organisations, such as the Conservative Party and Afrikaner Volksunie. Clive 
Derby-Lewis, a former Conservative Party MP and a member of a Presidential advisory 
council, is formally charged with the murder of Chris Hani. Former South African military 
and police commanders meet to form a ‘Committee of Generals’ to resist Pretoria’s handover 
to majority black rule. On the 26 June, the Afrikaner-Weerstandbeweging members attack the 
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World Trade Centre where the Multi-Party Talks are being held (Friedman & Stack, 
1994:309-310). 
In March 1994, leading up to the April elections, renewed outbreaks of political violence 
swept the country. Widespread revolt gripped Bophuthatswana as demonstrators which 
demanded the reincorporation of the nominally independent homeland into South Africa 
clashed with police forces. South African troops in armoured vehicles rolled into the capital 
of Mmabatho after some 50 people were killed and hundreds were injured during violent 
clashes in the homeland. In the homeland of Ciskei, a mutiny by police and defence forces 
led to the resignation of Brigadier Oupa Gqozo who had previously gained control of the 
homeland through a coup. The TEC immediately sent representatives to take over control of 
the homeland, and posted troops at its borders. Violent clashes occurred between Zulu IFP 
supporters protesting against the forthcoming 1994 April general election and the ANC’s 
security guards protecting the ANC headquarters Shell House. President de Klerk declared a 
state of emergency in Natal, in the hope of quelling the violence and ensuring a fair election 
there in April (Sparks, 1995:149-151). 
Fortunately, two days after the IFP agreed to participate in South Africa's first non-racial 
elections, security officials and independent monitoring groups reported that political 
violence had dropped dramatically in the country (Friedman & Stack, 1994:312). On the 23 
April 1994, the government, the ANC and the newly formed Freedom Front party signed an 
agreement establishing a framework for a separate state for whites. The AWB rejected the 
agreement. Regrettably, a car bomb exploded in downtown Johannesburg killing at least nine 
people and leaving ninety-two injured. The bomb, which left a waist-deep crater in the street, 
had been placed in a car parked mid-way between the national and regional headquarters of 
the ANC (Friedman & Stack, 1994:312).  
Another source of ethnic tension encompassed Operation Vula. Operation Vula had been an 
attempt by the ANC to strengthen the underground inside of South Africa by infiltrating 
senior leaders, trained in urban guerrilla warfare, into South Africa. Operation Vula was also 
intended to increase co-ordination between the political and military struggle and strengthen 
the ANC’s control over its non-government rivals such as the UDF and the IFP. Operation 
Vula attracted significant funds and large quantities of arms to supplement the ANC’s 
struggle against the Apartheid regime. This influx of funds and arms, with the infiltration of 
leaders who could train underground ANC’s combatants  greatly increased township conflict 
between the ANC and IFP in Kwa-Zulu and Natal during the period of 1990 onwards 
(Jeffery, 2009:191-193). 
 
3.4 Outcomes: 
South Africa held its first democratic general elections from 26 to 29 April 1994. Nineteen 
political parties participated in the election and 22 million eligible South Africans voted. On 
the 27 April, South Africa's interim constitution entered into force and the new flag was 
raised. On the 6 May, announcing the final results of the election, the Chairman of the 
International Election Committee, Judge Johan Kriegler said that the April 26-29 elections 
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were substantially free and fair. Admitting that the election was flawed but that this was 
peripheral, he said "we were able to establish the will of the people with reasonable 
accuracy". The final results of the three major parties were as follows: the ANC received 
62,6%, National Party 20,4%, IFP 10,5%. The Democratic Party (DP), the Freedom Front 
(FF) and the PAC each received less than 3% of the vote while the remaining parties received 
less than 0.2% each. In terms of the Interim Constitution, the distribution of seats in the 400-
member National Assembly was as follows: ANC 252, NP 82, IFP 43, FF 9, DP 7, PAC 5, 
and the African Christian Democratic Party 2. The ANC won 7 of the 9 provinces, losing the 
Western Cape to the NP and KwaZulu/Natal to the IFP. On the 10 May, Nelson Mandela was 
inaugurated as the new South African President (Deegan, 2001:106-112).  
In the end of May 1994, Cyril Ramaphosa, Secretary-General of the ANC, was elected 
chairman of the Constituent Assembly which was to write a new constitution for the country 
within two years. Opening the first session of the first non-racial parliament, President 
Nelson Mandela adopted a conservative reform policy. President Nelson Mandela, in his 
State of the Nation Address to Parliament, announced that South Africa would subscribe to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and acceded to human rights conventions of the 
United Nations (Deegan, 2001:113). Justice Richard Goldstone called for the establishment 
of a "truth commission" on Apartheid atrocities because "victims would not be able to forgive 
without openness". He said it was essential to expose the past as part of the healing process. 
President Nelson Mandela said that in order to promote national unity he was willing to bring 
into government those who remain outside. In a meeting with PAC leader Clarence Makwetu, 
President Mandela asked Makwetu to present him with a list of PAC members and indicate in 
which government structures they would wish them involved. Makwetu said the PAC had 
asked that 6,000 members of the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA) be incorporated 
in the National Defence Force and that the figure could reach 10,000. Mr. Mandela also met 
with the leader of the DP, Mr. Tony Leon (Grundy, 2000:40-43). 
 
3.5 Attempts at Reconciliation: 
During the negotiations, several attempts were made by both the NP government and the 
ANC leadership at showing good faith in seeing the transition through to its end. Due to the 
number of stalemates and deadlocks in the negotiations, the NP government pushed the 
negotiations along by dismantling Apartheid, while the ANC committed itself to ending 
military incursions, ending political violence and propagating peace and reconciliation to the 
nation. The aspect of ethnic reconciliation became the pivotal characteristic in the South 
African transition, unlike the Namibian transition where the formation of an independent 
Namibia and the end of colonial rule was the central aspect. What followed were the NP 
governments’ attempts at reconciliation, albeit limited to power-sharing between the white 
and black communities. The ANC had dedicated itself to a South Africa for all of its 
inhabitants in line with the Freedom Charter. The ANC leadership had frequently called upon 
its members and supporters during the transition to cease political violence and spread a 
climate of reconciliation across racial and ethnic divides. 
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For example, by the middle of 1990, the Ministry of Education announced that the 
government had decided to abandon the principle of segregated state education. From 
January 1991, white state schools would be allowed to accept black children, provided that 
the majority of the parents of such schools give their consent. The government also 
announced the abolishment of racial segregation of state hospitals, which however only 
included a small percentage of state hospitals that were reserved for whites only. On the 15 
October 1990, the 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act as well, as other acts that 
make the distinction of people based on race were abolished (Deegan, 2001:114-115).  
On the 5 June 1991, the South African Parliament adopted the Abolition of Racially Based 
Land Measures Bill, which will repealed the Group Areas Act 1966, the Black Land Act of 
1913, the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936 and the Black Communities 
Development Act of 1984, with effect on 30 June 1991. A provision in the new Bill would, 
however, allow neighbourhood committees to set "norms and standards", such as population 
density, maintenance and cleanliness, in their residential communities. This shows that de 
Klerk’s government was making concession regarding black political empowerment and at 
the same time ensuring further white domination of the areas already under white control. On 
the 17 June, the South African Parliament voted to repeal the Population Registration Act of 
1950. The population register would, however, be maintained until a new constitution had 
been negotiated. 
The white community mostly also supported the transition process when on the 24 February 
1992, de Klerk announced that a referendum was to be held on the 17 March requesting a 
mandate to pursue constitutional reform from the white electorate. By the 18 March, in the 
referendum for whites only, 68,7% voted "Yes", compared to 31,3% who voted "No". 86% of 
the white voting population participated in the referendum. On the 18 November 1992, the 
Existing white business and community organisations slowly but surely started to adept to the 
changing environment of the transition, as for example, the Afrikaner Broederbond adopted a 
new constitution, which would allow women and all race groups as members, as long as they 
all speak Afrikaans. It would henceforth be known as the Afrikanerbond. 
The single greatest attempt at reconciliation during the transition was the inclusion of a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. This formed part of the so-called “Sunset Clause”. The TRC 
was established though an act of Parliament, the passage of which was supported by all 
political parties except one. A critical factor contributing to the legitimacy of the TRC was 
the involvement of the public and key figures during the negotiations, such as Desmond Tutu 
and a number of publicly selected commissioners. The TRC was established to achieve a 
general purpose and several specific objectives. The overall goal was to promote national 
unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and 
divisions of the past. The more specific goals were to establish a complete picture of the past 
by creating a collective memory; facilitate the granting of amnesty; to establish the fate and 
whereabouts of victims and restoring human civil dignity; and the final goal was to produce a 
report the three afore mentioned issues and make recommendations on how to develop a 
political culture that would be respectful of the human rights of all citizens (Gibson, 
2004:11). 
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The commission was given legal powers in the form of search and subpoena powers and that 
the GNU had rejected any notion of blanket amnesty suggesting a serious attempt at dealing 
with crimes against humanity committed during Apartheid (Daniel & Ramdeen, 2006:194). 
The commission set out to uncover the horrors of the Apartheid security state, its gross 
human rights violation and state suppression to ‘heal’ the nation by uncovering the truth in an 
attempt of reconciliation. The underlying notion of the commission was that truth would lead 
to reconciliation, the forgiving of afore mentioned human rights abuses by a minority towards 
a majority. The effects the work of the commission had on reconciliation, will be further 
explored in section 4.6 
 
3.6 Assessment: 
South Africa’s transition to an all-inclusive democracy was eventually achieved only through 
major concession made by the two major negotiating powers, the NP and ANC. Although a 
number of different political parties and civil society groups, including the church, were 
included in the negotiations, the behind-the-scenes negotiation between the NP and ANC 
(greatly helped along by Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer) were quintessential in creating a 
framework and understanding in which the multi-party negotiations took place in. The NP 
eventually conceded its claims of control of the state by the white community and agreed to 
the ANC’s demand of an all inclusive democracy where every South African had the same 
rights as the next. Unlike the Namibian Transition, the South African transition was almost 
void of international influence. The international community merely acted as observers and 
occasionally reminded the NP government that a reverting of the transition would not have 
been possible. The South African transition was in a sense a miracle in that it was mostly 
peacefully internally organised and executed.  
As stated earlier, the most prominent attempt by the South African elites of assisting the 
public in coming to grips with the Apartheid history was the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission formed in 1996.  As argued by Gibson (2004), however, the TRC did not have a 
significant influence on reconciliation. As will be shown in Chapter 4 of this thesis, although 
uncovering the horrors of Apartheid, the TRC did not bring about a change in perceptions and 
attitudes between different ethnic groups. However, consideration has to be given that the 
Commission did have its merits and influences on the national consciousness regarding 
reconciliation. These will also be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter Four 
Reconciliation – Making the Past work for the Future  
4. 1 The Transitions Compared: 
The South Africa that emerged after 1994 was at the same time celebrated across the world as 
a miracle, but also seen by cynics as a potential disaster. The GNU was confronted with 
enormous difficulties. The need for reconciliation and consensus meant that the Tripartite 
Alliance had to work together with other political organisations. The ANC felt that the 
government would have to play a crucial mediatory role and act as a force between 
conflicting racial and ethnic interests. The spirit of the government at that time was one of 
reconciliation in providing a culture of negotiation and understanding. The new democratic 
parliament was filled with people either returning from exile or imprisonment. It was a very 
mixed environment and meant that the new South African leaders would have to set the tone 
and pave the way for the public to follow in the spirit of reconciliation. The governments’ 
strong emphasis on nation-building and reconciliation forged a climate of cooperative law-
making ahead of petty party politics. This transitional phase was essential in steadying the 
country and the GNU was important in providing a framework for diffusing potential 
problems.  
The asymmetrical nature of South Africa’s development under Apartheid produced a 
developed and underdeveloped world society, polarised along racial and ethnic lines - an 
industrialised, urban, technological and white society; running in parallel with an 
impoverished rural, largely black hinterland. Fifty years of economic policies that favoured 
the white minority created an economy characterised by serious structural weaknesses. The 
affluent and privileged few were deeply divided from the extensive poverty and social 
deprivation of the majority. The economy and society had to be transformed if, as the ANC 
asserted, the country was to achieve non-racialism, development and equality (Deegan, 
2001:115). 
For South Africa, according to Taylor and Vale (2000:401), the fact that the transition was 
pact-driven and the reasons for which it produced consensus rather than conflict, are crucial 
for an assessment for where South Africa stands today. Due to the compromises made during 
the negotiations of the transition it bode well for nation-building which was in line with the 
non-exclusivist, non-racialism of the ANC’s Freedom Charter. As mentioned earlier, 
interracial perceptions in South Africa carried a lot of negative connotations. Many believed 
that negative beliefs and stereotypes would cause great social friction and result in violence 
perpetrated by one group against another based on perceived ethnic differences. Especially 
the white, Coloured and Indian communities feared that the new black majority ANC 
government would instigate a system of reversed Apartheid that would threaten their socio-
economic development as well as personal security. However, most of these fears were 
irrational and unsubstantiated since the ANC had conceded to NP demands of rescinding 
radical and revolutionary action once coming into power. One of the functions of the GNU 
was to block any such attempt the ANC might seriously consider by the NP and IFP. Since no 
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radical changes to the status quo were made during the duration of the GNU, fears of 
reversed Apartheid repression by the ANC government began to ebb (Breytenbach, 
2006:175).  
As illustrated in Chapter Two, the Namibian transition was different in that it was for 
independence from South African colonial rule. Self-determination became the overriding 
aspect in the Namibian transition with South Africa relinquishing control and the UNTAG 
introducing an all-inclusive democracy void of racial and ethnic segregation. The parties that 
eventually occupied the government were instructed by the UN to follow democracy as the 
only option and any deviation would result in reprimanding by the international community. 
This was similar to what South Africa had experienced during the 1980s. Then again, the 
majority of the incoming Namibian political elite in 1990 committed itself voluntarily to 
democracy and its principles. However, due to a lengthy national liberation struggle against 
South Africa’s Apartheid-based rule in Namibia, led by SWAPO from 1966 and culminating 
in a December 1988 agreement brokered by the UN and the major Western powers, most of 
the Namibian population felt left out of the very important issue of state formation during the 
transition. The formation of the new Namibian government and its institutions was negotiated 
between the outgoing South African colonial administration and the UN. Namibian civil 
society and political elites from both sides of the racial divide did not nearly have as much 
influence on the transition as did the respective actors in the South African transition.  
In November 1989, relatively free and fair national elections democratically catapulted 
SWAPO into the position of majority political party in the country’s transitional Constituent 
Assembly, in which MP’s from six other parties also won seats. That Assembly ironed out a 
new constitution and became the National Assembly at independence. Since then, Namibia’s 
democratic framework of government has remained remarkably stable despite lingering racial 
antagonisms and political concerns. This stability in large reflects the continuing commitment 
to a  free and fair electoral process, a rule-abiding Parliament, vibrant local and regional 
councils, well-organised and active civil groups, and an army that is loyal to civilian rule. 
Nonetheless, underlying social and economic divisions remain unsolved and could provoke 
significant political problems in the near future.  
However, popular criticism has focused, among other issues, on the perceived lack of 
progress toward meaningful land reform, and on an apparent intensification of political 
centralism within SWAPO and the SWAPO controlled government and cabinet. Alongside 
this is an increasingly dismissive attitude of party leaders towards critique from both within 
and outside the party. In 1999, these factors contributed to the creation of a new political 
party from the ranks of SWAPO (Forrest, 2000:108). The new party, the Congress of 
Democrats (COD) became the official government opposition but has since 2006 been 
marred by infighting. A very similar situation abounded in 2005 within SWAPO that also led 
to another formation of a new political party, the Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP), 
also mostly constituted of disgruntled ex-SWAPO members. The RDP is poised to become 
the official government opposition in the November 2009 elections since they have 
campaigned on SWAPO’s failure in addressing the socio-economic imbalances between the 
‘two Namibia’ (Lindeke, 2009).  
53 
Despite the complaints by some political activists regarding the centralisation of power, the 
SWAPO government has thus far largely adhered to the protection of the personal and civic 
freedoms stipulated in the constitution. Accusations by the opposition of SWAPO moving 
towards ‘dictatorial’ rule and ‘tribalism’ policies underlines the extent of Namibia’s 
comparatively tolerant polity. Nonetheless, the deeply ingrained racial, ethnic and class 
divisions remain problematic and could engender further serious conflicts if economic 
development efforts falter dramatically. The continuing vitality of Namibia’s political 
institutions cannot alone sustain the progress thus far made towards reconciling the country’s 
social classes and political factions (Forrest, 2000:110). 
 
4.2 Context and framework: 
Having outlined the major differences between the South African and Namibian transitions, 
the pertinent question of this thesis is what the effect of either an internationally (Namibia) 
versus an internally (South Africa) orchestrated transition has been on reconciliation? To 
summarise the reasons given in the previous chapters, due to the varying nature of the two 
transitions, there could have (hypothetically) been a differentiation in reconciliation in the 
cases of Namibia and South Africa. The argument is that since the Namibian transition was 
organised, implemented and enforced by an outside organisation (the UN) in Namibia, 
hypothetically there should be greater tension between ethnic groups in Namibia than in 
South Africa, since there was no formal attempt at ethnic reconciliation. In South Africa, the 
entire transition process was internally organised and implemented, meaning that South 
Africans (although elite driven, ordinary South Africans were to a greater extent involved in 
the transition than ordinary Namibians in their transition) themselves constructed and shaped 
their new state and government. Another matter concerning a possible difference would be 
that while South Africa had created a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in line with the 
ANC’s national reconciliation policy; Namibia did not. This aspect will be explored later. 
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:81) distinguish between a number of governmental and 
political systems that abounded in Africa. In particular, Namibia and South Africa resembled 
what they called, “settler oligarchies”. A settler oligarchy resembles the bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes constructed by Europeans in those parts of the colonial world where 
settlers gained de facto control of the state. This is generally accompanied by exclusionary 
democracies. The dominant racial group, the white European settlers, used legislation to deny 
political rights to ethnic majorities by hierarchically organised coercion. These exclusionary 
democracies do, however, function as proper democracies within the settler enclaves; with 
features like elections, leadership turnover, political opposition, independent courts and some 
press freedoms. Access to the political process was limited to mainly white and maybe other 
selected ethnic groups. 
As mentioned above, according to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 178), Namibia and South 
Africa were the last settler oligarchies in sub-Saharan Africa. These settler oligarchies had a 
unique characteristic in that “…the protagonists were deeply divided along racial and class 
54 
lines into airtight corporate blocs.” After the transitions, the contenders (ANC and SWAPO) 
took control of political power but economic power remained with the predominantly white 
communities. Since neither side could govern the nation on its own, a compromise had to be 
reached, ultimately resulting in the transitions. However, a very important difference between 
the two transitions has to be made here, as demonstrated in Chapter Two for the Namibian 
transition: in the end, SWAPO took almost complete control of the government, although not 
a clear political majority. The South African transition on the other hand resulted in a 
government of national unity as shown in Chapter Three. Both protagonists negotiated to 
share power. The NP did not concede full political, nor economic power to the incoming 
ANC government. The ANC restricted itself on some of its more radical policies and ideas.  
The essence of the above paragraphs can be summed up as follows: taking the criteria for 
reconciliation (as outlined by Gibson in Chapter One) into account, there should 
hypothetically be differences in three of the four criteria between Namibia and South Africa; 
these being political tolerance, support for general principles of democracy, and legitimacy. 
Why should this be the case? With SWAPO assuming almost complete control of the 
government, with only minimal opposition, what was to ensure that SWAPO and its 
followers (and conversely the opposition and their followers) would be politically tolerant; 
supportive of democratic ideals; and would claim legitimacy? 
Reconciliation is hypothesised to contribute to democratisation because reconciliation is not 
an end in itself; it is a necessary step for democratisation in South Africa’s and Namibia’s 
case. Once people from different racial and ethnic groups have reconciled i.e. done away with 
superficial racial and ethnic identities, democratic consolidation can take place. Gibson 
(2004:5-7) argues that democratisation and democratic consolidation is not possible without 
reconciliation, since the core of reconciliation is tolerance. Democracy works best when it is 
rooted in a society which holds similar interests, values and attitudes. The majority populace 
has to be supportive and vigilant of democratic ideals and principles, which reconciliation can 
bring about. Gibson argues that when democratic institutions are only supported when they 
produce a favourable outcome it makes them weak and inefficient. It should be that 
democracy, the rule of majority, in which political and state institutions serve the majority of 
society, are bound to change and adapt to changing social circumstances.  
Before reconciliation can be further conceptualised, a definition of identity (racial and ethnic) 
has to be made to clarify the issue of how ethnicity and race play a significant role in the 
South African and Namibian contexts. Using the most widely known definition of social 
identity theory by Tajfel and Turner (1979:33), they postulated the hypothesis that group 
status amongst other groups is often achieved through conflict. Any group that wishes to 
advance its position in society relative to other groups will do so by competition for scarce 
resources such as wealth, political power and prestige. Therefore, any group in conflict with 
another group seeks to differentiate itself in the form of identification and positive attachment 
to any certain value-laden group characteristic that is different from another groups’ 
characteristic. This creates an in-group and an out-group. The in-group is one’s own group 
one belongs to, while the out-group is any other group to which the in-group is compared to. 
Furthermore, intergroup competition enhances morale, cohesiveness and cooperation 
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amongst members of the in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 34). Social identity is therefore a 
way individuals strive to maintain and enhance their self-esteem through identifying with 
positive or negative group characteristics. 
Democracy is seen as the best suited political system for human nature. It best allows for 
variations and commonalities in any country to co-exist, therefore it allows for a truly 
inclusionary and competitive regime. According to Mattes (2003), democracies are fragile 
and more difficult to sustain than non-democratic regimes, such as authoritarian or socialist-
communist regimes, for example Cuba. But nonetheless, democracy is the preferred regime 
due to the single fact that it recognises human rights and seeks to protect and improve on 
these. So why have neither Namibia nor South Africa reverted to an authoritarian regime 
style with the majority suppressing the minority? 
The answer may lie in the statement by Dahl (quoted in Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:39) 
that “…a distinction is made between political competition and political participation”. What 
is meant by this is that political competition is the extent of permissible public opposition to 
government policies. To what degree is political power concentrated in the hands of small 
political and economic elites in monopolistic regimes, or the opposite, to what degree is 
power dispersed amongst numerous institutions and groups in pluralistic regimes? Political 
participation on the other hand is defined as the breadth of popular involvement in the public 
sphere on equal terms for all. Inclusivity and exclusivity is measured along the public’s 
participation in decision making. However, a political regime is also constituted by its 
institutions which set constraints on behaviour of the regime in the form of rules and 
regulations. These institutions also need to have the capability of enforcing political norms, 
rules and regulations onto the regime (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:40). However, 
according to Bates (2008:97-128) African democracies are more likely to fail and become 
authoritarian style regimes if there is a conjunction of a number of factors; such as a collapse 
of publicly supported institutions which includes the support for the rule of law; government 
mismanagement; elite predatory behaviour; and politics characterised by regionalism and 
ethnic rivalry. 
 
4.3 Extended Reconciliation Criteria: 
The following discussion will serve to further distinguish between the four criteria of ethnic 
reconciliation mentioned in Chapter One, before applying them to the Namibian and South 
African cases. Interracial perceptions12 deal with the breakdown of negative perceptions of 
out-groups. This means that increased contact between groups that identify in ethnic 
differences can lead to greater tolerance of ‘the other’. Breakdown of interracial perceptions 
find their basis in interracial contact theory. Gibson (2004:18) contends that a breakdown of 
barriers across race through interaction and communication is essential for the success of 
                                                 
12
 Gibson’s (2004:4) term is interracial reconciliation. However, for this thesis, a slight adaptation is made in 
that emphasis is place on perceptions and not the overarching concept of reconciliation as outlined in Chapter 
One. 
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reconciliation. The key factor of the contact hypotheses is that increased contact between two 
groups which are culturally and ethnically different, might serve to overcome negative 
perceptions by showing members from one group that stereotypes often do not apply and that 
people from ‘other’ ethnicities can be trusted. But it can also have the effect of enhancing the 
perception of group differences, further enforcing group antagonism, if the contact between 
different groups is a negative experience. To expand the concept is to argue for a minimalist 
and maximalist version, in which the development of a political culture that respects human 
rights is necessary. There has to be a development of universal consensus of basic democratic 
rights and human rights for all, widespread support for the rule of law and political 
institutions and their legitimacy. Interracial contact theory where he argues, as mentioned 
before, that increased contact between groups will help increase understanding and break 
down racial animosity may result in increased political tolerance where the severities of the 
perceptions of threats are reduced and the interconnectedness between groups is increased. 
The essence of reconciliation entails the fundamental realignment of relationships between 
groups and the breakdown of distrust, stereotypes and inequality; so that balance is restored, 
thereby averting future social and political distortions and upheavals. Much work has been 
done on this aspect within both the South African and Namibian contexts. In particular, 
various studies have been done to assess the relationship between different ethnic groups and 
their perceptions of one another in South Africa and Namibia (Gibson & Gouws, 1997; 
Gibson & Gouws 2003; Bratton, Mattes & Boadi, 2005; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Mattes, 
1995). The overall nature of these studies was to assess the perceptions that various ethnic 
and racial groups have of one another after the end of Apartheid and whether or not they have 
changed for better or worse. Perceptions and attitudes are important in reconciliation in that 
they shape the relationship between groups. 
Interracial reconciliation is of importance because of historical conditions. In both South 
Africa and Namibia, the transition to democracy was a transition from white minority rule to 
black majority rule. Furthermore, the separation of social groups based on ethnicity and race, 
was formally legislated in both countries. In no other country has this separation been so 
deeply legislated and enforced at state and nation-wide level. The systematic separation of 
races gained international notoriety as Apartheid. Although South Africa’s attempt at 
implementing Apartheid in Namibia during the 1960s and 70s never truly manifested, there 
was also, and still is, widespread inequality between racial groups in the country. The essence 
of this separation of ethnicity and race was the attempt at separate development for the 
various race groups. From the very start of colonisation, Eurocentric views have caused 
differentiating economic development between the European and Asian settlers; and the 
indigenous black populations (Bauer & Taylor, 2005:208-14 & 241-8).  
The result is that discrepancies in economic development gave way to inequality in wealth, 
political, social and intellectual development and influence between the various race and 
ethnic groups in both South Africa and Namibia. Therefore, the importance lies within 
reconciliation theory. In any given society, the relationship between various cultures and 
groups are always in balance in terms of economic and political power each group holds. 
However, if these balances become distorted, revolution occurs until the balance is restored. 
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Such revolutions can take on various aspects, either being overtly violent or a peaceful 
transition. Such political revolt and occasionally violent action refers to all collective attacks 
within a political community against the political regime, its actors – including competing 
political groups as well as incumbents – or its policies. All such acts of violence pose a threat 
to the political system in two senses: they challenge the monopoly of force imputed to the 
state in political theory; and, in functional terms, they are likely to interfere with and, if 
severe, to destroy normal political processes (Gurr, 1970:4). 
No one can write about South African and Namibian politics without referring to race. It 
forms a very salient part of the context of both countries. However, the concepts of race and 
ethnicity are considerable laden with emotions and are immensely subjective depending on 
which field of study the context is viewed from. For the field of study of political science and 
this thesis, ‘race’ is defined as the historical origin of the group. This definition relies on the 
racial categories created during Apartheid. Although some might argue that such 
classifications are only superficial, the use of these categories is unavoidable in the South 
African and Namibian context, due to the fixity they have come to acquire both in popular 
conscience and official business, private and public. The racial group terms used during 
Apartheid were black, Coloured, white and Indian (South Africans of Asian origins). These 
classifications persist even today, but in slightly more politically correct versions of 
‘African’, ‘Caucasian’, ‘Coloured or Mixed’, ‘Asian South African’; and the addition of 
‘Other’. 
Ethnicity, on the other hand, refers to sub-groups/sub-categories of a specific race during 
Apartheid. Ethnicity referred to the language and/or cultural sub-group of the race, for 
example, Xhosa and Zulu are ethnic groups of the ‘African’ race. During Apartheid, 
emphasize was placed on differences, even between those of the same skin colour and same 
‘race’. Apartheid legislation was built on these classifications and had entrenched itself in 
society. Even 15 and 19 years after the transition to inclusive democracies, these 
classifications are still used in South African and Namibia respectively. Apartheid continues 
to shape political reality in both countries (Gibson, 2004:26-27). Ethnic reconciliation then, 
means to resolve past differences and bring together historical protagonists; the protagonists 
being the various ethnic groups that were created during Apartheid and still exist today. 
Although race is overarching of ethnicity; there are perceived differences among and between 
the various groups, within and between black and white races, there exist different ethnic 
groups. 
The reality of the South African and Namibian society is that the economic and political 
relationship between various groups is fundamentally tied to race and ethnicity. As long as 
one group is relatively deprived of economic and social power compared to another group, 
the balance of powers in that society is not yet restored. Relative deprivation is associated 
with perceptions. As long as the majority black population in Namibia and South Africa 
perceive themselves to be at a disadvantage relative to the white and other ethnic groups, the 
relationship between them is distorted and unbalanced, which can be a cause for future social 
and political upheavals. The greater the frustration over economic and social inequality; the 
greater the aggressive response of one group towards another will be (Gurr, 1970:25-33). 
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The structural and ideological inflexibility of the white minority government and its 
institutions in South Africa and Namibia caused a social and political revolution that 
culminated in a transition to democracy. The important aspect is that the tension between the 
various ethnic groups, especially between white and black, has not faded, nor disappeared 
after the transitions. The persistence of Apartheid beliefs and perceptions between the 
different ethnic groups is still strong and slow to change. There still is much rivalry and 
grievance present in South African and Namibian societies today. The attempt then is to 
explore whether or not ethnic reconciliation has taken place due to the nature of either 
transitions. 
Political tolerance in this setting then means the attitude of ‘putting up’ with those people 
that hold different ideological, social, cultural and political viewpoints other than one’s own. 
However, essentially one can only be tolerant of that which one despises; is not fond of. One 
can hardly tolerate that which one likes. There is a dichotomy in that one is either tolerant or 
not. Political tolerance is often ascribed to the views and ideologies an individual holds and 
the level of political sophistication. This means that political tolerance increases when an 
individual has a higher level of education, and the person has come into contact with political 
viewpoints and cultural norms different to the personal one. Being educated allows the person 
to formulate, comprehend and discern the differences and similarities between one’s own and 
the opponents’ differences; and hopefully reassess personal opinions and attitudes to become 
more tolerant of the other. To be educated is to have the ability to gather, analyse and 
comprehend information and discover where one’s self-interests truly lie (Erikson & Tedin, 
2007:174). In the context of South Africa and Namibia; to be tolerant means to eschew racial 
and ethnic stereotypes; remove any association placed on these; and allow members from 
other groups the same political, social and economic rights and privileges that the in-group 
enjoys. Political tolerance then means to abject from taking negative actions against another 
group for reasons of race and ethnicity. 
It is argued that support for the principles of democracy (henceforth referred to as political 
support) is subject to the level of political tolerance an individual has. Political support for 
democratic ideals is made up of social and political trust; efficacy is the cognitive or belief 
component of support; it is the extent to which a person believes his or her political activities 
will influence government decision-making. It can therefore be argued that, for a government 
and state - and subsequently their institutions - to function properly, a certain level of support 
is necessary for the institution to operate without the continued consent of the people; 
meaning not having to hold a referendum on every issue (Erikson & Tedin, 2007:177). The 
levels of support are crucial in that they act as a barometer indicating how government and 
the state are performing in accordance with the expectations of the populace. If support levels 
are low, social disruption might occur. If individuals as a collective do not believe they are 
able to influence government and the state, they will logically not be supportive of 
democracy. In the context of South Africa and Namibia this means that if the people, or a 
group of people, feel marginalised and unable to change the situation, support for democratic 
ideals will most probably decrease as the group tries to find another way of reaching their 
desired aims and goals. Racial and ethnic marginalisation can cause negative consequences 
for reconciling the nation. 
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The above mentioned, ties directly into the issue of legitimacy of state institutions. 
Legitimacy in this sense means the perception the populace holds of the righteousness an 
institution has to execute its mandate. The perceived legitimacy is influenced by how an 
institution relates to the people. Legitimacy contributes to the compliance with unpopular 
political and legal decision. For the South African and Namibian contexts, the new regime 
has to have a certain level of legitimacy in the eyes of the disempowered for them to support 
the new regime. If institutions, such as the police, suffer from a legitimacy deficit, they are 
unlikely to be effective agents of democratisation and ethnic reconciliation (Gibson, 
2004:19). In essence, legitimacy is the belief in the legality of political objects; that it is right 
and proper to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime. 
Often, subordinate and/or disadvantaged groups do not perceive the regime to hold great 
legitimacy. Due to the transition to majority rule in South Africa and Namibia, the 
subordinate groups have been reversed; those disadvantaged during Apartheid now hold 
political power while those previously in control of political power are now relegated to 
being an ethnic minority. 
Therefore, one can argue that a reconciled South Africa and Namibia are societies which 
eschew racial stereotyping; are politically tolerant; subscribe to a universal set of beliefs; and 
recognise the legitimacy of political institutions. To arrive at such a level of reconciliation, 
Gibson (2004:17-19) points to the previously mentioned four criteria that in their sum are 
greater than their single parts. Political support for the post-colonial and post-Apartheid 
governments from all sectors of society gives legitimacy to the new regimes’ political 
institutions and how these relate to the citizens they govern.  In addition, the perceptions 
citizens hold of such institutions also impact on reconciliation between previous antagonists. 
 
4.4 Applying the Reconciliation Criteria: The South African and Namibian Contexts: 
4.4.1 Interracial Perceptions: 
In a study done by Habib and Naidu (1999:190), it was shown that the South African 1999 
elections were very much a placid affair with the outcome largely predetermined. The only 
serious political contestations emerged in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal where 
provincial government relied on the swing vote of the Coloured and Indian communities, 
respectively. Although these communities made up only nine and three percent of the 
national electorate in 1999; they did however make up 55% and 13% of the electorate of the 
Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal respectively. Illustrating the voting behaviour of the 
Coloured and Indian communities during the 1994 and 1999 national elections, and the 1996 
regional elections, Habib and Naidu (1999:191) argued, according to the racial census theory 
that issues and interests run parallel to factors such as race and ethnicity. However, they also 
argue that there is generally no ‘bloc’ Coloured and Indian vote in either of the two afore 
mentioned provinces. It is quite possible that often, within the Coloured and especially the 
Indian community, class interests preceded racial and cultural interests. Often the Coloured 
and Indian community members with higher socio-economic development voted along racial 
and cultural lines while those members with lower socio-economic development voted along 
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class interests. In other words, the latter were concerned with employment and economic 
stability. The result was that overall, the majority of the Coloured and Indian communities 
voted for either the New National Party (NNP) and DP (and its successor the Democratic 
Alliance) since they perceived these parties’ economic policies more sound than the ANC’s 
policies for economic development. Affirmative Action and BEE policies by the ANC 
enticed the lower class of the Coloured and Indian community while the upper classes voted 
for the opposition (Habib & Naidu, 1999:196-197). What one can extrapolate from this is that 
the ANC and the opposition parties were willing to utilise existing perceived racial and ethnic 
differences in political campaigning. This however, did not have considerable impact on the 
Coloured and Indian swing vote in that they did not necessarily identify with ethnicity. 
Rightly, Mattes (1995) argued that the racial census theory did not apply itself rigidly to the 
South African context. More than often, most South Africans identified with everyday issues 
that did in some way or another relate to race and ethnicity, but which did not become the 
overriding factor in decision-making. Most respondents in Mattes’ study confirmed that 
economic and class interests were dominant and that race and ethnicity only played a minimal 
role in every-day decision-making. However, the study also showed that race and ethnicity 
were an informal ‘shortcut’ when people were confronted with relatively complex situations 
and came into contact with cultural norms different from their own. Stereotyping through 
perceived racial and ethnic differences seemed to simplify the complexity of the South 
African context.  
On the other hand, a study done by Ferree (2006) suggested that racialised party images 
played a critical role in shaping South African voting behaviour a decade after the 1994 
elections. These perceived party images (the ANC being the Xhosa party, the IFP the Zulu 
party and the DA the party for the white minority) may have interacted with evaluations of 
the incumbent party’s performance. However, high uncertainty levels and actual cross-over 
voting actually shaped performance evaluations. This suggested that South African voting 
could not be explained purely vis-à-vis politics-as-usual. Performance evaluations mattered, 
but they were not intimately related to voters’ beliefs about the racial credentials of parties. 
Although political parties used racial credentials as a central factor driving attraction of 
voters in South Africa; the study showed that racial identities in South Africa had a 
surprisingly low prevalence and did not explain patterns of cross-over voting. Many voters 
who conformed to the racial pattern, voting for the party that reflected their own ethnic 
identity, nevertheless did not identify in racial terms. 
Owing to class and race being deeply intertwined in the Namibian context due to decades of 
Apartheid-style economic and social development, much of the racial reconciliation lies with 
the attempt by government and foreign donor organisations to bring about increased socio-
economic development for the lower classes in Namibian society: the majority black 
population. For both practical and political reasons, the decision was made to maintain the 
existing economic system. SWAPO had realised, as was the case with the ANC in South 
Africa, that the retention of white business skills and expertise was essential in keeping the 
economy stable and growing. Whilst on one level this decision was understandable, at other 
levels it has done almost nothing to redress one of the most glaring inequities of the colonial 
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system: that of disproportionate expenditure of public funds on the towns, to service in the 
first instance a large urban elite. These economic elites are the majority whites and the slowly 
increasing number of middle class blacks. Progress however, has been slow, and differences 
between the affluent white classes and the destitute black classes are as evident as before 
independence, with however an emerging black middle class (mostly government and civil 
service employees) (Leys & Saul, 1995:164). 
The government’s caution in effecting profound change within the political economy led to 
public charges which showed that national reconciliation was a one-sided process that 
benefited the white settler community far more than the poor black majority. This bitterness 
was most strongly felt by the thousands of repatriated exiles who struggled with little success 
to re-enter the labour market and reintegrate themselves fully into Namibian society during 
the beginning of the 1990s. Within the private sector there was a marked antipathy of 
employing returnees, who were often seen by potential employers (white owned businesses) 
as representatives of the ruling party. The ‘land-question’ also remained highly problematic: 
unequal access to productive land and to water is a central feature of Namibia’s colonial 
inheritance. In the context where both these resources are scarce, some 75% of potential 
arable land by mostly white commercial farmers is a major source of the inequalities of 
incomes (Leys & Saul, 1995:165). The differences in socio-economic development between 
the white, Coloured, black and other communities are quite apparent in Namibia. The 
percentage of poor white is minuscule compared to that of the black population of which 
about two-thirds are rural based and over half are classified, by the Namibian government, as 
living in poverty. The socio-economic development of the Coloured and other communities 
(such as the Nama-Damara) is also of higher quality than for the black community, due to the 
Coloured community being favoured for economic development under the South African 
Apartheid administration. The authorities that negotiated the Namibian transition (wholly 
non-Namibian) did not truly consider the differences of the various social groups in Namibia. 
The focus lay mainly with brining about democracy rather than ‘revamping’ Namibian 
society.    
As Dobell (1998:107-110) points out, SWAPO had a similar policy of national reconciliation 
to the ANC’s one. The reasons for this were the economy’s dependence on the white business 
community; the adoption of the 1982 Constitutional Principles (which advocated universal 
human rights); the need to integrate former enemy armies into the police and National 
Defence Force; and to swiftly rebuild the nation after three decades of insurgency warfare 
which had split communities and divided families. The national reconciliation policy of 
SWAPO was in general to avoid retribution on a large scale by either party. Economic 
reconciliation would come at the cost of social and political reconciliation. Civil society, 
however, was not capable of significantly challenging the government to bring about racial 
social stratification in terms of socio-economic development during the 1990s. However, a 
very important fact has to be reiterated, namely that a large number of black Namibian 
political exiles that left Namibia during the 1970s and 80s were sent to and did obtain skills 
and expertise in all fields by studying in former Soviet countries as well as Cuba. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, the black community in Namibia had significant knowledge and 
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expertise at hand to integrate more quickly into the ‘white’ economy than had happened in 
South Africa after 1994 since the number of returning exiles in proportion to the existing 
professional white business community was higher than in South Africa, where only a small 
number of exiles returned with political and business skills. There was therefore, a far greater 
intermingling of people who had different ethnic and racial identities, thereby making cross-
cultural experiences possible in Namibia. As was pointed out earlier, this contributed to a 
breakdown of negative racial stereotypes and attitudes. This effect was however limited due 
to the different socio-economic development with class interests being overriding for the 
majority of the population, although characterised by race and ethnicity. 
4.4.2 Political Tolerance: 
Do the above mentioned studies then show that identifying with race has rescinded in South 
Africa and Namibia; meaning that people no longer identify with ethnicity as strongly as in 
1994? By taking political tolerance into consideration, this phenomenon can be verified. The 
reasoning is that if South Africans do not place as great importance on ethnic identities as 
was the case in 1994, then they should also be more tolerant of political views from other 
groups. The approach to political tolerance studies builds on the work done by Sullivan et al. 
(1982). Their definition of political tolerance is as follows, “…as the willingness to allow all 
groups, irrespective of their political viewpoints, to compete for political power through legal 
and peaceful means…” (Gibson & Gouws, 2003:41). The South African context is culturally, 
racially and ethnically heterogeneous which has considerable influence on the perceptions of 
the average South African. History has caused a disproportionate development of political 
consciousness and most South Africans were never taught the basic principles of democracy. 
Political intolerance is pervasive in South African society and carries much emotional 
meaning. According to Gibson and Gouws (2003:45-6), to tolerate is to allow political 
activity to ones political enemies, with an addition of apathy; the political enemy must be 
despised, loathed and/or disliked. The key definition of a liberal democracy is that all 
political movements and active groups have institutionalised opportunities for competing for 
political power within the existing framework of democracy that was established during the 
negotiations. To deny such to a group or person then is to be intolerant. The research done by 
Gibson and Gouws (2003:52-5) used the content-controlled method in which respondents 
were asked to select their four most-disliked groups and then answer whether or not they 
would allow them certain civil liberties. The results indicated that the most disliked groups 
were on the extreme periphery, usually those groups that advocated extreme political 
measures and opinions; such as the AWB, and to a lesser extent the PAC. However, in the 
South African context, racial and ethnic polarisation also gave rise to or enhanced political 
intolerance towards ideologically different groups.  
South Africans have relatively high levels of intolerance compared to other studies done in 
other countries and intolerance is of a pluralistic nature, meaning that it is spread over many 
groups instead of being focused on one or two specific groups. This indicates that South 
Africans are more inclined to not tolerate different political opinions and views over the 
entire spectrum of the South African population; which means that political tolerance in 
South Africa is still bound to ethnic stereotypes. To what extent the average South African 
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has internalised democratic principles is evident in that the average South African is 
intolerant of those groups that have a different ethnic identity than their own. As mentioned 
above, from the selected most-disliked groups, all had ethnic characteristic different to those 
of the respondents’ own group. The fact that political intolerance in South Africa is pluralistic 
means that any group other than their own, no matter the difference, is not tolerated as should 
be the case in a consolidated democracy. For South Africa, if one group is intolerant of many 
other groups then group identity is based on ethnic differences. There are however not that 
many economic and politically different groups, merely superficially created ethnic and racial 
groups. The South African transition did not then, in respect to the above mentioned, have 
considerable influence on the tolerance levels of people from different ethnic groups towards 
each other. Beliefs of the ‘other’ are still ground primarily in Apartheid ideology and 
stereotyping. The Namibian society shows no difference in toleration levels regarding the 
assumed differences in ethnicity and race expounded during the South African administration 
era. Namibians are as intolerant of one another as South Africans are, based on stereotypes of 
racial and ethnic differences (du Pisani, 2003:129-132). 
According to Bratton, Mattes and Boadi (2005:100-102), economic factors relating to a free 
market economy in a democracy rank highly in Namibia and South Africa. Unemployment is 
highest on the development agenda. These responses, they argue, are due to anxieties by the 
unemployed (fairly high in both Namibia and South Africa with 29% and 31% respectively) 
centred on the condition of the national economy and the quality of the government’s 
macroeconomic management. Only in Zimbabwe is the fixation on economic issues higher. A 
distinct difference emerges between Namibia and South Africa, in that Namibians value 
education higher than South African; with 21% of Namibian respondents ranking education 
highest. On the contrary, South Africans rank crime prevention highest on the social issues 
rank. South Africans of all racial groups fear becoming a victim of crime, however, this fear 
is higher among white and Indian groups than among black and Coloured groups. In contrast, 
crime barely registers as a concern for Namibians, and they do not connect crime to race, as 
is the case in South Africa. Considering the differences in transition style, South Africans fear 
crime more due to a sense of loss of power by the previously advantaged and a loss of trust in 
the power and influence of the security forces such as the police by the majority population. 
This differs from Namibia, where the entire society was compulsorily shifted from colonial 
rule to a democracy. As for economic self-reliance; there is no significant difference between 
Namibians and South Africans, with just over half choosing to be self-reliant for economic 
development than rather relying on government to provide economic advancement (Bratton, 
Mattes & Boadi, 2005:105). 
To improve the levels of tolerance in conjunction with existing geographical separation of the 
different groups of people, the Delimitation Commission in Namibia was specifically directed 
by the constitution to undertake demarcation without any reference to the race, colour or 
ethnic origins of the inhabitants. This latter consideration was specified in the constitution 
owing to Namibia’s goal of creating a unified democracy out of a highly unequal and divided 
past. To further the goal of a unified democracy, the arrangement of public disclosure of 
private donations or membership fees for political parties was introduced. Namibia is an 
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exception in this regard in Southern Africa. Annual public funding to represented political 
parties was introduced in 1997, but failure to disclose foreign donations may result in a fine 
or imprisonment. This latter provision was introduced following the 1989 elections when the 
DTA received substantial funds from the South African NP government. No foreign funds 
have been disclosed since the introduction of the amendment (Pottie, 2001:138-141). 
According to the Freedom House report for 2009 (Puddington, 2009) Namibia received a 
downward trend arrow due to the ruling party’s harassment and intimidation of the new 
opposition party (RDP), including the disruption of the group’s meetings and rallies.  
4.4.3 Political Support: 
Why then should support for democratic ideals be important in South Africa due to the 
negotiated nature of the transition? According to a study done by Bratton and Mattes 
(2001:447), democratic consolidation occurs when citizens and alike conclude that no 
alternative form of regime has any greater subjective validity or stronger objective claim to 
their allegiance. In other words, the type of regime is the most legitimate. However, they 
argue that in any new regime, where democracy is a novel experience, citizens often fall back 
on a performance based judgment of the regime; meaning the people support democracy for 
what it provides to them. In their study they developed the theory that South Africans hold an 
instrumental view of democracy, rather than an intrinsic view; meaning they equate 
democracy with what it does for them. The South African survey revealed that black South 
Africans more often choose economic benefits over political ones; including housing, jobs 
and a decent income over political rights such as the freedom of speech, regular elections and 
minority rights.  
The exact opposite was true for the non-black South African population. They did however 
recognise that these difference in political support among the South African population lay 
with socio-economic development rather than with an internalisation of democratic values. 
Accordingly, they exposed that most black South Africans were able to provide meaningful 
responses to questions regarding their understanding of democratic values. Evidently, the 
ANC’s concession on the economy during the transition has resulted in less political support 
as a third of the population thought the economy was performing poorly under democracy 
and over half would give up regular elections for better economic prospects. South Africans 
in general were unsatisfied with the way the transition was handled with regards to economic 
aspects by the ANC as well as the ANC’s lack of service delivery (Bratton & Mattes, 
2001:458 & 461). Would there then have been a difference in political support for democratic 
ideals had the South African transition been executed and implemented by an outside 
organisation?   
Not according to Mattes (2002:34), who argues that the proportional electoral system was an 
important aspect in establishing inclusivity for the numerous civil and political groups in 
South Africa during the transition; but had become flawed in limiting the voters’ control over 
their elected representatives, who are elected on the party-list system without any grassroots 
accountability to voters. It might therefore have contributed to the trend of a dominant-party 
system and institutional centralism in South Africa, i.e. the party executives are invariably 
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linked to the state rather than the grassroots structures that should dominate the policy-
making process which goes hand in hand with erosion of parliament. Either way, had a 
foreign organisation implemented the transition to democracy, a proportional electoral system 
would also have been implemented but could have resulted in a difference since there would 
not have been negotiations where the incoming political elite (the ANC leadership) had to 
renounce radical ideologies. 
As Breytenbach (2006:177) pointed out, Mandela attempted to reconcile the nation by 
working from a “four nations” perspective (these being black, white, Coloured and Indian) 
which helped in working towards a common goal of reconciliation allowing for dealing with 
divisive issues such as Afrikaner concerns, Zulu nationalism, militant youths, big business, 
and ANC radicals. The institutions set up by Mandela were of a corporatist nature, such as 
the GNU and the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) which 
strived for co-operation between the state, the market, and civil society. Mbeki’s presidency, 
however, brought with it the concept of an African Renaissance in which the country was 
divided into two nations, the one rich and white, the other poor and black. For Mbeki, nation-
building meant the strengthening of the newly forming black bourgeoisie in not only the state 
and parastatal sectors, but also in the private sector. For non-blacks, this state intervention 
into the private market has the potential to erode trust in the government. However, Mbeki 
actively encouraged rapprochement with the IFP, in-line with his two-nation approach. 
Mbeki also moved government closer to the black consciousness movement by bringing in 
AZAPO members into key government structures. The preferential treatment that the black 
community received under Mbeki’s leadership did not contribute much to decreasing inter-
ethnic animosity. Especially the white community felt that they had been marginalised. 
Furthermore, the more ethnically conscious Mbeki became the more the general populace did 
as well, especially the black South Africans. The top-down effects of nation-building had 
taken on negative effects for ethnic reconciliation in the change of leadership from Mandela 
to Mbeki (Breytenbach, 2006:178-179).   
Evidently then, the support for the rule of law is also a component of political support in that 
the support for the rule of law indicates the publics’ willingness to follow the rules of the 
government in the context of democracy. To abide to the law is to be supportive of the regime 
type. South Africans’ perception of the rule of law, according to a study done by Gibson and 
Gouws (1997) showed that few people endorsed the idea of unequal treatment of citizens by 
the institutions administrating law. Virtually no one endorsed arbitrary deviations from the 
rule of law based on ethnicity and race. Among the respondents to the study, there was 
greatest agreement that one was obliged to follow even those laws made by the political 
opposition. However, just over half agreed that an emergency situation allowed for the 
suspension of the law and just under half of the respondents thought it was legitimate to 
manipulate the law without actually breaking the law. The interesting part of the study is that 
it indicated that white South Africans overwhelmingly support the rule of law, and Asian 
South Africans as well. Black South Africans were distinctly less likely to adhere to laws 
made by a government controlled by an opposition party. The negotiated nature of the South 
African transition did not have a reconciliatory effect in this regard for black South African 
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as they had suffered the most under Apartheid and were thus reluctant in following a 
government that was not ANC-led. Another aspect to the unwillingness to support the rule of 
law lay in the perceived inability of state institutions in fighting crime (Gibson & Gouws, 
1997:180). If the police was perceived as being unable to combat crime, the majority of 
South Africans would take the law ‘into their own hand’, as was seen with the xenophobic 
attacks across South Africa in May 2008, where those involved argued that the police was 
unable to stop the ‘lawlessness’ of the foreigners. This also shows that perceived ethnic and 
racial differences can exaggerate negative stereotypes of groups (Gibson & Gouws, 2003:72-
73). 
Political support in Namibia is relatively average compared to Southern Africa. However, 
since the majority of Namibians, rural and urban have at least a primary education and the 
more affluent socio-economic classes have secondary and tertiary education, it enables the 
majority of the population to form relatively complex political opinions. Civil society action 
groups and interest groups that place pressure on government have increasingly been more 
successful in the 2000s than in the 1990s. According to Afrobarometer data, interpreted by 
Bratton, Mattes and Boadi (2005:67) and their own study (2005), 66% of Namibians have a 
basic understanding of democracy and possess a basic awareness of democracy and what it 
entails. However, the second most given answer was a resounding, “Don’t know”. 
Comparatively speaking, however, about 91% of South Africans had a basic understanding of 
democracy. This shows the difference of transition styles in that due to the involvement of the 
South African populace in the transition process and the relative non-involvement of the 
majority Namibian populace during the transition, greater emphasis is placed on support for 
democratic principles in South Africa than Namibia. 
As for popular understandings of democracy, Namibians view democracy as very positive 
and almost no politically aware person presented a negative definition. Bratton, Mattes and 
Boadi (2005:69), however, warn that such an optimistic association of democracy could lead 
to democracy becoming an ideologically unassailable symbol that nobody wishes to openly 
oppose. However, the percentage of South Africans preferring democracy over a non-
democratic regime was greater than compared to Namibians. Responses to the democracy 
facilitating ‘peace and unity’ were not higher in Namibia than in South Africa; even 
comparably the same as the rest for Africa where violent civil conflicts had only recently 
taken place (Bratton, Mattes & Boadi, 2005:70-73). The rejection of an alternative regime, 
such as military rule, one-man rule, one-party rule, or authoritarian rule was for Namibia an 
overall average of 60%, ranking lowest compared to other African countries in the study. 
South Africa scored an average of 66%, third-lowest on the list of African countries (Bratton, 
Mattes & Boadi, 2005:77). Just over half of the Namibian population would reject military 
rule and even fewer would reject one-man rule. Tolerance of the concentration of power in 
the hands of the President/executive, suggests an extremely fragile democratic commitment 
by the populace. Namibians are therefore more willing to accept a non-democratic regime, 
emphasising the lack of emotional involvement in the transition process and the formation of 
Namibian democratic institutions. 
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As Bauer (2001:53) argues, the development of the Namibian democracy during the 1990s 
had been accompanied by a notable concentration of power within the executive branch of 
government and considerable evidence of an opposition to democratic political practices 
among some Namibian leaders and citizens. In addition, while Namibia could at least boast of 
peace and stability for much of the first decade of independence, this had been shattered by 
the unpopular decision of a few SWAPO leaders in government to involve Namibia in two 
regional wars; and by an armed secession attempt in the Caprivi region. These developments 
had led to significant human rights abuses and violations by the Namibian security 
institutions (police and military) in much of northern part of Namibia, especially the Caprivi 
region. However, an awareness of previous experiences is evident in the public discourse 
around the concepts of democracy and civil society, for example in the media and among 
members of non-governmental organisations, political parties, and some in government. The 
concern that the current government is repeating past mistakes, is both implicit and explicit in 
statements and documents of the COD and RDP. Namibia’s unique circumstances might also 
favour an active and growing civil society. Civil society, where it had emerged, had done so 
in the context of considerable anger at, and alienation from, the SWAPO government. In 
Namibia, the struggle over the last few decades was against a largely foreign and now 
vanquished opponent. Moreover, the struggle against white minority South African rule did 
not generate the same level of boycotts and uprisings in Namibia as it did South Africa. 
Instead, in Namibia, outright guerrilla war and international diplomacy were the primary 
means by which the struggle was waged. To date, with few exceptions, there does not appear 
to be the same anger and alienation against those in state power in Namibia. Rather, there 
appears to be an eagerness on the part of many organisations to engage the state, despite 
resistance from some political leaders to such engagement and the considerable inexperience 
of many of the groups. Much of the media, meanwhile, remain unfazed in their commitment 
to freedom of expression (Bauer, 2001:54-55). 
The SWAPO government however, even after nineteen years of democracy, still frequently 
uses liberation struggle rhetoric to entice the poorer sections of Namibian society to support 
the party. However, Namibians are in general satisfied with democracy as a regime structure. 
Namibians scored an overall 64% for being satisfied with democracy; 26% being unsatisfied 
and 10% being neutral. This level of ‘satisfaction’ refers to the way in which respondents 
perceive democracy to be working in their country. Namibia scored higher on the 
‘satisfaction’ scale than South Africa, which only reached 52% of respondents satisfied with 
democracy; however having 45% unsatisfied with democracy in South Africa (Bratton, 
Mattes & Boadi, 2005:82). We can see here that the negotiated nature of the South African 
transition; the concession made by the major parties and their constituencies; might be partly 
responsible for the lower levels of satisfaction with democracy in South Africa than in 
Namibia, where democracy was the only option for a transition from colonial rule. However, 
in both Namibia and South Africa, willingness to entertain authoritarian alternatives to the 
democratic regime are also above average for Southern Africa; especially for the white 
minority population; as for the rest of the Southern African countries in the study (Bratton, 
Mattes & Boadi, 2005:89). Bratton, Mattes and Boadi (2005:90-93) indicated that, for South 
Africa and Namibia, this seemed to be an expression of regret for an old regime amongst 
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persons who previously possessed to the levers and spoils of power, but have now lost out 
under the new regime. Under closer inspection, satisfaction for democracy; and therefore its 
institutions; by South Africans has fluctuated since 1995 and has increased only very 
gradually. Pro-democratic feelings were mixed at the time of the transition and had only 
slowly won over new adherents. However, South Africans expect the quality of their 
democracy to decline in the near future. Contrary, Namibians expect the quality of their 
democracy to increase in the near future due to the formation of stronger political opposition. 
This however is limited to the affluent class of Namibians, regardless of race and ethnicity. 
4.4.4 Legitimacy: 
The above mentioned then leads to the question of legitimacy of state institutions. If the 
institutions that abound in contemporary South Africa were agreed upon during the 
negotiations by the political elite who they subsequently voted into power, then the South 
African populace should consider these state institutions as legitimate. Breytenbach 
(2006:179-180) points out that Mandela’s legacy of nation-building and national 
reconciliation came at the cost of effective government; something which Mbeki strived to 
correct under his presidency. Under Mandela, the strategy of consensus-making and 
cooperation resulted in the GNU and NEDLAC and brought about an increase in the 
centralisation of institutions under ANC hegemony. Eventually, political opportunism 
illustrated the absence of a serious political opposition from a collective opposition in 
government. However, under Mbeki, centralised government resulted in the loss of 
representativity or accountability, since neither the administrative branch nor big business or 
organised labour were ever directly accountable to the electorate which made them elitist and 
barred the rise of mass-based grassroots politics.  
Under Mbeki, Mandela’s RDP (Reconstruction and Development Program) was replaced by 
a more capitalist-market orientated GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) policy. 
GEAR was a typical neo-liberal market framework which appeased the mostly white business 
community but brought with it confrontation with the mostly black workers unions under 
leadership of COSATU. Even though the GEAR policy did produce more economic growth 
than the RDP, it was still insufficient for employment growth for the unemployed, mostly 
black South Africans. Transformation and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE and Broad-
Based BEE) have benefitted mostly the elites and urban bourgeoisie; in a country where two-
thirds of the populace is still rural based and habitually destitute (Breytenbach, 2006:181). 
Evidently, anger by poor blacks aimed at the wealthy whites has increased since the 
transformation because the ANC government had failed to incorporate the majority poor 
blacks into the economic empowerment policies. Conversely, whites are angered at being 
disadvantaged by such policies like Affirmative Action and Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE), which some claim to be ‘reverse Apartheid’. Breytenbach 
(2006:182-182) argued that under Mbeki almost everything shifted. Mandela’s nation-
building was shifted to the left alienating some while co-opting others; decision-making 
government institutions became more centralised; and economic policy was shifted further 
right angering the leftist unions and socialist elements in government and society. Institutions 
such as the IEC, the judiciary, media freedom and a growth in civil society, have their 
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premise in the negotiated nature of the transition and have strengthened due to the leadership 
styles of Mandela and Mbeki, but on the downside, the electoral system now feeds into one-
party dominance while fragmenting the opposition. The positive growth of a free media and 
civil society organisations offers a much needed ‘checks-and-balances’ to the evermore 
centralising government.   
Jung and Shapiro (1995:272) have argued that a serious flaw in the interim institutions as 
negotiated as part of the transition in South Africa was the absence of an institutionalised 
opposition. They argued that democratic systems rely on such and it was doubtful that any 
regime can survive in the long term. They contended that such opposition requires both the 
permissiveness of freedoms of speech and association, and the presence of institutions and 
practices that make it possible for counter elites to organise themselves so as to be able to 
contest for power. The GNU of 1993 was antithetical in the development of such opposition. 
The GNU was short-lived due to this. Furthermore, the ANC, as the ruling party since 1994, 
had failed to adapt to ‘normal’ politics and still remains a liberation movement. Although, 
political power was consolidated and execution of mandate moved ahead under Mbeki, a 
great number of central ANC members still regularly use liberation rhetoric to justify their 
positions in government and privileges to the masses of ANC followers.  
However, an ever increasing trend has become noticeable since the 2004 elections. The 
number of strikes and civil actions aimed at service delivery by the government have 
increased considerably and the time in between each such action has become shorter. Election 
promises made by the ANC have failed to materialise and the poor, mostly black township, 
masses have taken to the barricades to demonstrate their anger at the failure of basic service 
delivery such as electricity, water and basic infrastructure. It could potentially be argued that 
the ANC’s inability to implement more radical economic policies that could bring about 
changes in socio-economic development between ethnic groups is the reason for the slow 
pace of change. However, as was pointed out, the ANC realised during the negotiations that 
they did not have viable existing plans and policies for the national economy in 1994 and that 
any radical change of the existing economic status quo would cause a mass exodus of white 
skills and business and potentially cause a collapse of the economy, as had happened in 
Uganda after Idi Amin expelled the Asian business community. The ANC therefore had no 
other choice but to concede to the NP that the economic status quo of 1994 would be 
maintained with only very little gradual change, such as the opening of the economy to all 
South Africans regardless of race and ethnicity. However, because the negotiations failed to 
address the imbalance in human and economic capital between the white and black 
communities, the opening up of the economy to the majority South Africans did not 
substantially change much for the socio-economic development of black South Africans since 
they did not have the skills and expertise, nor the financial capital to bring about significant 
socio-economic development in their own communities. Reluctance by the white business 
community to incorporate the black majority into the economy further showed that ethnic 
animosity had not subsided years after the negotiated transition. 
As Suttner (2004:769) puts it, “Whether democracy is consolidated depends also on the 
extension and deepening of democracy, the involvement of people in politics during and 
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between elections, the viability of participatory democracy and the existence of autonomous 
organisations of civil society,  and organs of direct democracy.” They may relate to the state 
but may simply be organs of self-empowerment in relation to issues that matter to people, 
organised in street committees and similar structures. This was a common phenomenon in the 
1980s but exists unevenly in the present period, partly because of the ANC’s ambiguity over 
pluralism and that some of its members sense that involvement in social movements would be 
construed as ‘disloyal’ to the ANC party. This involvement in self-empowering organs of 
direct and participatory democracy is important not only as a manifestation of pluralism, but 
as extending the range of meanings given to democracy and to the opening clause of the 
Freedom Charter which reads, ‘The People Shall Govern!’ One of the reasons why coups 
were so regular a feature in the early decades of independent Africa is that ordinary people 
were demobilised and felt they had no stake in the political system. It is important to create 
movements for popular participation extending much wider than periodic voting. That is the 
most powerful way of consolidating democracy in the broadest sense. Beyond this, if 
consolidation refers partly to the public seeing itself as stakeholders, socioeconomic 
transformation is an important way of developing that sense. The extent to which excluded 
and marginalised sections of the population have their concerns addressed also impacts 
substantially on the sustainability of democracy. Undoubtedly, current unemployment and 
inequalities are part of the wider obstacles that need to be confronted in the process of 
maintaining this democratic order. 
That it is even possible to assess a decade of democracy in South Africa is a testament to the 
country’s success in overcoming a legacy of polarisation and seemingly intractable political 
conflict. That this relative success has been achieved while affirming the rights and dignity of 
all South Africans serves as a reminder that a stable democracy is more than just a well-
crafted conflict management mechanism. South Africa’s record of government 
responsiveness and accountability, though far from perfect, demonstrates that democratic 
contestation and constitutional government provide a solid institutional platform for 
developmental governance, especially when combined with an active civil society. At the 
same time, any democracy in which a single political party is overwhelmingly dominant has 
structural vulnerabilities. Institutionalised limits on government authority must be self-
enforcing; that is, the government must find it to be in their own political interests to abide by 
them (Alence, 2004:89-90).  
All else being equal, a government enjoying the support of a very large majority faces 
stronger temptations to transgress formal limits on its authority, possibly contributing to 
democratic erosion. What is to keep the ANC from eroding democracy to ensure its 
continued dominance of the government? For one, the ANC is already doing so by 
centralising government which allows the ANC leadership to have most of the important 
decision making in the vicinity so as to exercise more influence on the outcome. This trend 
was very noticeable under Mbeki. How this will continue under Zuma is yet to be seen. 
Evidently then, the negotiated nature of the transition and Nelson Mandela’s leadership of 
nation-building and reconciliation did contribute to ethnic reconciliation in that the top-down 
approach during the 1990s did result in some ethnic reconciliation across the perception 
barrier. However, South Africans remain politically intolerant and there is reason to believe 
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that this might not change considerably if the racial and ethnic characteristics of the socio-
economic divide are not altered soon. However, radical change would only antagonise the 
white community which is needed in South Africa for their business and intellectual skills 
and expertise.  
On the up-side, due to the negotiated nature of the transition, support for the democratic 
principles seems to be widespread in South African society. The majority of South Africans 
believe they are able to influence government decision making by keeping to democratic 
rules and regulations, i.e. elections, referenda, public participation and the formation of civil 
action groups to pressure government. The legitimacy of the new South African government 
institutions seems unsteady at best. The negotiations did not contribute significantly to 
persuading the wider South African populace in the authority of the new ANC government. 
During the 1990s, many of the previously-advantaged felt that the ANC government was 
working in a manner of eschewing ethnic and racial differences. This, however, has changed 
during the 2000s where an ever increasing tendency by the ANC government to employ 
ethnic and racial differentiation in political rhetoric and the execution of government policy 
has become apparent, such as Affirmative Action and BBBEE policies. There still is 
discrimination based on ethnic and racial differences.  
How then can the ANC government preach ethnic reconciliation and nation-building on the 
one hand and on the other implement racially discriminatory economic and social policies? 
Ultimately, the negotiated nature of the transitions, combined with Mandela’s leadership style 
brought about some ethnic reconciliation during the 1990s, but was in danger of being 
reversed by Mbeki’s leadership and a change in attitude of the ANC leadership due to the 
absence of a strong political opposition. South Africans are only a little more ethnically 
reconciled today than they were in 1994. However, this is not to suggest that a different 
transition style; i.e. as in the Namibian case; could have made a more positive difference. It 
has to be emphasised that the negotiated nature of the South African transition was the best 
possible option for South Africa at that time. 
However, political and state institutions in Namibia also suffered a loss of legitimacy due to 
the fact that the ruling SWAPO party was able to change the constitution in 1999. The 
SWAPO leader, and President of Namibia at that time, Sam Nujoma, was able to change the 
constitutional provisions that prevented him from running for re-election and continuing his 
rule. He succeeded in changing the constitution to enable him to compete in the elections for 
a third term. The constitution was amended by an act of Parliament. Nujoma, who began his 
second term in 1994 with 76% of the popular vote, decided to push for an amendment that 
would allow him to run for a third term in 1999. A two-thirds parliamentary vote in favour of 
amending the constitution was successful since SWAPO formed the majority in the 
Parliament (Posner & Young, 2007:133-135). This case illustrates that SWAPO leaders 
posses the power to shape outcomes to suit their preferences, even when those preferences 
conflict with formal limitations on what they are legally permitted to do. The effort to extend 
Presidential term limits is a further reflection of executive ambition. In weak institutional 
settings without an effective legislature or judiciary to provide checks and balances, 
Presidential control tends to foster many of the same problems that characterized earlier 
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systems of personal rule, including a lack of government accountability and transparency. 
The lack of political restraint by SWAPO diminishes the legitimacy of its government and in 
overall the legitimacy of state institutions. Political support therefore decreases as well, as the 
minorities in Namibia slowly realises that the government is moving away from the tenants of 
democracy as laid out during the transition. 
 
4.5 Assessment: 
In a study done by Lindberg (2006), he argued that it was also noteworthy that elites in so 
many diverse countries across Africa seem to adjust their behaviour and strategies as a result 
of repeated elections. Fear and mistrust among former combatants and political rivals in 
places like South Africa and Namibia have slowly been replaced by mutual coexistence, 
acceptance, and peaceful competition. Even longstanding ethnic rivalries that constituted 
major divides in these countries seem to have over a few electoral cycles lost their potential 
for generating violent conflict. While it may be too early to pass definitive judgments on 
more long-term social processes such as these, it appears that democratic frameworks for 
political competition and participation lead to greater levels of acceptance and peaceful 
coexistence.  
A 2002 Afrobarometer survey of public attitudes suggests that Namibia’s democracy faces 
serious challenges. While most Namibians believe they are benefiting from democracy, some 
evidence – such as the sizeable number who would support civilian authoritarianism in the 
form of a strong President – also suggests that while support for democracy is widespread, it 
is not deep. Although there are no clearly definable social groupings that can be labelled 
“anti-democratic” or “non-democratic,” two important factors account for much of the 
variation in opinions and attitudes: the urban-rural divide, and partisanship. The urban-rural 
divide captures many of the socioeconomic inequalities present in the country and has a 
significant influence on almost all variables. A clear divide also emerges between supporters 
of the ruling party and those who back the opposition. Namibia still appears to be a country 
with serious political divisions. This reality, coupled with the lack of depth in the support for 
democracy, presents a potentially serious obstacle to democratic consolidation. But Namibia 
also exhibits a number of elements conducive to the consolidation of democracy, including 
high levels of legitimacy, high levels of trust in representatives, and a strong belief that the 
system is responsive to the needs of the citizenry (Keulder, 2002).  
In recent years a few incidents have raised concern about Namibia’s prospects for achieving 
ethnic reconciliation in the context of democratic consolidation. First, the constitution was 
amended to allow the incumbent President, Sam Nujoma, a third term in office. Second, in 
the Caprivi region a small group of secessionists challenged the territorial integrity of the 
country, and in the short confrontation to subdue the group, the Namibian security forces 
committed a substantial number of human rights violations, some of which are still subject to 
investigation. Thirdly, several senior officials in the government and the ruling party, 
including the President himself, had launched scathing verbal attacks on segments of 
Namibian society and the international community that have not only raised questions about 
the status of the policy of national reconciliation, but also bordered on accusations of hate 
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speech. Together with a number of assaults on opposition supporters during the 1999 and 
2004 Presidential and national assembly elections, this is perhaps the clearest indication that 
Namibia lacks a democratic value system. 
 
4.6 The TRC as a Tool for Reconciliation? 
A possible difference in reconciliation between South Africa and Namibia is the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa, and the absence of such a commission in 
Namibia. In its most basic form, the commission in South Africa was seen as a tool to be used 
to come to grips with the Apartheid past. The setting up of the TRC was a result of the 
negotiations between the Apartheid government and the ANC, in that conditional amnesty 
was to be granted to all those involved in Apartheid atrocities so as to prevent the ANC a 
‘witch-hunt’ of such persons after the transition. As with any issue there were those that 
applauded and commended the success of the TRC and those that criticised and detracted 
from it. Those arguing in favour of the TRC13 point out the great success it has had in 
reconciling the different ethnic groups, while those arguing against the TRC14 point out that 
the revealing of the truth had only caused further inflammation of hatred and embitterment of 
opponents making them far less likely to be willing to coexist in a new democratic regime. 
In the by far most extensive study and assessment of the TRC, Gibson (2004) took a critical 
look at the commission’s workings and its supposed ‘successes’. In the case of the TRC, it 
was argued that reconciliation was a relationship that is created between victims and 
perpetrators, between beneficiaries and those exploited during Apartheid. It was aimed at 
bringing the opposing sides together and creating common ground with which a united 
society could build a successful future on (Gibson 2004:5-7). ‘Truth’ was therefore an 
imperative to reconciliation in that it was used to create a common and shared memory for 
society and the nation. Gibson’s (2004) study on the TRC focused on the micro-level of 
reconciliation where the individual with his/her experiences of Apartheid were central. This 
level of reconciliation is grounded in the individual, from either side to accept the blame, 
offer apologies and give forgiveness. Gibson does so justifiably because the definition of 
reconciliation at the macro-level is intrinsically flawed. It is defined as reconciliation between 
those that profited and those who were injured under Apartheid, but as being essentially a 
non-racial ideology of reconciliation. In a country such as South Africa (and to a lesser 
extent, Namibia), where the entire system of Apartheid was grounded in superficial 
ideologically created racial and ethnic differences, race and ethnicity cannot be simply 
ignored in favour of simplifying ideology. The religious overtone of the TRC might have also 
caused some confusion in certain settings. Often it led to the mistaking of forgiveness with 
reconciliation. 
But due to the fact that there are almost no studies that explore the empirical side of the TRC, 
no definite answer can be given of the success of the TRC, or if the TRC had even achieved 
                                                 
13
 See, for example, Goldstone (2000); Allen & Allen (2000); Dyzenhaus (2002). 
14
 See, for example, Kaminer et.al. (2001); Gibson (2004); Norval (2002); Hamber (2002). 
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its goals. ‘Telling the truth’ did not create reconciliation. Gibson (2004:329-332) argued that 
individuals must willingly support equality in a society that has historically been divided 
along racial, ethnic and cultural line. Political tolerance also has its source in the support for 
democratic values. For a person to be tolerant of another, the individual must want to. Merely 
agreeing that the rule of law and equality are important does not automatically result in the 
following through by individuals. Individuals of one group might want equality within their 
own group but not for another group, possibly a minority. What can be an explanation for this 
might the fact that threat perceptions are not easily restrained and take a considerable amount 
of time to fall below threshold levels, meaning to cause political intolerance.  
However, Gibson argued that political intolerance is not influenced by group identity. He 
argues that there is no significant connection between social identity theory and political 
intolerance, meaning that the individuals’ decision to identify with a group does not 
necessarily result in intergroup conflict. Nevertheless, group identification is the precursor for 
intergroup relations and as soon as an item of competition is introduced into the relationship, 
conflict is inevitable. Such items can be scarce resources such as wealth, and ideological 
items such as language, culture and religion. Conflicting groups always share common 
characteristics or share a common space. In the South African and Namibian context, group 
competition was both over scarce resources, such as economic power, and ideological 
reasons, such as the supposed superiority of one race over another. This has certainly not 
changed after the advent of democracy. 
However, the greatest drawback of Gibson’s study is the lack of socio-economic measures. 
The lack of including the socio-economic aspect in reconciliation and therefore democratic 
consolidation limits the validity of the study. Other studies (Bratton & Mattes, 2001) have 
shown that support for democratic principles by the majority of the South African public is 
instrumental. This means that those individuals who are deprived of economic security, are 
more likely to view democracy as a tool to gain economic security and equality. Democracy 
means to them a change from socio-economic oppression under the Apartheid state. Would a 
previously disadvantaged individual feel reconciled to a previously advantaged individual if 
the socio-economic situation did not change for the previously-disadvantaged individual? 
Since the basic ideology of Apartheid was ‘separate development’, but ended in exploitation 
and unequal development, reconciliation for many South Africans and Namibians could mean 
equal socio-economic development. The gross human rights violations and abuses that took 
place were limited to a small number of the oppressed under Apartheid. The majority of the 
oppressed suffered economically.  
Even though the TRC was successful in bringing about reconciliation in the form of a shared 
understanding of Apartheid cruelty and condemnation of such by the majority public, it is not 
clear whether or not reconciliation was actually achieved. As Gibson (2004:329) notes 
himself, his study is limited in that it is not a longitudinal study and only represents one point 
in time. Although a shared understanding and history was created by the TRC, it did not 
much to spread political tolerance, since it, as argued before, needs to be diffused to the 
general public over time and from a both top-down and bottom-up approach. A supporting 
argument to Gibson’s interpretation would be to point out the value the TRC had for the 
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individuals who experienced human rights abused under the Apartheid regime. In a studies 
done by Kaminer et. al. (2001) and Norval (2002) that assessed the relation of the TRC on 
the psychiatric status and level of forgiveness among survivors of human rights abuses, they 
concluded that there was no significant association between TRC participation and 
psychiatric status or forgiveness levels. They conclude that truth commissions should form 
part of, rather than be a substitute for, comprehensive therapeutic interventions for survivors 
of human rights abuses.  
The TRC has, however, also received considerable praise and recognition for its 
groundbreaking approach to reconciliation. Judge Richard Goldstone (2000: viii-x) points out 
that the question of having to deal nationally with human rights abuses only became relevant 
during the last three decades or so. The TRC in South Africa had in a certain sense brought 
about justice by publicly exposing the truth with perpetrator and victims involved in the 
process, it brings much needed solace to the victims and initiate the healing process. By 
receiving full public acknowledgement of the human rights abuses and crimes against 
humanity during Apartheid; a permanent record of history had been created. Goldstone 
argues that the public interest in exposing and recording the human rights abuses has a 
number of advantages such as the prevention or curbing of denials and revisionism; the 
prevention of recurrence; the removal of perpetrators from public office; and by 
individualising the guilt of perpetrators thereby averting collective guilt being ascribed to 
groups. The greatest achievement the TRC can claim is to have brought about recognition of 
the formerly advantaged group that human rights abuses had occurred and that amendments 
are necessary to reconcile the nation. Goldstone however, concedes the point that uncovering 
and recording the truth will not necessarily prevent the recurrence of human rights violations. 
The TRC also had its own dilemmas to solve. As Wilson (2001:8) points out, the problem lay 
with first differentiating and then choosing between on the one hand, individual human rights 
in the name of justice or sacrificing individual human rights in the name of national unity and 
reconciliation. The final compromise of the transition was to grant amnesty for perpetrators 
of human rights abuses. Wilson (2001: 9-10) also points out that the best possible course for 
the creation of a non-racialised country to emerge was to create a spirit of Ubuntu, an African 
expression of community based on reciprocity, respect for human dignity, community 
cohesion and solidarity. Ubuntu was to define restorative justice and prevent revenge; to 
reinforce a new culture of human rights not driven by vengeance or legally sanctioned 
retribution. 
A TRC, or a similar commission would not have made any significant change in ethnic 
reconciliation in the Namibian context due to the following reasons. Firstly, there is no 
overall consensus that the South African TRC contributed to easing ethnic and racial 
tensions. Secondly, the Namibian context was different to the South African one in that it was 
claimed by SWAPO that the South African colonial administration, the South African 
Defence Force, and the South African security apparatus were responsible for human rights 
abuses during the liberation struggle. The involvement by the SWATF was insignificant in 
that the Namibian citizens recruited into the South African military were indoctrinated by the 
South African military. However, Dobell (1998:372) does point out that a commission 
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executing an inquiry into the SWAPO ‘Spy issue’ would be beneficial. In addition, SWAPO 
is being accused of widespread mistreatment of suspected dissidents during the earl 1980s; 
with some demanding full confession and apology from the perpetrators. It is important to 
note that such a commission, although modelled on the South African TRC, would not be as 
racially characterised as the South African TRC was, with the majority perpetrators being 
white South Africans who had enforced Apartheid and maintained the state security 
apparatus. The SWAPO ‘Spy issue’ involves members of SWAPO who had been suspected 
of collusion with the South African colonial administration during the 1980s. Dobell 
(1997:373) also points out that SWAPO’s reconciliation policy was far more cautious than 
the ANC’s. In SWAPO’s opinion, resurrecting the past would not serve a constructive 
purpose. A successful transition, it was argued, required cooperation among former enemies. 
Delving into past injustices would only incite a desire for vengeance and distract a still-
fragile nation from the paramount tasks of reconstruction and development.  
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of Findings and Areas for Future Research:  
As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, although the path to ethnic reconciliation in the 
context of democratic consolidation has been somewhat different for Namibia and South 
Africa, there seems to be no significant difference in levels of ethnic reconciliation. There 
still exists, after more than a decade of democracy for South African and almost two decades 
for Namibia significant ethnic animosity, albeit based on unequal socio-economic 
development over the time period for each country respectively. It seems as though hostility 
between different groups based mainly on the superficial racial and ethnic differences that 
were created during Apartheid has made way for hostility centred more on socio-economic 
differences.  
The level of social development; these being intellectual, business skills and technical 
expertise; for the previously advantaged community in both South Africa and Namibia are 
still to a great extent superior than the social development of the previously disadvantaged 
under Apartheid. While socio-economic issues have become the overriding concern for both 
South Africans and Namibians, socio-economic differences between individuals and groups 
are still largely tied to ethnicity and race. The antagonism of the majority poor black 
population in both South Africa and Namibia towards the minority affluent white population 
will shape public discourse and political decision-making for a considerable part of the near 
future. 
A further similarity that Namibia and South Africa share, although a cheerless one, was that 
the UN and UNTAG left Namibia with considerable speed after having brought about 
independence for the country. For South Africa, international pressure was off but uncertainty 
remained as to how South Africa would develop. The Namibian people were left to their own 
devices, similar to the South African situation, who had chosen to follow the path to 
democracy on their own. South Africa was considerably better equipped for the advent of a 
majority democracy than the Namibians. Prominent Namibian political leaders and business 
people lobbied foreign governments and international organisations for financial and 
technical support for the first years of democracy which were also the most formative of the 
newly independent republic. Although both countries adopted very similar democratic 
systems, there were a few notable differences, with differences between the South African 
electoral system and the Namibian one being noteworthy. South Africa is a liberal electoral 
democracy which embodies respect for civil and political liberties, for example, by tolerating 
press criticism. Such liberties are upheld by relatively effective legislative and judicial 
institutions which act fairly independent within a largely rule-governed process. In contrast, 
Namibia is a normal electoral democracy, where legislative and executive offices are also 
filled by popular election but lack the security of civil and political liberties as in a liberal 
electoral democracy. Political minorities are sidelined from the protection of the constitution 
and justifiably complain of neglect or even repression (as was the case in Namibia with the 
Caprivi secession movement). Freedom of speech is also more compromised in Namibia than 
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in South Africa, through the domination of the media by government. The number of private 
media companies in comparison to government owned institutions is lower in Namibia than 
South Africa. The greatest difference in the two electoral systems is that in Namibia, more 
power lies with the executive with significant decision making powers unavailable to other 
elected officials. This is certainly true for Namibia under Nujoma, but South Africa has also 
shown signs of government centralisation of the executive under Mbeki (Bratton, Mattes & 
Boadi, 2005:16). 
As Friedman (1998) pointed out, the way in which transitions to democracy are achieved is 
often believed to shape the polity which they produce. He stressed that although the 
uncertainty among political protagonists is the optimal guarantor of democratic institutions, 
i.e. the less those who draft the rules know about the likely outcome of their choices, the 
more likely is it that they will choose democratic mechanisms. He argues that this approach 
was inapplicable to the South African case and therefore, perhaps, to other pact driven 
transitions. A key expectation underpinning the settlement was that the outcome of majority 
rule was certain, that the National Party therefore sought to negotiate a constitution which 
diluted its effect and guarantee continued white dominance. But inadequate information 
prompted it to choose options which were not optimal both for its own interests and for 
democratic consolidation. The NP’s aim was to the very last minute a deal on power-sharing, 
guaranteeing rights for the numerically ethnic minorities. In the case of the Namibian 
transition, there was a complete absence of this scenario. The Namibian parties and actors 
during the transition were not involved in the shaping of transition process, merely as players 
waiting to be instructed by the UN and UNTAG. 
Certainly the nature of the political regime prior to the transition in Namibia was unlike that 
of any other African country attempting a regime transition in recent years and this surely 
accounts for much of the difference in Namibia’s transition outcome. More important than 
Namibia’s status as a ‘settler oligarchy’ was undoubtedly Namibia’s status as a colony. In 
fact, Namibia’s transition was a decolonisation – a transition from 100 years of colonial rule, 
first by the Germans and then the South Africans – to political independence and national 
sovereignty. It was not a transition from an indigenous authoritarian rule to an indigenous 
democratic rule. In addition, the mechanics of the transition itself are important and 
distinguish Namibia in some ways from other African countries. Perhaps most significantly 
was the international component of Namibia’s transition. The actual hand-over of power in 
Namibia was the culmination of a year-long transition supervised by the United Nations and 
guided by United Nations Security Council Resolution 435. Indeed, independence for 
Namibia was achieved only after decades of diplomatic struggle at the United Nations where 
South Africa’s occupation of Namibia was repeatedly contested, and a decades-long armed 
struggle between soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia and the South African 
Defence Forces. Ultimately, Namibia’s managed transition was the result of a carefully 
negotiated settlement. This settlement had as much to do with events in neighbouring Angola 
and Southern Africa as a whole and, by extension, with the ending of the Cold War, as with 
events inside Namibia (Bauer, 2001:34-35). 
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It has to be conceded that there might exist variables that have an effect on ethnic 
reconciliation that have not been considered in this thesis. A pertinent one would be to point 
out the differences in population for South Africa and Namibia. South Africa has about 24 
times the number of citizens than Namibia has. South Africa has a population of 
approximately 48 million while Namibia only 2.1 million; while South Africa’s geographic 
area is only a quarter larger than Namibia’s. This might seem to be significant but it is not 
really. As the Namibian population is considerably smaller than the South African one, so is 
everything else pertaining to it. The annual national budget is significantly smaller for 
Namibia than South Africa; any government expenditure is adjusted to the population size. 
This causes no significant difference because the socio-economic development stratification 
across the Namibian population is relatively the same. The white minority in both countries 
make up roughly 7-8% of the total population and still hold considerable control over the 
economy. The affluent white population forms the tax-basis in both countries as the 
formation of a black middle class has been slow.  
A further reason why the difference in population is not important is that natural resources in 
Namibia are not capable of supporting a larger population. Water scarcity has, ever since the 
first historical record of Namibia, been a cause for concern for the populace. The industrial 
basis in Namibia is also not as diversified as in South Africa. The Namibian economy is 
largely based on the export of raw materials and subsistence agriculture, with a 
manufacturing industry almost completely absent. The racial and ethnic make-up of the 
populations is also roughly the same for Namibia and South Africa. Extensive immigration 
from South Africa to Namibia over a course of 100 years has produced almost the same 
ethnic stratification, except for two differences. The one being that the largest ethnic group is 
Namibia is the Ovambo community forming about 50% of the population, and the second 
being the extensive influence the German community has in Namibian politics and the 
economy due to its ties with Germany, which is the country that makes the largest financial 
and economic aid donations to Namibia; more than any other donor nation and/or 
organisation.  However, the above stated is based on assumptions and further research has to 
be done to establish with certainty whether or not differences in population make-up between 
the two countries has a significant influence in shaping democratic consolidation. 
The main finding of this study suggests that the differences in the transition style - the one 
being internationally orchestrated and the other being internally negotiated- seems not to 
have had any significant affect on national reconciliation. The reason for this is that although 
in both  transitions the actors were restricted to adhere to democratic rules (this was imposed 
by the international community in the case of Namibia and part of the negotiated dispensation 
in the case of South Africa), 19 and 15 years after the transition in Namibia and South Africa 
respectively, the ruling parties have entrenched their one-party dominance and both show 
increasing tendencies of rolling back the democratic advances made since the transitions. 
Both countries have dropped in Freedom House’s ratings according to political rights and 
freedoms such as freedom of speech and discrimination of minorities based on ethnic and 
racial differences (Freedom House, 2009). Also, there seems to be a tendency of both ruling 
parties to continuously hark back to their ‘struggle credentials’ in rectifying any decision that 
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alters society and is not well received by some or other portion of society. It is about time that 
both the SWAPO and ANC reform themselves from liberation struggle movements into 
political parties that serve the people and not the other way around as is increasingly 
becoming evident as increasing evidence of neo-patrimonialism surfaces. 
 
5.2 Worrying Future Trends: 
There have been a number of incidences and issues that could potentially agitate the racial 
and ethnic tension in both Namibia and South Africa. There has in general not been any 
reversal of the differences in socio-economic development between black and white 
communities in both countries. A recent study has shown that neither Namibia nor South 
Africa have improved their overall Human Development Index, both ranking 129th and 128th 
respectively out of 185 countries (UNDP, 2009). The GINI-coefficient (the measure of 
inequality between rich and poor with a value of 1 being totally unequal) for South Africa 
temporarily reached 0.77 in 2001 and then dropped to 0.69 in 2008. For Namibia the numbers 
are 0.76 in 2001 and 0.69 in 2008. These two countries are two of the most unequal countries 
in the world today regarding the distribution of wealth and socio-economic development. If 
no serious attempt is made to rectify the issue within the context of an electoral democracy to 
which both countries subscribe, then cause for concern is justified.  
Furthermore, press freedom, freedom of speech and civil liberties have continuously come 
under attack in both countries. Numerous times, the Namibian ruling party has used negative 
political rhetoric to denounce newspapers that dare to criticise and expose government 
failures in policies and corruption (Makundu, 2009). The elite cadres of SWAPO have, in the 
recent past resorted to negative political rhetoric during political speeches that borders on 
hate speech and racial discrimination and marginalisation of minorities. Ex-President Sam 
Nujoma has continuously called for the white minority to be forcefully removed from 
existence by loyal nationalist SWAPO members to entice the poor and economically 
disadvantaged portion of the population.  
As for the ANC, increasing numbers of its senior cadres are using emotionally laden racial 
rhetoric to accuse minorities of acting in bad faith of national interests and attempting to 
undermine the stability of the country. Moeletsi Mbeki, brother of ex-President Thabo Mbeki, 
has pointed out that the ANC elites have used their positions in government to accrue enough 
political and economic power to instigate forms of Black Nationalism in which non-black 
minorities are not integral. He also points out that BEE was misused to enrich a handful of 
loyal ANC cadres rather than economically empower the previously disadvantaged masses. 
He argues that the predatory behaviour of political incumbents on state and government funds 
will eventually lead to a break-down of order and ‘free-for-all’ corruption will result (Mbeki, 
9 September 2009). Furthermore, the ANC leaders have been reluctant to restrain ANC 
members that advocate the marginalisation of racial minorities, such as ANC Youth League 
Julius Malema, Winnie Mandela and Blade Nzimande, who openly call for the forceful and in 
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a democracy illegal, appropriation of economic assets belonging to white South Africans 
(Alberts, 2009; Ntabeni, 2009; Uys, 2009; Trewelha, 2009). 
Evidently then, these trends towards negative racial relations have to be monitored closely. 
Civil society needs to be in a position to contest the issues in the equality and constitutional 
courts as it seems both the SWAPO and ANC leadership are currently reluctant to address the 
fear-mongering of some of their members. If left unchecked, continued political rhetoric that 
only further damages already fragile racial reconciliation efforts will be devastating to racial 
relations and reconciliation in general for both countries. In combination with developing 
government policies that work to decrease inequality and differences in socio-economic 
development, both the governments of Namibia and South Africa should also openly commit 
themselves to doing away with racial rhetoric and reprimanding their members for inciting 
negative emotions based on racial and ethnic characteristics.  
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